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The Navy has seen a significant increase in the presence of mobile and smart 
devices on its units due to advancements in technology and younger sailors’ desire to be 
connected at all times. These devices create security threats due to their easily 
concealable size and their host of connectivity and image related features. The insider 
threat (intentional or not) now includes the ability to take photos, record conversations, 
share data wirelessly, and communicate official use and classified information, all more 
easily than ever before. 
Current enterprise solutions and associated policy does not address managing 
personal devices. In fact, management of personal devices is currently outside the 
Department of Defense (DOD) effort to control Personal Electronic Devices (PED) since 
the organization does not own the device and therefore has no way to mandate what must 
or must not be installed on them. The current path to a bring your own device (BYOD) 
policy is unclear. Security vulnerabilities with these devices have not been addressed in a 
uniform matter in policy or in practice. It is with these statements in mind that we address 
how to take the first steps in developing feasible management of personal devices on 
naval units and potentially throughout the DOD. 
In this thesis, we provide a thorough evaluation of National Institute for Standards 
and Technology, Defense Information Systems Agency, and DOD publications to 
provide a starting point for adapting current policy and to guide the development of our 
application. We then examine the feasibility of implementable software application 
solutions to hardware features that pose a threat to security. Specific research addresses 
why each hardware feature on a mobile device is a security concern, how it is controlled 
inside the Android Studio API, and how we utilize these controls to lockdown and then 
unlock said hardware features through a simple proof of concept Android application. 
Finally, we provide examples of how future work can grow our application into a 
security-manager controlled program to secure devices and find a path toward making 
BYOD a reality.  
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Naval platforms continue to have instances of individuals carrying unauthorized 
devices into restricted or secure spaces or using devices in ways that are not in line with 
naval regulations. Seeing a mobile device in spaces such as CIC or radio puts leadership 
in the difficult position of self-reporting the incident and handling the device. In addition 
to embarrassment to the command for having these instances occur, the presence of these 
devices presents an opportunity to maliciously photograph, record, or document data in a 
way that can be very difficult to detect. Even in instances without malintent this is a 
known violation of naval and Department of Defense (DOD) policy.  
The use of these devices is not going away. Sailors today report to their command 
with more devices than ever in the form of computers, tablets, and smart phones. As 
technology progresses it is important that the fear of a security incident does not restrict 
successful implementation of mobile devices where appropriate and possible. So far, the 
Navy has avoided setting a clear bring your own device (BYOD) policy. Instead, devices 
are prohibited in their entirety or mismanaged to an extent that the written guidance has 
little meaning. Written restriction continues to be ineffective in limiting individuals 
carrying mobile devices throughout the ship. For this reason, it is necessary to establish 
what would be required to lock down the vulnerable features of non-enterprise procured 
mobile devices. An examination of characteristics that increase the possibility for security 
incidents along with proposed mitigators is discussed. We create an Android application 
to demonstrate what settings on a phone can be manipulated to lock down high-risk 
features (including the camera, microphone, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, etc.).  
The application’s development is driven by information assurance requirements 
and known security concerns. Documentation exists within the Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA), across DOD organizations, and in the corporate world that 
outline security concerns associated with a mobile device’s presence. These is used to 
develop the application, ensuring policy recommendations associated with mobile 
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devices are implemented as possible. Additionally, examination of the current application 
marketplace and available tools as models are shown and referenced for a deeper 
application development. 
The developed application’s implementation must be simple and activation must 
be quick for the end users. With this in mind, the use of a Quick Response (QR) code and 
near field communication (NFC) technology is examined to activate the application, 
change security manager settings quickly, and implement a commander’s device policy 
on board a naval ship. The use of QR codes or NFC also presents the opportunity to 
update the settings on a phone as it moves throughout a ship. For example, the back half 
of a submarine would have completely different device permissions (essentially fully 
locked down) when compared to the front half where blue tooth and voice-recorded notes 
on a device might be acceptable. Flexibility of implementation is a principle concern. 
Further, in-depth policy evaluation is conducted alongside possibility of quickly 
adjusting the settings for so many end-user devices. Focusing on Android also allows 
access to data that will provide expected market reach for each operating system (OS) 
iteration based on the application’s development. After providing the code for 
implementation, pre-programmed NFC devices are used to study how easily settings are 
changed and how quickly a security manager can push updates for new policy settings in 
dynamic environments such as those on a warship. All of this provides a basis to begin 
using the devices in sailors’ possession in a manner that is acceptable for them and useful 
for the Navy. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Discussion of any BYOD policy will start with a commander asking how safe the 
device actually is. Defining what is meant by locking down a device, and how much can 
be controlled is the first step in setting the appropriate policy. Additionally, that 
definition must be compared with best security practices and current Navy policy to 
ensure that there is an acceptable level of comfort to security managers and commanding 
officers when implementing a mobile device policy. Clearly stating how device lockdown 
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is defined according to the Navy, so that these devices represent less of a threat, and how 
it can be implemented afloat and ashore is the first goal. 
The subsequent questions involve the device interaction themselves. Is the 
development of a basic mobile application with QR code or NFC interaction even 
possible for accessing those functions defined as dangerous in the lockdown definition? If 
so, what is an efficient example that can be implemented and expanded for Navy-wide 
use and if not, what recommendations can still be made for some form of BYOD 
implementation? With an application that is meeting the requirements, how are the 
various lockout and control features implemented and what form of data logging can be 
put into place in the future to ensure that users are not disabling the application on the 
end device? These questions will help establish the boundaries of an application and 
detail the areas that require further study and development. 
Finally, once the features that can be locked down have been identified and an 
application demonstrates implementation, will this meet the Navy’s and the DOD’s 
requirements for a secure device? If not, what is keeping it from being a fully secure 
device and what expectations of security have been increased on the end user device? 
Additional future work is discussed to fill any gaps and help this app grow in its utility. In 
the same section, we try to answer what future study areas might help in the utilization of 
sailors’ devices for Navy requirements. Additionally, we explore whether extra OS 
profiles be created or administrator apps be designed enabling sailors to access unsecure 
but official use only websites and databases or is the use of a personal device still too far 
off beyond simply limiting its features. 
The utilization of smart, mobile devices has already been implemented at an 
enterprise level. The defining of requirements and approval of devices is not a fast 
process. The DOD is getting better at provisioning smart devices and providing them 
with a means of security already installed and demonstrating implementation options.  
C. DEFINING THE STAKEHOLDERS 
The stakeholders for a BYOD enabling application can be broken into three 
categories with overlaps between them. Those are the end users, leadership at individual 
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commands, and the DOD/Navy as a whole. All of these have an interest in understanding 
smart usage of personal devices and avoidance of security incidents afloat. By 
investigating what the actual concerns associated with personal devices are and building 
software mitigations to lock down features, it may be possible to increase the sailors 
utilization of devices they already have while commanders get greater control over what 
can be running while on board. 
1. The Sailors and Their Devices 
Sailors are reporting to their command with more electronic devices than ever. 
The thought of having to exist in any environment without access to a mobile device is 
troublesome, as dependency on these devices had grown. Users now use smart devices to 
provide access to navigation while driving, data/educational content, entertainment, 
social media, and breaking news in addition to the traditional roles of phone calls and text 
messages (Figure 1).1 This dependence leads sailors to believe their device must always 
be on them so that they are always connected. Recent studies indicate that individuals 
that regularly rely on a smart device feel increased levels of anxiety when they do not 
have access to it.2 This creates a unique challenge for a Navy that is trying to keep 
official information from spilling out into the civilian world, reduce the number of 
security incidents on board a vessel, and still allow technology to have a place among our 
service members. 
It is the combination of avoiding security incidents and sailors wanting access to 
their devices that is the rub. Should mobile devices be taken away once sailors step across 
the brow of a ship or should they be allowed to roam any space where they are assigned 
with a mobile hard drive, camera, and microphone attached to their hip? Has a 
consideration been made about the possibility for inadvertent recording of the spaces by 
                                                
1 Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center 
2015),http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/.  
2 Nathan Hurst, “IPhone Separation Linked to Physiological Anxiety, Poor Cognitive Performance, 




taking photos, the microphone being turned on and recording a conversation, or any of 
that data being pushed automatically to the cloud once outside the skin of the ship?  
It is obvious that taking away or restricting cell phones would work to a degree, 
but as with secure facilities people would still accidentally carry them in. Additionally, 
service members’ need to feel connected and within reach of family members, which 
leads to an increased desire to have the phone on hand. PEW research indicates not just a 
growing reliance on smart phones and devices for quick access to data, but shows that 46 
percent of adults feel their cell phone is “something they can’t imagine living without” 
(Figure 2).3 A report from the same organization a year earlier has this sentiment 
attributed to 29 percent of the adult population.4 
As mobile device capability grows, individual dependence on these devices will 
also grow. The myriad of activities and ways to connect provide a sense of comfort and 
access to the online world. Sailors will report to commands with these devices, which 
represent an unleveraged technology for the DOD. This has been recognized by attempts 
to fit a BYOD future into the organization. The topic then shifts to one in which we have 
a personally procured device that is secure enough to be carried inside our warships, 
locks down those components that allow recording, and leaves the device useful enough 
to provide some service. Access to data exchange can and should enable our sailors to 
complete routine, unclassified tasks and training without having to wait on access to 
limited computers on board a warship. Proving which mobile device features can be 
locked down and demonstrating the methods for doing this is the first step in this process. 
                                                
3 Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015.  
4 Pew Research Center, “Mobile Technology Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, 2013, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/.  
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Figure 1.  American’s rely on the smart devices for more than phone calls 
 
The days of using a cell phone for a short message or phone call have long passed. 
American’s now use smart phones as a line to the outside world for coordination of 
events, social media, and even as a GPS. Source: Pew Research Center, “People Use 





Figure 2.  Every year more smartphone owners view their device as a 
necessity 
 
Public opinion on cellphones as a social distraction has shifted from viewing them as 
something nice to have to a device that is necessary and connects them to the outside 
world. They are viewed as a helpful tool for daily life. Source: Aaron Smith, U.S. 
Smartphone Use in 2015 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/. 
2. The Commander’s Policy and Implementations 
Leadership on the waterfront is left with a myriad of references to assist in setting 
policy aboard their vessels. Between DOD security manuals, DISA directives, and big 
Navy/CNO directives, ship commanders may receive instructions that leave too much 
room for interpretation or are unreasonably restrictive. This can be witnessed when 
communicating with sailors’ currently assigned to ships and listening to how their CO is 
handling PEDs on those individual units. The disparity is a significant indicator that, at 
the ship level, the Navy is not ready to implement anything that looks like a BYOD 
policy. 
In the submarine force, the range of limitations has swung wildly from allowing 
devices in certain portions of the boat to collecting and locking up all forms of PEDs. 
More recent policy has clearly outlined what is and is not allowed (Figure 3); however, as 
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manufacturers increase device capabilities, simple devices like e-readers or mp3 players 
may have the ability to record data.5 This may leave sailors on a short underway or even 
a whole deployment without access to readers, mp3 players, personal computers, etc. 
These were two different interpretations of the same policy. Commanders have tried to 
meet in the middle ground, restricting PEDs with certain capabilities from going into 
sections of their boat with FOUO or classified material. Photographs of reactor 
compartments and recordings of conversations create a risk of data being released 
regarding naval sub construction and layout or even capabilities and location. All of this 
is classified at a minimum secret level and may move into the top secret, compartmented 
access realm.  
                                                
5 “Portable Electronic Device Policy,” 2013, 
http://kitsap.navylifepnw.com/modules/media/?do=download&id=f08e4efe-a340-4cf6-8d80-c6c96e3f7e2e, 
10 (enclosure 2).  
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Figure 3.  A table pulled from a submarine force instruction showing what 
devices and capabilities are permitted inside the boat 
 
Source: “Portable Electronic Device Policy,” 2013, http://kitsap.navylifepnw.com/modules/
media/?do=download&id=f08e4efe-a340-4cf6-8d80-c6c96e3f7e2e, Enclosure 2, 10.  
In the surface fleet, the inconsistency is just as present but documentation is less 
specific. This is not the commander’s fault but is the result of trying to allow reasonable 
use while restricting the potential for a security violation. Some ships have set up use 
areas, much like smoking areas, which are topside and safe for sailors to go check 
messages, respond to family or take a break on their device. Other commanders have a 
zero use policy, much like what was described for submarines above. Still others have 
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written documents that are more traditional, just stating which spaces are not authorized 
for use of mobile devices. These spaces are usually radio, combat, some engineering 
spaces, or any other place where electronic classified information may be generated. This 
is a smart, liberal policy but does little for actual implementation. Sailors moving about 
the skin of the ship are eventually going to enter a location by mistake where they should 
not have their device. While this is a reportable security incident, the usual response is to 
leave the space quietly. 
If commanders had the ability to disable those portions of a smart phone or tablet 
that caused concern they could work with the boat’s security manager to establish a specific 
policy for which devices are allowed and how they must be configured. These devices would 
still not be allowed in DOD prohibited areas, but the devices would be set to nullify a 
security threat even before going inside a ship. An application that scans an input source and 
shuts down the camera, microphone, wireless data transfer methods, and any other write 
method, would provide a sense of security and control. Sailors running the application could 
easily show the device to leadership, who could spot check that the application is running and 
which hardware is disabled. If a security violation happens, it can be noted in the required 
report that the application was running and which pieces of hardware had been disabled. The 
days of writing loose policy that is poorly implemented or overly restrictive and that is 
burdensome on the sailor and leadership could be reduced significantly. 
3. The DOD Security Concern 
The Department of Defense wants to move towards utilizing devices that people 
already own for email, calendar, contacts, and limited access to encrypted data. There is no 
full solution at this time and the result has been enterprise procured devices that must be 
accounted for, distributed, and collected from users. In addition to creating another device for 
users to carry, these devices are generally a year or more behind current technology and are 
strapped to older hardware or operating systems and those vulnerabilities. DISA is 
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developing software solutions to access classified content on government procured devices 
and hopes to move this out to personally procured devices in the future.6  
For now, however, there is nothing in place for all of the mobile devices moving 
in and out of official, secure facilities that would limit the hardware from recording 
potentially harmful data. This is where a lockdown application has the potential to help 
manage the DODs movement towards a BYOD policy, give commanders the flexibility 
to control the hardware at the root level, and allow users to still have access to their 
devices in a more limited capacity while at work. 
D. A RECENT EXAMPLE OF A SECURITY INCIDENT 
In the last half of 2015, questions were being asked aboard USS Alexandria if 
unauthorized photos had been taken of sailors and spaces. The investigation eventually 
turned towards a specific sailor, MM1 Saucier, when his phone was found in a trash 
canister off the ship. After being questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
someone attempted to destroy other devices before discarding them in the woods near 
Saucier’s grandmother’s house. Retrieval of the data showed that photos had been taken 
of “Alexandria’s control panels, reactor compartment, and a monitor showing the sub’s 
exact location at the time of the photo.”7 
The articles do not state where the ship was operating or the nature of the 
underway period. What is important to note is that, had this device been locked down 
with an application that disabled photographic and audio recording capability at the root 
level, this user would have been much less likely to have had the opportunity to commit 
this act. The real goal of locking down a device is to provide proof that PEDs can have a 
place on a warship and can be controlled by the command as desired. However, in the 
                                                
6 Kim Rice, “DOD Mobility, Presentation,” Defense Systems Information Agency, June 17, 2015, 
http://www.disa.mil/~/media/Files/DISA/News/Conference/2015/Secure_MobilityRice.ashx.  
7 “Sailor Faces Charges after Photos of Navy Attack Sub Found on Cellphone,” Fox News, August 3, 
2015, accessed February 14, 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/08/02/sailor-faces-charges-
possessing-photos-navy-attack-sub-on-cellphone.html; David Larter, “Sailor Faces Charges for Submarine 




immediate future it also provides a method to simply reduce the propensity to 
accidentally or intentionally commit violations of security practices. Reducing this will 
increase the security of the ship and help limit the loss of ship-specific information. 
E. METHODS AND ORGANIZATION 
The following methods are used to evaluate the ability to address security 
concerns and implement an application that could help address them: 
• An examination of current Navy practices and policies with regards 
personal electronic devices (PEDs). 
• An analysis of programming packages for Android that provided 
flexibility and access to root level permissions. 
• Study of QR code uses and libraries, real world applicability, and utility in 
changing device settings using the camera as input. 
• Study of NFC devices and on-device receivers, real world applicability, 
and utility in changing device settings with the NFC receiver as input. 
• Investigation of which aspects of a phone capabilities cause the greatest 
concern for Navy and industry leadership with regard to security 
vulnerabilities associated with PEDs. 
Below is a list of thesis chapters and a summary of content: 
• Chapter II—Review of current literature for commercial mobile devices, 
and comparison of benefits to bring your own device (BYOD) policy 
changes. Discussion of how policy would allow and where BYOD could 
be effective if it is possible to implement. 
• Chapter III—Technical aspects of intended research are examined 
including Android architecture. Each input/output (IO) method is 
examined individually so that appropriate functions may be incorporated 
in the development of the application. The benefits of QR and NFC input 
are discussed and analyzed with respect to ease of implementation. 
• Chapter IV—Details of application development and implementation of 
desired functions and controls. Code samples for lock down methods 
settings changes using NFC are demonstrated. Testing and demonstration 
of the application and its implementation.  
• Chapter V—Future work including BYOD implementation in a larger 
environment with emphasis on Navy-wide use. Where BYOD can be 
implemented in a beneficial manner, and in which cases will it still cannot 
be and why. Defining the potential for application development that will 
minimize or assist in elimination of security incidents related with mobile 
devices.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The overall aim of research conducted is directed at developing a security 
application for use on mobile devices used by sailors throughout the Navy. Our approach 
to literature review is a two-part process. First, we attempt to gain as much knowledge as 
possible in overall policy and instruction currently in place throughout the United States 
government with respect to security and mobile devices, applications, and networking. 
Second, after gaining insight in to the policies and instructions that would ultimately 
govern the use of a mobile security application, we shift our focus to Android based 
literature as we commence development. Routine reviews of both areas are conducted to 
ensure that our research employed the most current and up to date information and 
tactics. This chapter discusses current policies and instructions, while Chapter III will 
address the Android-specific technical considerations. 
As mentioned above we direct the bulk of our early research efforts at thoroughly 
examining current and proposed policies and instructions governing technology. More 
specifically, we examine policy on how mobile devices are authorized for use, where 
they are authorized for use, and how our application development could allow greater use 
of personal electronic devices (PED) throughout the Navy enterprise. We take the 
approach of identifying each instruction and or policy and make a concerted effort to 
discuss how the contents of each relate to mobile application development. The intent is 
to provide insight into how development efforts and designs, as well as resulting products 
are affected by each policy or instruction. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The Department of Defense (DOD) offers the best high-level scope of instruction 
and regulation with respect to mobile device and application development. We find that 
the DOD instructions governing mobile devices address agency procured devices and 
policies for their security, with little guidance governing personal devices. While the 
DOD does address restrictions for personal mobile devices through bans on use and 
connectivity, there is little other than plans for future work with respect to personal 
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electronic device integration in the workforce. This naïve notion reflects the DOD’s 
narrow concern with agency procured devices that access, use, store, or manage DOD 
information, while ensuring that personal devices do not touch (directly or indirectly) 
department information or systems. We agree with most DOD literature regarding 
personal mobile devices when considering the effects of unsecured access to Department 
of Defense networks by personal mobile devices. For this reason we feel that personal 
mobile device security is an essential, and relatively unaddressed area of concern within 
the DOD. By addressing each applicable information technology instruction in the DOD, 
we identify areas for improvement or recommend inclusion of personal mobile devices 
and how our security application could positively impact their security.  
1. Department of Defense Commercial Mobile Device Implementation 
Plan 
The DOD Commercial Mobile Device (CMD) Implementation Plan addresses a 
number of issues with respect to use of mobile devices throughout the department. First 
and foremost, the plan identifies the growing end user dependence on mobile devices and 
the importance of maximizing the availability of mobile devices.8 The plan also identifies 
the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) as the DOD mobility program 
manager, and directs it to provide “secure classified and unclassified mobile 
communication capabilities to the DOD on a global basis.”9 As a direct result of this 
plan’s directive to create a mobile application store (MAS), DISA has created and 
currently manages the DOD MAS through user portal access10 (Figure 4). Another 
benefit of the plan is the creation of component MASs that provide tailored applications 
for services and are fully integrated and supported by the DOD MAS.11 
                                                
8 Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer, Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 
http://archive.defense.gov/news/DoDCMDImplementationPlan.pdf, 3–4.  
9 Ibid., 3–4.  
10 Defense Information Systems Agency, “DOD Mobility Applications,” accessed June 17, 2015, 
http://www.disa.mil/Enterprise-Services/Mobility/Apps.  
11 Department of Defense, Commercial Mobile Device Implementation Plan, 7.  
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Figure 4.  Component mobility pilots 
 
List of component and service pilot programs identified in the Department of Defense, Mobile Device 
Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 7.  
The aim of our application development is the submittal and approval of the app 
to Digital Sea Bag for use throughout the fleet. Furthermore, given the potential for 
securing mobile devices via our application, submittal to DISA’s MAS for approval and 
ultimate use would assist in advancing mobile implementation throughout the DOD 
enterprise. We further address the specifics of the development life cycle and how the 
government’s requirements for application development effect that life cycle in the DISA 
literature review.  
2. Department of Defense Interoperability of Information Technology, 
Including National Security Systems Instruction 8330.01 
The Department of Defense chief information officer seeks to improve 
interoperability of IT enterprise wide and thoroughly covers duties and responsibilities of 
each level of the Department of Defense in this instruction. To greater effect, 
DODI8330.01 provides a means for high level analysis of interoperability by 
“establishing a capability-focused, architecture-based approach for interoperability 
analysis.”12 DODI 8330.01 directs the director of DISA to “Aid the DOD Components 
                                                
12 Department of Defense, Interoperability of Information Technology (IT), Including National 
Security Systems (NSS) (DOD Instruction 8330.01) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 
https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-US/706841/file/77077/DoD%20-
%20Instruction,%20DoDI%208330.01,%20Interoperability%20of%20IT%20and%20NSS,%2021%20May
%202014.pdf, Enclosure 2, 11.  
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with developmental IT interoperability testing to deliver solutions, reduce duplication of 
effort, and enhance IT interoperability”.13 
We find that our efforts at mobile application development on a widely used and 
well-known operating system, namely Android, assist in providing joint interoperability 
by utilizing technology that is already in the hands of DOD personnel. Expanding 
application development to other operating systems such as iOS only furthers this effort.  
3. Department of Defense Cybersecurity Instruction 85000.01 
Applicable across the DOD enterprise, with the exception of DOD SCI special 
access programs, DODI 8500.01 provides overarching insight into the mission, roles, and 
responsibilities in DOD information systems. Of special note is the department wide 
transition from using the term “Information Assurance” (IA) to the term 
“Cybersecurity.”14 Moreover, DOD8500.01 cancels its earlier version titled DOD 
Information Assurance. This revision has driven the U.S. Navy CIO to expand the scope 
of instructional coverage from IA defined areas of concern, namely information and 
information systems, to cybersecurity defined areas of “computers, electronic 
communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and 
electronic communication, including information contained therein.”15 We feel that 
personal mobile devices reasonably fall within that scope or definition.  
DOD 8500.01 addresses the issue of mobile device security with respect to DOD 
procured devices:  
DOD Components will ensure new computer assets (e.g., tablet, 
smartphone, personal digital assistant, mobile phone) procured to support 
DOD will include a technical performance measurement (TPM) version 
                                                
13 Ibid.  
14 Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer [DOD CIO], Cybersecurity (DOD Instruction 
8500.01) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001_2014.pdf.  
15 Department of Navy, Chief Information Officer, “DOD Instructions Lead to Change in 
Cybersecurity Term,” Department of Navy Chief Information Officer, August 25, 
2014,http://www.doncio.navy.mil/ContentView.aspx?id=5431.  
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1.2 or higher where required by DISA STIGs and where such technology 
is available.16  
This is the sole reference to mobile device security however and it does not address 
personal devices used by DOD personnel. Given that this instruction replaces the DOD 
Information Assurance instruction (of the same number, 8500.01), and is written and 
designed in an attempt to bring the DOD up to speed with current technology, we find 
that it does not go far enough in realizing the true scope of personal mobile device 
security. An example is on page 43 of DOD 8500.01: “All IT that receives, processes, 
stores, displays, or transmits DOD information will be acquired, configured, operated, 
maintained, and disposed of consistent with applicable DOD cybersecurity policies, 
standards, and architectures.”17 The matter of DOD procured devices is addressed with 
respect to cybersecurity, but nothing is said about personal mobile devices. Given that 64 
percent of American adults currently have smartphones, and 90 percent and higher of 
those individuals use their smart devices for Internet, video, voice and text,18 the 
principle DOD instruction on cybersecurity should address security on these devices in a 
DOD environment. In an attempt to better equip DOD and Navy personnel to utilize their 
devices while at the same time secure them, we feel that applications like ours are 
essential and required to maintain enterprise wide security. 
4. Department of Defense Risk Management Framework for DOD 
Information Technology (DODI 8510.01)  
DODI 8510.01 provides “an integrated enterprise-wide decision structure for 
cybersecurity risk management.”19 As stated in previous sections of this chapter, any 
reasonable individual who has accessed the Internet via their mobile device would 
assume that personal mobile device security would fall into the definition of 
cybersecurity. This instruction lacks any direct reference to mobile devices, personal or 
                                                
16 DOD CIO, Cybersecurity.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015.  
19 Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer [DOD CIO], Risk Management Framework 
(RMF) for DOD Information Technology (IT) (DOD Instruction 8510.01) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2014).  
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enterprise procured, with respect to risk management. What this instruction does provide 
is an authority in the following phrase: “The cybersecurity requirements for DOD 
information technologies will be managed through the RMF consistent with the 
principals established in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special 
Publication (SP) 800–37.”20 Further discussion on NIST is reserved for that section of the 
literature review, but worth noting is the intra-agency collaboration (DOD specifically) 
found within NIST guidance. We have found that the majority of DOD’s directives either 
directly or indirectly refer to NIST guidance based on the authorities found herein.  
5. DOD Chief Information Officer Memo of 17 February 2012, 
Optimizing Use of Employee Information Technology Devices and 
Other IT to Achieve Efficiencies 
Initially, and by title, this memo from the DODCIO showed promise by directing 
optimization of the department through the use of employee information technology. 
Upon further investigation however, this memo is concerned with optimizing the use of 
issued technology by eliminating redundancies in issued IT equipment. Solutions offered 
include offering kiosks for group in cases where individual employees do not require 
routine and regular use.21 This instruction helps to emphasize what we address major 
faults in enterprise solutions by discussing acquisitions’ deliberate and burdensome 
processes, cost and budget issues, and redundant technologies.22 There is no mention of 
the use of personal mobile devices in this memo. We add this memo to this literature 
review to demonstrate how seemingly applicable documentation within the DOD was 
often found to contain no guidance for personal mobile devices, and point out further 
how memos like these convolute a security professional’s ability to find guidance and 
make decisions for protection of systems.  
                                                
20 Ibid.  
21 Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer, Optimizing Use of Employee Information 
Technology (IT) Devices and Other IT to Achieve Efficiencies [memorandum] (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense 2012).  
22 Ibid.  
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B. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
Of all the departments’ and agencies’ instructional guidance, the Department of 
the Navy (DON) has the least technical coverage of mobile devices. Most importantly 
however is the overall lack of DON guidance on securing mobile device technology. 
Today more than ever in the past, sailors and marines utilize modern technology in their 
daily lives, including at-work and in-work spaces. One only needs to be underway on a 
U.S. Navy vessel for a day to realize how integrated mobile technology is in our sailors’ 
lives. Without direct guidance from the DON Chief Information Officer (DONCIO) with 
up-to-date technology coverage, the future of mobile security will be limited at best. 
1. Department of the Navy Enterprise Mobility 2008  
DON Enterprise Mobility 2008 shapes the need for mobility in the phrase “The 
end state capability to realize this vision will utilize ‘smart’ devices in the field….”23 As 
an end state, this document delivers the vision for utilizing commercially available 
mobile devices. Recognizing the need for wireless solutions for sailors and marines, the 
document states, “The DON looks to a variety of commercially available wireless 
products to meet much of its enterprise mobility needs.”24 These goals are however 
limited to the scope of enterprise solutions, whereby mobility is encapsulated by the 
delivery mechanism of agency procured devices. The limited scope of the DONCIO 
vision is completely captured in this section of DONCIO Enterprise Mobility 2008. 
As technology convergence drives more power and functionality into 
smaller and smaller devices, such as smart phones, they become 
increasingly important in delivering enterprise mobility. Using 
commercial wireless products also enables standardization and 
interoperability across the Enterprise. 
First, the desire for enterprise solutions limits the Navy to acquisitions 
requirements and budgetary constraints, similar to procuring any other part or component 
in the military. This results in significant lag time between available technology and the 
                                                
23 Department of Defense, Chief Information Officer, Enterprise Mobility 2008 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, 2008).  
24 Ibid.  
 20 
ability of the Navy to use it placing the department in a position where technology is 
outdated before it is acquired. Second, the aim of standardization of devices places the 
Navy in a position of choosing one device, or set of devices over another. This adds 
processes by inserting a procurement cycle, whereby testing, contracting, and budgets 
again take precedent over technology advancement and utilizing those devices that are 
already in most sailors’ possession.  
We seek to build a security application that begins to meet the vision of this 
document, while avoiding the burden of enterprise solutions with standardized devices. 
By developing an application to address security issues on mobile devices, technology 
continues to evolve without the Navy having to choose or invest device by device. 
Rather, the Navy invests in keeping this and potentially other applications up to date and 
as functional on as many devices as possible. The choice and cost of devices is then put 
in the hands of the sailor, and outside of current DON and DOD procurement processes. 
2. Department of Navy (Plan for Optimizing Use of Employee 
Information Technology Devices and Other IT to Achieve Efficiencies 
This memo issued by the DONCIO is the Navy’s response to DODCIO’s request 
for employee optimization of IT resources. As in the DOD issued memo, this memo 
focuses primarily on enterprise IT equipment such as government issued phones, laptops 
and tablets. By using enterprise solutions for the Navy’s IT needs, whereby the 
government procures the requisite devices, the Navy is put in the position of having to 
not only buy, but also track and optimize the use of said devices. The level of effort 
required in such an endeavor is captured in the following phrase: “The DON has 
deployed tools that enable commands to track zero-use devices, minute optimization, air 
card costs, and roaming costs down to the individual level.” Any reasonable individual 
could safely assume that several man hours would be spent in tracking and managing 
government issued IT. While we do not propose that our security application will solve 
all the efficiency issues designated in this or the associated DOD memo, putting mobility 
costs in the hands of the user will offer greater optimization over bureaucratic agency 
solutions. This is achieved through use of a personal mobile device with Navy issued 
applications, including our security application, whereby the user determines the when, 
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where, and how, including which carrier they utilize, the amount of data they use, and 
pay for such services themselves.  
3. DON Security Guidance for Personal Electronic Devices (DON CIO 
Message DTG: 202041Z AUG 07) and Subsequent Amplifications 
This message contains DON guidance for the use of personal electronic devices 
(PED), one of the early terms used to describe mobile devices in the last half of the 2010. 
While still in use today, the term personal electronic devices usually applies to 
government procured and issued devices, as opposed to personally owned devices.  
This message does detail some very important requirements for accessing DOD 
networks and more specifically DON email and associated accounts. As with many of the 
sources and guidance we have encountered in our literature review, this instruction is 
focused mainly with PED’s that are procured through the government. Furthermore, this 
message provides what would be useful guidance for personally procured devices (bring 
your own device [BYOD]), such as “all PEDS must be capable of supporting digital 
signature and encryption (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)) 
functionality.”25 This example S/MIME guidance does make its way into more recent 
documentation, especially throughout the NIST literature, but has not been updated to the 
specifications found in said NIST guidance. 
Given that the date of this message places it in 2007, one could safely assume that 
the Navy at the time of writing was not yet fully aware of the relative technology 
explosion that has put personal electronic devices in the hands of many of its sailors. Just 
two percent of American cell phone subscribers owned a smartphone in 2005, and 
according to Business Insider, in 2007 global smartphone ownership was only three 
percent.26 Interestingly enough, there has not been amplification or additional guidance to 
this instruction that should include today’s technology and how it should access 
                                                
25 Department of the Navy, Chief Information Officer [DON CIO], DON Security Guidance for 
Personal Electronic Devices (202041Z AUG 07) (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2007), 
http://www.doncio.navy.mil/uploads/0128BAA54339.pdf.  
26 Cathy De Rosa et al., Perceptions of Libraries, 2010, Context and Community (Dublin OH: Online 
Computer Library Center, 2010); John Heggestuen, “One in Every 5 People in the World Own a 
Smartphone, One in Every 17 Own a Tablet” Business Insider, December 15, 2013, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/smartphone-and-tablet-penetration-2013-10.  
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government networks. As it stands, this message series has amplification in 2009, stating, 
“PEDS operating without an associated smart card reader shall be disconnected on 31 
December 2009.”27 This provides a framework for personnel to use their PED to access 
government networks, and given the somewhat recent procurement of mobile device 
CAC card readers by the DOD, there is relevance in such guidance.28 Worth noting is 
that this access does come at an expense, where readers can cost anywhere between $99 
and $369 making agency wide procurement or personal purchase costly.29 
According to this naval message, “all PED interconnections must be made using a 
designated accrediting authority (DAA) approved device through either a physical 
connection or a secured Bluetooth communications link.”30 This is especially important 
today as multiple mobile games now support linking through Bluetooth, and anyone who 
has been underway on a U.S. navy vessel can find sailors utilizing Bluetooth linking of 
devices. This is an important area to address in our mobile application, as data could 
theoretically be shared between two Bluetooth devices, one inside, and one outside a 
secure area up to 100m apart.31 While future implementations of our application could 
include specific Bluetooth connection block types (i.e., device to device), at the current 
stage of development we simply lockout all access to Bluetooth (discussed further in 
Chapter IV). 
C. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY  
From its founding in 1901, NIST has been the source of information and 
standards in the United States. For example, the more technical, original aspects for 
                                                
27 Department of the Navy, Chief Information Officer, Amplification Guidance for Purchase and 
Installation of Personal Electronic Device Smart Card Readers (281919Z JAN 09), (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, 2007).  
28 “Tactivo Order from US Department of Defense,” Precise Biometrics, December 17, 2014, 
http://precisebiometrics.com/news/2014/12/tactivo-order-us-department-defense/.  
29 Michael J. Danberry, “MilitaryCAC’s Information on Using Your CAC with Your Mobile Device 
including AKO Email,” ’January 13, 2016, https://militarycac.com/mobile.htm.  
30 DON CIO, DON Security Guidance for Personal Electronic Devices.  
31 Joshua Wright, “Dispelling Common Bluetooth Misconceptions,” Security Laboratory: Wireless 
Security, September 19, 2007, http://www.sans.edu/research/security-laboratory/article/bluetooth. 
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electricity were managed and promulgated through NIST.32 Today, many departments 
rely on the standards set forth by NIST, including the DOD. The vast majority of DOD 
and DON publications regarding technology either reference NIST standards or take 
standards directly from their publications. With 399 publications on computer security, 
and 712 documents related to information technology, the NIST provides a wealth of 
guidance on practices, policies, and procedures related to technology. Important to the 
reader is that NIST not only uses its own staff for research but also draws on industry 
experience from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Department of Defense (DOD), Committee 
on National Security Systems (CNSS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and various corporations with extensive industry 
participation in NIST’s guidance delivery undertakings. For the purpose of this research, 
we focus on NIST standards relate to mobility, mobile applications, mobile security, and 
mobile device utilization, and recognize it as the foremost authority on mobile device 
guidance based on breadth and depth of coverage in the area of concern. 
The NIST typically publishes special bulletins related to overarching topics and 
guidance in broad categories of interest. It also issues bulletins that update or amplify 
information for an associated special publication. This is essential to our research as the 
majority of the special publications we accessed had amplifying guidance set forth in a 
follow on bulletin.  
1. NIST SP 800–53 Revision 4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal 
Information Systems and Organizations (SP 800–53r4) 
This publication ties the authorities and requirements established at the highest 
levels of government through the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA) and the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) to specific security 
requirements for use within each agency of the government. More specifically this 
instruction provides “guidelines for selecting and specifying security controls for 
organizations and information systems supporting the executive agencies of the federal 
                                                
32 National Institute of Standards and Technology, “The Story of NIST,” National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, last updated February 24, 2014, http://www.nist.gov/timeline.cfm.  
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government to meet the requirements of FIPS Publication 200, Minimum Security 
Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems.”33 The security controls 
discussed in this document provide the base level of our first problem statement whereby 
we seek to determine what we need to do via our application to secure a mobile device.  
As discussed in the introduction to the NIST, collaboration is an important part of 
the guidance they provide. This is clear in the list of SP-800-53r4 contributors that 
includes “NIST, the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and the 
Committee on National Security Systems as part of the Joint Task Force, an interagency 
partnership formed in 2009.”34 NIST here includes private sector experts from top 
industry partners such as Mitre, Booz Allen Hamilton and Johns Hopkins APL. The DOD 
collaborators include its Chief Information Officer and his technical directors, including 
cybersecurity. The intelligence community provides its inputs from its director (DNI), via 
the national intelligence chief information officer, and the intelligence community 
security risk manager. We point this out and list its principal partners because based on 
our research, SP 800–53r4 has the broadest and highest ranking group of technical 
security professionals of any of the documents we reviewed. Based on this collective 
expertise, we recognize this document as the baseline document for security within 
information systems (IS) including mobile devices. 
We find our first standard definition of a mobile device in this instruction. While 
we later discuss a more thorough definition in a later NIST publication, this one certainly 
gave us the highest level technical attempt at defining mobile devices. SP 800–53r4 gives 
a four plus definition whereby devices are broadly identified across four areas, plus 
additional possible quantifiers. The first trait identified by this publication is that the 
device “has a small form factor such that it can easily be carried by a single individual”35 
Simple and strait forward, by this trait laptops, smart phones, tablets, apply. Second, the 
device “is designed to operate without a physical connection (e.g., wirelessly transmit or 
                                                
33 Department of Commerce, and National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security and 
Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (SP800-53r4), rev. 4 (Gaithersburg, 
MD: U.S. Department of Commerce, and National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2013).  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
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receive information)”36 Here is the notion of mobility. While essential to the definition of 
a mobile device, we find this property too vague, and better defined in other NIST 
publications discussed later in this chapter. Third, the device must “possess local, non-
removable or removable data storage.” This portion of the definition is generally applied 
throughout the majority of the literature we found that references or attempts to define 
mobile devices. The notion of mobile data storage created serious security concerns for 
the Navy resulting in complete bans on USB thumb drives and other removable media on 
its networks.37 Technically speaking introduction of malware through removable media is 
a valid and effective attack vector for malicious behavior in business, government and 
personal computing. Fourth, the device “includes a self-contained power source.”38 This 
part of the definition does not play a major role in the overall mobile device specification 
other than to point out that the device has a life cycle where it can operate independent of 
power. This differentiates a mobile device from the USB drive or CD, which require 
power provisioning. The additional features covered in the “four plus” definition include 
some of the most important mobile features especially from a security standpoint. Among 
those is the onboard sensors and/or built in local and remote data synchronization.39 
Finally, SP 800–53r4 provides its clearest description of mobile devices through its 
examples that include “smart phones, tablets, and E-readers.”40 
The purpose of this instruction is to provide a security control framework to allow 
federal organizations to effectively and as completely as possible implement security 
controls over technology in the workplace. To accomplish this SP 800–53r4 provides 
control recommendations and selection criteria for those recommendations. SP 800–53r4 
then breaks those categories into eighteen families (Figure 5).41 In the broadest sense 
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39 Ibid.  
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41 Ibid.  
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possible we address those controls that NIST associates with mobile devices and attempt 
to explain how those controls govern the use of mobile devices and how our application 
might provide the recommended control. With respect to the applicable mobile device 
controls, we found the following five controls addressing mobile devices. 
Figure 5.  Security control identifiers and family names 
 
Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security and Privacy Controls 
for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (SP 800–53r4), 2013, 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf, 9.   
AC 19 provides direct guidance with respect to mobile devices and access control. 
The most definitive statement in this control section states that the organization 
“establishes usage restrictions, configuration requirements, connection requirements, and 
implementation guidance for organization-controlled mobile devices.”42 While directed 
at organization controlled devices (read enterprise), we feel that this control applies to 
personally owned mobile devices, and that our application could be used to provide and 
enforce usage restrictions, and configuration management. The control amplification 
section gives further guidance on what implementation of this control is acceptable as 
follows: “configuration management, device identification and authentication, 
implementation of mandatory protective software.”43 Our application could be used to 
identify users in a database implementation that associates users to devices (discussed 
further in Chapter V), and could be classified as protective software. Another key feature 
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that we address in our application’s current configuration is “disabling unnecessary 
hardware (e.g., wireless).”44  
This control method further recommends, “unclassified mobile devices and the 
information stored on those devices are subject to random reviews and inspections and if 
classified information is found, the incident handling policy is followed.” We feel that by 
offering full lockdown on our application and implementing that at access points to areas 
where secure information exists, we significantly reduce the need for intrusive searches 
of personal property by restricting the ability for the information to get on the device. 
Furthermore, with the current display that shows the state of connectivity related features 
on the device, security checks could be accomplished by viewing the display to ensure 
proper controls for the applicable space are implemented, and if a user is found in 
violation of the required setting, said inspections of their device could then be completed.  
(1) AC-20 Use of External Information Systems 
The control statement in Access Control (AC) 20 gives guidance on “the use of 
non-organizationally owned information systems, system components, or devices to 
process, store, or transmit organizational information.”45 AC-20 defines personal mobile 
devices as independent information systems. In the “Additional Control 
Recommendations” AC-20 lists four restrictions related to the use of non-organizational 
information systems (including personal devices), three of which are directly applicable 
to our research. The first recommendation relates directly to our application by calling for 
the “implementation of organization-approved security controls prior to authorizing such 
connections.”46 Our application could be one of the Navy security controls that users are 
required to install under the authority of this instruction. The second restriction 
recommendation states that an organization can “limit access to certain types of 
information, services, or applications.” We interpret this as authority to lock out access to 
features on mobile devices, exactly how our application locks out Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 
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Camera, Data etc. The third restriction does not directly apply to the current 
implementation of our application as it discusses virtualization and storage on servers.47 
The fourth recommended restriction provides the authority for users to utilize their device 
in the workplace by requiring the them to “agree to terms and conditions for usage.”48 
(2) CA-9 Internal System Connections 
Security Access and Assessment (CA) provides the authority to approve or deny 
network access by clearly defining the type of connection, either for individual 
connections or connection groups. The control implemented by this instruction calls for 
the documentation of each connection (or group of connections), the interface 
characteristics, and the security requirements for use of that connection or interface, and 
the information travelling by means of that connection or interface.49 Our application 
directly supports this control by specifically restricting access to connection interfaces. 
An example of this control in use could include identifying smart phones as a connection 
group, and require that Wi-Fi be secured while onboard the ship.  
One additional security control provided by CA-9 is the notion that “smart phones 
be configured with a specific baseline configuration.”50 This baseline configuration could 
require that our application be installed, and furthermore the application could be 
modified to verify a baseline configuration upon installation. 
(3) SC-42 Sensor Capability and Data 
System and Communication Protection (SC) 42 speaks directly to the use of 
mobile devices, and covers access to sensors that process, transmit or are activated by 
environmental data. An example provided by SC-42 is GPS. The control provides for the 
restriction or complete prohibition of access to such features, and points to the threat of 
covert activation and collection by an adversary.51 The example provided by SC-42 is 
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something that we tried to convey to the crew of the ships we were on whereby an 
adversary “remotely activates the GPS function on a mobile device and gains the ability 
to track the specific movements of an individual” or unit.52 
(4) MP-7 Media Use 
Media Protection (MP) 7 provides for restriction or prohibition of devices with 
information storage capability. Two important recommendations are made in this control, 
specifically organizational restriction on the type of device authorized for use such as 
personally owned devices, and disabling or removing capability to write to the device.53 
Anyone who has been underway on a U.S. Navy vessel has seen implementation of the 
first restriction, as mobile devices are normally restricted from use in any space with 
classified information. This restriction results in many of the issues discussed in Chapter 
I, whereby verification and reporting of personnel with mobile devices in secure spaces is 
a heavy burden and lacking universal application on the rule. The second 
recommendation is more aptly served by our application and approach, as in future 
implementations of our application, we could prohibit device access to onboard storage. 
Upon activation of lockdown via NFC swipe, the device would be locked out of write 
capability. This and other work is discussed further in Chapter V.  
2. Special Publication 800–124 Revision 1 Guidelines for Managing the 
Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise 
As we seek to provide a security application for the Navy to utilize in secure 
mobile devices, we sought out a definition for mobile device that would encapsulate the 
vast majority of the devices we seek to secure, while at the same time drawing a distinct 
line between a mobile device and the more traditional laptop or desktop computer. For 
the purposes of our research we find that NIST SP 800–124 provides a concrete 
definition of “mobile device” providing the proper scope of interoperability and 
definitive characteristics. Furthermore, many of the characteristics listed therein are the 
very characteristics we seek to lock out as they are potentially significant security threats. 
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While basic considerations will be covered in this chapter, the specifics of why these 
features are considered a threat to security will be covered in Chapter III, technical 
aspects of research, and where explanations are given instructionally. SP 800–124 defines 
the mobile device in the following list (Figure 6): 
Figure 6.  NIST SP 800–124 mobile device characteristics 
 
Source: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security and Privacy Controls. 
A comprehensive and efficient list of characteristics defining mobile devices. 
NIST SP 800–124 goes further with features it describes as “optional.” SP 800–
124r1 does identify these features as “particularly important in terms of security risk.”54 
In the case of our research, and especially as far as the Navy is concerned, we feel that 
these additional features should be included as primary in any future instructional 
guidance that governs mobile devices. The additional features that NIST SP 800–124 lists 
are (1) network services, (2) presence of camera and or video recording component, (3) 
microphone, and (4) storage. As it pertains to our research, the SP800-124 additional 
features are what we would in fact find to be vital features, as they are the very features 
we seek to lock out with our application. While some features discussed below are not 
present in every single smart phone or tablet, including them as universal features for 
lockdown will provide the greatest breadth of coverage in preventing access to mobile 
device features.  
                                                
54 Murugiah Souppaya, and Karen Kent, Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in 
the Enterprise (SP800-124r1) rev 1 (Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2013). 
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(1) Network Services 
SP 800–124r1 lists Bluetooth and NFC in the optional characteristics. As far as 
our research is concerned, both of these features offer the potential to pass information 
from one device to another and should be controlled and lockable. Another feature listed 
in the optional network services section is one or more wireless network interfaces for 
voice communication such as cellular.55 We find that these features are also essential for 
our definition of mobile device, and further identify these features as ones that we seek to 
lock out with our application. Voice communication and other form of communication 
with or attempts to communicate via cell phone towers are features that could pose a 
threat to security. Finally, Global Positioning Systems that enable location services 
considered optional in SP 800–124r1 are for the purposes of our research considered a 
security threat. 
(2) Digital Camera or Video Recording Device 
Considering that anyone purchasing a phone or tablet would have reasonable 
difficulty finding a device without a camera onboard, we find that this feature is 
absolutely essential to the definition of a mobile device (with the exception of some e-
readers). A search for tablet on Google and Amazon does not allow the search including 
an option for “no camera,” rather only allows specification of the resolution. It is easy to 
understand why the military would want to limit, if not completely lock out, access to a 
camera given the level of security and classification of the material in the areas where a 
mobile device might be present. For this reason, and the aforementioned prevalence of 
cameras in mobile devices, we feel that further instructional guidance should include the 
feature as one of the definitive features rather than optional. 
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(3) Microphone 
In similar fashion to the camera feature, microphones are extensively prevalent in 
the mobile device market. They are fundamental to the operation of the communication 
aspect of the devices. The use of applications such as Facetime, Skype and Google+ 
allows users to communicate via video using their onboard cameras and microphones. 
Where one is present, one can generally assume the other does as well. The microphone 
is different, however, in that its use in a secure space can be more covert since the device 
could be inside an individual’s pocket, purse, or backpack, and be actively recording 
audio. Considering that a clandestine recording like this occurring in a sensitive or highly 
classified space could be detrimental to the confidentiality of the material discussed, we 
consider this feature vital to the definition of a mobile device. 
(4) Storage 
Non-removal data storage is included in the baseline definition of NIST SP 800–
124r1, but support for removable media and support for the device itself functioning as 
removable storage for another computing device is not. Rather, the last two features are 
listed as optional. The Navy currently does not allow the use of removable media due to 
the security threat it poses on its networks.56 Extensive policies are in place throughout 
the fleet and shore commands prohibiting users from inserting a personal storage device 
into any official navy computing device.57 For this purpose we do not address this feature 
in our application, rather we attempt to prevent the use of any feature that creates data 
(such as the image file created using the camera, or the voice file created using the 
microphone) thereby preventing storage of potential threat creating application data. 
(5) Synchronization of Local Data with a Different Location 
The vast majority of personal mobile devices used at sea on naval vessels are used 
for reading, studying, gaming, listening to music, and movie viewing. This is not an all-
inclusive list of potential activities, but certainly captures the bulk of the uses for mobile 
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devices on Navy vessels. Given that every activity listed has local data that is stored on 
the device, and requires communication to access existing libraries stored in the cloud 
and new purchases, we feel that this is another essential base line characteristic for an 
accurate mobile device definition.  
One of the initial assumptions in our research is the notion that everyone’s device 
is unsecured. NIST SP 800–124r1 supports this and states, “Many mobile devices, 
particularly those that are personally owned (bring your own device, BYOD), are not 
necessarily trustworthy.”58 Furthermore, NIST SP 800–124r1 clarifies, “There is frequent 
jail-breaking and rooting of mobile devices, which means that the built-in restrictions on 
security, operating system use, etc., have been bypassed.”59 The notion of rooted devices 
would frighten any reasonable individual in a security role where mobile devices are 
present, as security controls are easily removed. We therefore recommend that rooted 
devices be prohibited as part of policy restrictions for use on DOD and DON networks. 
Again, this instruction provides commentary on device security as it states, 
“Organizations should assume that all mobile devices are untrusted unless the 
organization has properly secured them and monitors their security continuously while in 
use with enterprise applications or data.” We believe this requirement is partially 
accomplished by securing the device with our application and providing an on screen 
presentation of device feature status. Additionally, we propose future work discussed in 
Chapter V for continuous monitoring solutions that could enable manager notification in 
the event that our mobile application was altered or in cases where attempts were made to 
deactivate its functionality. 
The common approach used by most secure areas in the Navy is to prohibit device 
presence inside the area. NIST SP 800–124r1 states exactly that in discussing options for 
bring your own device (BYOD): “One option is to restrict or prohibit use of BYOD 
devices, thus favoring organization-issued devices.”60 This is the very heart of our 
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research as we seek to open the organization up to the use of personal devices by securing 
features that pose risks to security through our application. By controlling a device’s 
access to features such as the camera, data transfer, Bluetooth and WiFi, the device is 
placed in a controlled state that prevents the user from transmitting harmful code or 
documenting classified material. This is an option discussed in NIST SP 800–124r1. The 
obvious difference is that we seek to use an individual’s personal device as opposed to a 
device issues by an organization. As Souppaya, and Kent describe, “Another effective 
technique is to fully secure each organization-issued mobile device; this gets the mobile 
device in as trusted a state as possible, and deviations from this secure state can be 
monitored and addressed.”61 We believe we can put a personal mobile device in a secure 
state as discussed early by controlling its features that pose a security threat. The final 
option offered by NISP SP 800 124r1 is as follows: “There are also technical solutions 
for achieving degrees of trust in BYOD devices, such as running the organization’s 
software in a secure, isolated sandbox/secure container on the mobile device, or using 
device integrity scanning applications.”62 This is an option we discuss in Chapter IV, as 
partitioning a device and initiating a separate managed administration profile by NFC is 
possible. In fact, this offers the benefit of the Navy authorizing specific applications for 
use within the managed profile.  
In the following statement, NIST SP 800–124r1 points at a lack of central 
management and the resulting requirement for manual and individual management: “If 
there is not a centralized management solution, or certain mobile devices cannot use it, 
then mobile devices have to be managed individually and manually.”63 This is a common 
belief among mobile security instructions. We disagree on both points made in this 
phrase, as we seek to minimize central management by allowing the application to 
control access to features that represent security threats, and at the same time eliminate 
the need for individual or manual management, by having the application installed on all 
devices that will be brought on the ship when an individual checks in to the command.  
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In its observation that “it may not be possible to manage the security of the device 
when it is not physically present within the enterprise.” NIST SP 800–124r1 misses a 
control opportunity by ignoring the presence of a mobile application that resides on the 
device, and is initiated upon accessing the enterprise. The technical aspects of how this 
works in our application are covered more thoroughly in Chapter IV, but for sake of 
discussion, an application that launches and closes upon entry and exit to DOD areas 
respectively offers a wealth of upgradability and configurability by its very nature. With 
the advent of near field communication (NFC) and the ability to program tags that launch 
the application, updates can be pushed to the application upon initiation. 
One of the most important parts of the publication is the general policy guidance 
with respect security on mobile devices within the enterprise. Our application meets 
several of these recommendations directly and eliminates the need for those remaining. 
For the sake of clarity, in Table 1, we list each recommendation and how we answer the 
recommendation with our application, through future work potential, or list as not 
applicable due to application control of the feature. 
Table 1.   NIST SP 800–124r1 recommendations correlated to the features of 
our application 
NIST SP 800–124r1 Recommendation Research and Comments Related to 
NIST Requirement 
GENERAL  
Restrict user and application access to 
hardware. 
Our application takes control of device 
hardware and locks out access to it while 
the application is running 
Restrict user and application access to 
native OS services, such as the built-in web 
browser, email client, calendaring, 
contacts, application installation services, 
etc. 
Future work could lockdown each 
application individually. Web browsing 
and email are both controllable via device 
policy administration. All remaining 
applications could be controlled via 
broadcast receivers or direct API lockout. 
Manage wireless network interfaces (Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth, etc.) 
 
Our application directly restricts access to 
WiFi and Bluetooth 
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NIST SP 800–124r1 Recommendation Research and Comments Related to 
NIST Requirement 
Automatically monitor, detect, and report 
when policy violations occur, such as 
changes from the approved security 
configuration baseline, and automatically 
take action when possible and appropriate 
Alarms and notifications to security 
managers could be built into future 
implementations of our application. 
Limit or prevent access to enterprise 
services based on the mobile device’s 
operating system version (including 
whether the device has been rooted/
jailbroken), vendor/brand, model, or 
mobile device management software client 
version (if applicable). Note that this 
information may be spoofable. 
Enterprise services such as access to 
command networks is currently controlled 
by IT infrastructures Navy wide. Future 
access could be contingent upon 
verification of application installation and 
operation, but this is not an issue on a 
personal device until this access is made 
available by DOD. 
DATA COMMUNICATION AND 
STORAGE 
 
Strongly encrypt data communications 
between the mobile device and the 
organization 
Encryption of communications is an 
optional feature for future development 
discussed in Chapter V, but Android 
provides default onboard encryption. 
Strongly encrypt stored data on both built-
in storage and removable media storage. 
Restricting access to onboard and 
removable storage while in lock down is an 
area of future research identified in Chapter 
V, but Android provides default onboard 
encryption and it is an optional feature for 
removable media. 
Wipe the device (to scrub its stored data) 
before reissuing it to another user, retiring 
the device, etc. 
Not applicable to BYOD. 
Remotely wipe the device (to scrub its 
stored data) if it is suspected that the device 
has been lost, stolen, or otherwise fallen 
into untrusted hands and is at risk of having 
its data recovered by an untrusted party. 
This is an option in the Android OS and the 
recommendation should be to have it 
turned on for users. This could be 
addressed with training and device security 
policy. 
A device often can also be configured to 
wipe itself after a certain number of 
incorrect authentication attempts. 
See comment above. 




NIST SP 800–124r1 Recommendation Research and Comments Related to 
NIST Requirement 
Require a device password/passcode and/or 
other authentication (e.g., token-based 
authentication, network-based device 
authentication, domain authentication) 
before accessing the organization’s 
resources. 
Access to command networks is controlled 
by local instruction and according to Navy 
guidance. These accesses currently require 
login and authentication. 
If device account lockout is enabled or the 
device password/passcode is forgotten, an 
administrator can reset this remotely to 
restore access to the device. 
As our application is locked and unlocked 
via NFC, in the case where neither happens 
as designed, a master NFC tag can be 
encoded to always lock/unlock all app 
features. 
Have the device automatically lock itself 
after it is idle for a period (e.g., 5 minutes). 
Typically OS specific, but it is a feature 
and best practice for Android. This could 
be addressed with training and device 
security policy. 
Under the direction of an administrator, 
remotely lock the device if it is suspected 
that the device has been left in an unlocked 
state in an unsecured location. 
This remote feature is available in Android 
and provides users a way to lock their lost/
misplaced device.  
 
APPLICATIONS  
Restrict which app stores may be used When in locked status, or on an authorized 
command network, screening of websites 
or stores accessible would be controlled 
locally according to Navy instructions on 
approved wed sites. Additionally, policy 
and training should recommend/prohibit 
access to third party application stores. 
Restrict which applications may be 
installed through whitelisting or 
blacklisting 
Not addressed by our application. 
Restrict the permissions (e.g., camera 
access, location access) assigned to each 
application. 
Our application fully locks out access to 
network features, thereby removing each 
application’s access to that feature. 
Install, update, and remove applications. 
Safeguard the mechanisms used to perform 
these actions. Keep a current inventory of 
all applications installed on each device. 
By locking out access to features at the 
device level, other applications are unable 
to access them, thereby removing the risk 
of malicious application actions (such as 
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NIST SP 800–124r1 Recommendation Research and Comments Related to 
NIST Requirement 
opening a microphone in the background). 
Restrict the use of operating system and 
application synchronization services (e.g., 
local device synchronization, remote 
synchronization services and websites). 
Not addressed in the current 
implementation of our application but 
possible in future work. 
Verify digital signatures on applications to 
ensure that only applications from trusted 
entities are installed on the device and that 
code has not been modified. 
Not addressed by our application and not 
required. However, as capabilities open as 
discussed in Chapter V, this would be a 
consideration for authentication. 
Distribute the organization’s applications 
from a dedicated mobile application store. 
DISA currently maintains at DOD 
application store, as does the Navy through 
Navy Seabag. Our aim is to have a future 
version of our application included and 
available through these stores.  
Adapted from National Institute for Standards and Technology, Guidelines for Managing the Security 
of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise (SP800-124), rev 1 (Washington, DC: NIST, 2013).  
3. The Information Technology Laboratory at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology ITL Bulletin for July 2013
This bulletin is used to implement many of the government procured device 
security recommendations for use of personal devices. In fact this bulletin directs 
organizations to utilize the controls and policies implemented for organizational devices 
when implementing or authorizing personal mobile device use.64 This ITL recommends 
the very approach we have taken to securing mobile devices. Specifically, we utilize as 
many of the security controls for organizationally owned devices as possible with respect 
to personal mobile device security recommendations. 
4. Special Publication 800–163 Vetting the Security of Mobile
Applications
NIST SP 800–163 provides the general guidance for the process and requirements 
for approval of mobile applications. This document was the framework for design 
64 Elizabeth Lennon, “ITL Issues and Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices,” ITL 
Bulletin, July 2013. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistbul/itlbul2013_07.pdf.   
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considerations while building our applications. Many of the topics covered here are also 
considered by Google and other application stores with the addition of more restrictive 
security controls.  
The first category in the requirements for approval is that the application have 
authorized functionality. By this, the instruction further describes that the application 
must work as described, and error conditions must be clearly identified and notify the 
user. The second category requires that the application not contain any unauthorized 
functionality such as data exfiltration and malware. We accomplish this by only allowing 
the application to store the state of the device as locked or unlocked as discussed in 
Chapter IV. The third category evaluates the permissions granted to the application, and 
recommends limiting them to only those necessary for operation. Our application only 
operates with those permissions required to lockdown the device and does not contain 
any unnecessary permissions. The fourth category requires that the application protect 
sensitive data. The application we developed does not currently handle user information 
and future implementations would only handle usernames associated to device IDs. The 
fifth category addresses code dependencies. These dependencies include the need for and 
use of libraries. This drove the design of our application as discussed in Chapters III and 
IV, and at the current time our application’s only dependency relies on knowing the state 
of the device. The sixth category tackles testing app updates. Updates to our application 
are discussed further in Chapter IV, but thorough testing would be part of any update. 
Another vital part of SP 800–163 for our development was the testing approaches 
section. The approval process for vetting applications is to include four basic steps: “(1) 
correctness testing, (2) analysis of the app’s source code or binary code, (3) the use of 
static or dynamic analysis, and (4) manual or automatic testing of the app.”65 We 
specifically wrote and re-wrote the code used in our application to ensure source code 
correctness, and statically and dynamically tested it as discussed in Chapter IV.  
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D. DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY 
Drawing its roots from the technology utilized in World War II and the need for 
management of such technology DISA now serves as the principle authority for 
certification and regulation of information assurance and security in the Department of 
Defense.66 DISA operates in and supports the DOD and the Whitehouse communications 
office, with combatant command field offices embedded in all COCOMs and joint 
operations centers (JOCs).67  
DISA served as a principle source of information with respect to our research in 
the use of personal mobile devices in the DOD workplace. By design, DISA is the 
forward leaning technology arm of the DOD, as evidenced through its Mobile Device 
Management (MDM) program for enterprise procured devices used in classified and 
unclassified capacities. The program itself functions as a DOD certified interface that 
“provides the commercial mobile device (CMD) and user level controls necessary to 
enforce security policies within and for the use of the mobile device.”68 By creating a 
managed profile on the device, the MDM is able to “institute policy, security, and 
permissions that define the functions enabled on the mobile device.”69 DISA elaborates 
on the specific management and security functions of the profile capabilities as follows: 
“(MDM) Supports malware detection, over-the-air (OTA) electronic software distribution 
of applications, remote data-wipe capabilities, remote device configuration management, 
and asset/property management capabilities that protect against key and data 
compromise.”70 
One of the keys to DISA’s MDM functionality relies on the use of enterprise 
procured devices. DISA identifies the equipment it manages as government furnished 
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equipment (GFE), and stipulates that any devices that will operate on its MDM must be 
GFE. DISA does go further by providing regular updated authorized device lists that 
improve the functionality of its MDM program. The list of approved devices correlates 
strongly with technology currently available to the consumer market, with offerings such 
as iPhone 6 and 6 Plus, and Samsung Galaxy S6 and S6 Edge.71 With respect to BYOD, 
DISA does identify the use of personally owned devices within the DOD as an area of 
future growth as seen in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.  DISA brief on mobility and security 
 
Source: Kim Rice at the Mobile Project Management Office identified BYOD as an area 
of future growth and research in her 17 June 2015 DOD mobility brief. Kim Rice, “DOD 
Mobility, Presentation,” Defense Systems Information Agency, June 17, 2015, 
http://www.disa.mil/~/media/Files/DISA/News/Conference/2015/
Secure_MobilityRice.ashx.  
1. DOD Mobility Applications 
As our research pertains to the development of a mobile application to aid in the 
security of personal mobile devices, we sought out DISA guidance for such development. 
We found that while DISA is forward leaning in the MDM sector, the application 
development area appears at best burdensome. Based on the current model offered by 
DISA, the process from inception to implementation is six steps with multiple testing and 
report development phases (Figure 8).72 While the need for extensive testing and vetting 
of security flaws in applications designed for use by the DOD presents a significant 
challenge, the overall process as currently implemented is time and build prohibitive 
based on Figure 8.  
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Figure 8.  DISA mobility application development process 
 
DISA’s mobile application development process showing six stages with multiple testing 
and report generating phases. 
DISA is currently working on its own IDE that would allow for significant 
streamlining of application development in its MDM program. Their proof of concept 
model is currently called the Application Development Platform, and seeks to provide 
drag and drop UI with cross platform and OS interoperability.73 Based on DISA’s 
description this IDE would be similar to Google’s Android Studio, with one major 
exception: DISA seeks to provide an HTML hybrid code development suite.74 This will 
be a massive undertaking considering the scope of mobile operating systems and lack of 
interoperability between them. An example is the Java based Android suite and the C# 
based iOS environment that requires coding in largely different formats and according to 
different design principles. Coding in either Java or C#/SWIFT allows direct access to 
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root function controls such as Device Policy Administrator. We explored coding 
environments such as Ionic that enable HTML coding with implementation across both 
Android and iOS operating systems, but were cumbersome in accessing root features. We 
found that additional training was required and after multiple attempts did not provide as 
much functionality as writing the app to be OS specific. Using an HTML hybrid IDE 
similar to Ionic could provide a roadblock to rapid development of complex, root level 
access applications in DISA’s application environment.  
E. SECURITY TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDES  
Security technical implementation guides (STIGs) are developed by the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA). For the purposes of our research, we evaluated 
several STIGs in the areas of mobility and wireless security. We found extensive 
guidance on the use and associated security of commercial mobile devices (CMDs). As 
with other sources explored in our literature review, we found very little guidance on the 
use of personal mobile devices in the workplace. Furthermore, we reached out twice 
seeking further guidance and received no feedback. For the purposes of our research, we 
will evaluate STIG policy associated with CMDs and enterprise solutions, identifying 
areas where BYOD could be applicable.  
STIGs offer guidance and findings associated with Information Assurance. The 
goal of the guidance is to provide “technical guidance to ‘lock down’ information 
systems/software that might otherwise be vulnerable to a malicious computer attack.”75 
Each STIG is identified within a category by its associated STIG ID, and includes its 
severity code. These severity codes indicate the level of security compromise and are 
summarized for technical use by Josef Weiss in his article “STIG Alerts (by CAT)” as 
follows:76 
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• CAT I—allows “primary security protections to be bypassed, allowing 
immediate access by unauthorized personnel or unauthorized assumption 
of super-user privileges.”77 
• CAT II—”potential to lead to unauthorized system access or activity.”78 
• CAT III—”recommendations that will improve IA posture.”79 
For the purposes of our research as a proof of concept in mobile security 
application development, we focus on the CAT 1 severity code issues first then address 
applicable CAT II severity code issues.  
STIGS are grouped in security requirement guides (SRG) according to the genre 
to which they apply. We evaluate the two SRGs associated with mobility as they contain 
the widest breadth of applicable STIGs, and are the SRG against which the commands 
are evaluated during and information assurance accreditation, certification, and 
evaluation inspection. The majority of these STIG’s are essential to this and any other 
research in the area of personal mobile device utilization within the DOD and the Navy. 
In order to understand how our research relates to each STIG, we introduce the STIG by 
its number, followed by the associated rule taken verbatim from the STIG. The 
recommended check and associated fix are also verbatim from the STIG. We then 
provide a general discussion of BYOD related issues and how our application 
development applies either in current form, future development potential, or as not 
applicable. Those STIG’s not applicable to our research are labeled as such, with brief 
rule descriptions and reasoning for non-applicability.  
1. Mobile Policy Security Requirements Guide Release: 2 Benchmark 
Date: 26 Jul 2013 
Mobile Policy Security SRG covers policy, procedure and settings 
recommendations for agency wide use of mobile devices. “Mobile Policy Security 
Requirements” SRG contains 71 rules associated with mobile policy security 
requirements within the DOD. Of the 71 rules, nine are CAT I, 35 are CAT II, and 27 are 
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CAT III. Numbers one through nine are rules with CAT I severity, numbers 10 through 
45 are rules with CAT II severity.  
(1) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-015 
Rule: “The organization must remove the wireless interface on computers with an 
embedded wireless system before the computer is used to transfer, receive, store, or 
process classified information.”80 
Recommended fix: “Remove computers with embedded wireless interfaces that 
cannot be removed from all classified use; these computers must not transfer, receive, 
store, or process classified information.”81 
Discussion: This STIG does not apply to mobility on the device end or discuss 
security requirements there-in.  
(2) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-017 
Rule: “The organization must ensure all wireless systems connected to a DOD 
network (including associated peripheral devices, operating system, applications, 
network/PC connection methods, and services) are approved by the approval authority 
prior to installation and use for processing DOD information.”82 
Recommended fix: “Obtain DAA approval, documented by memo or site security 
plan, prior to wireless systems connected to a DOD network being installed or utilized.”83 
Discussion: DOD networks are not approved for use of non-agency procured 
mobile devices. Later STIG’s specifically address this issue and identify what networks 
non-agency procured devices are authorized to access. Our application can assist in 
preventing the peripheral device (mobile device) from accessing the network however, by 
locking out WiFi access. 
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(3) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-020 
Rule: “The organization must maintain a SIPRNet connection approval package 
with the Classified Connection Approval Office (CCAO) when connecting a Secure 
WLAN (SWLAN) to SIPRNet.”84 
Recommended fix: “Disable or remove the non-compliant SWLAN until the site 
has all required approvals for operation.”85 
Discussion: This specific STIG is not applicable to mobile devices specifically, 
but does address the approval needed for creating a SWLAN. Our application could assist 
in this effort by blocking access to WiFi in general from the device. 
(4) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-037 
Rule: “The organization must have written policy or training material stating 
CMDs must not be used to receive, transmit, or process classified messages unless 
specifically approved by NSA for such purposes and NSA-approved transmission and 
storage methods are used.”86 
Recommended fix: “Develop and publish policy preventing CMDs from 
processing, sending, receiving, or storing classified data.”87 
Discussion: Commercial Mobile Devices are generally defined within DISA and 
these STIG’s as agency procured and provisioned devices. In the spirit of trying to 
closely design policies and procedures related to agency procured and provisioned 
CMD’s for the use of personally owned mobile devices, we find that this limitation on 
CMD’s applies directly to BYOD. Furthermore our application can lock out access to 
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WiFi and Bluetooth thereby completely eliminating the ability to receive or transmit 
classified messages.  
(5) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-040 
Rule: “The organization must have a policy forbidding the use of wireless 
personal area network (PAN) devices, such as near-field communications (NFC), 
Bluetooth, and ZigBee, to send, receive, store, or process classified information. The 
check applies to Wireless USB (WUSB) devices…however, it does not apply to wireless 
email devices (BlackBerry, Windows Mobile, etc.)”88 
Recommended fix: “Develop and publish a policy forbidding the use of wireless 
PAN devices for classified processing.”89 
Discussion: Our application can lock out device access to NFC and Bluetooth 
with growth work potential for lock out of all other wireless PAN mediums, thereby 
eliminating the threat to sending or receiving classified information. 
(6) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-042 
Rule: “The organization must have written policy or training material that states 
non-enterprise activated CMD are not permitted to connect to DOD networks.”90 There is 
a significant risk of introducing malware on a DOD network if these types of devices are 
connected to a DOD network. Allowed “exception: the device can be connected to a 
DOD managed Internet-Gateway-only connected Wi-Fi access point (AP).”91 The 
organization requires approval from the authorizing official for the connection of 
unclassified mobile devices to unclassified information systems. 
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Fix: “Develop and publish the policy or procedure preventing connection of 
CMDs and tablets classified as non-enterprise activated to DOD networks and users are 
trained on the requirement.”92 
Discussion: Our application currently offers two states for the device, either 
locked down or unlocked. Growth potential exists such specifically authorized network 
connections could be authorized, discussed further in Chapter VI. The DOD managed 
Internet-Gateway-only network would provide access (when device is unlocked) for 
sailors to social media sites, online media and other materials. By offering the capability 
to lockout out the devices wireless accesses, the Navy could control access times and 
locations, for example limiting wireless access during the workday thereby minimizing 
device distractions. 
(7) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-052 
Rule: “The organization must follow the incident handling policy if classified 
information is found on mobile devices.”93 
Recommended fix: “Ensure the organization has defined an incident handling 
policy with specific actions to be implemented when classified information has been 
found on mobile devices… Follow all incident handling policy actions to be taken when 
classified information has been identified on mobile devices.”94 
Discussion: Later STIG’s address what specifically has to happen when classified 
information is found on a mobile device, namely data wiping. Our application steps in 
front of this need by allowing the commander to set lock/unlock locations where the 
application delivers its lockdown state to the device. In the case of this STIG specifically, 
by locking down access to the camera in the current implementation, and access to data 
storage in future implementations, our application could provide a mechanism for 
eliminating the threat identified by this STIG. 
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(8) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-058 
Rule: “The organization must not use DOD-issued software certificates for Non-
enterprise activated CMDs.”95 
Recommended fix: “Publish the organization’s implementation guidance 
prohibiting the use of DOD-issued software certificates on non-enterprise activated 
CMDs.”96 
Discussion: In its current form, and as stated above, our application functions in 
two states, either fully locked or unlocked. As discussed in Chapter VI, the growth 
potential for plug ins or increasing the number of states could eliminate the device’s 
ability to download or access DOD-issued software certificates.  
(9) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-069 
Rule: “The organization must develop procedures for ensuring mobile operating 
systems, mobile applications, and mobile device management agents on managed mobile 
devices are updated within an organization defined period after the updates/patches are 
available.”97 
Recommended fix: “Develop procedures to update mobile operating systems, 
mobile applications, and mobile device management agents on managed mobile devices 
within the organization defined period after the updates or patches are available.”98 
Discussion: While this STIG addresses managed mobile devices, we feel that this 
requirement directly applies to our application and to the use of personally procured 
devices. Any reasonable individual understands that software patches are part of the 
framework of good cyber security practices. Outdates OS’s missing patches and updates 
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are a prime target for malware. Our application could be grown to include a mechanism 
for checking the OS build number and deterministically locking out WiFi on DOD 
networks until the OS has been brought up to the most recent update. The specifics of 
exactly how this could be accomplished are covered in depth in Chapter VI, but it is 
worth mentioning here that this feature would be a more advanced feature requiring 
extensive development and testing, as well as a robust reference database of device 
hardware and software, requiring routine management and technical oversight. 
(10) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-001 
Rule: “The organization must define the maximum number of consecutive, 
unsuccessful login attempts to CMDs are permitted.”99 
Fix: “Clearly define the maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful login 
attempts to the mobile device in its access control policy and/or security procedures.”100 
Discussion: Theft or loss of a CMD poses a significant security threat if the 
individual in possession of the device is given multiple attempts to login to it. Unlimited 
attempts to unlock the device only increase the threat of a brute force attack on the 
password space of the device. Lock out after a predetermined number of login attempts is 
an important feature of the agency procured device, or enterprise solution and we feel the 
same is true of a personal mobile device. For that reason, we feel that if an individual 
uses their personal device on a DOD Internet Gateway network, they should be subject to 
device lockout after a designated number of incorrect attempts. This will increase 
vigilance in personal device management, as well as deter to some extent the thefts that 
occur while underway on a Navy vessel. This requirement could be spelled out in a site 
security instruction and or built into our application.  
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(11) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-003 
Rule: “The organization must make a risk-based determination for applications 
before they are accredited by the DAA prior to distribution or installation on a CMD.”101 
Fix: “Include a risk-based determination and DAA accreditation for applications 
prior to installation on a CMD in the CMD policy.”102 
Discussion: DISA Mobility User Corner provides the mechanism for conducting a 
risk based determination of an application. In fact, the risk based determination for 
applications is part of the application approval process required by DISA for use within 
the DOD. 
(12) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-005 
Rule:  
The organization must monitor for unauthorized wireless connections to 
the information system at an organization defined time period…DOD 
components will ensure a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) is 
implemented that allows for monitoring of WLAN activity and the 
detection of WLAN-related policy violations on all unclassified and 
classified DOD wired and wireless LANs.103 
Fix: “Monitor for unauthorized wireless connections to the information system at 
an organization defined time period.”104 
Discussion: WIDS could provide the essential back end protection for the lockout 
feature in our application. Currently, attempts to access network features while in lock 
down are blocked by our application. The state of the device is stored while running and 
upon power cycling is restored. Upon installation of the application a registration of the 
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device user and associated MAC address could provide a means of identifying 
unregistered devices to the WIDS. 
(13) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-006 
Rule: “The organization must define a time period for monitoring of unauthorized 
wireless connections to information systems, including scans for unauthorized wireless 
access points.”105 
Fix: “Define the time period for monitoring of unauthorized wireless connections 
to information systems to include the time period for performing scans to identify 
unauthorized wireless access points.”106 
Discussion: as stated in STIG SRG-MPOL-005, simple registration of device and 
associated identifying information could be gathered and stored following install of our 
application as discussed in Chapter IV. Furthermore, future work could include alarms 
and notifications that identifying unauthorized access to wireless connections.  
(14) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-007 
Rule: “The organization must document and take appropriate action if an 
unauthorized wireless connection is discovered.”107 
Fix: “Update documented procedures to document and take appropriate action if 
an unauthorized wireless connection is discovered.”108 
Discussion: This rule can have two specifically associated scenarios. The first 
would be unauthorized attempt is made to connect to a wireless network with our 
application is installed but remained unlocked. In this case, and as discussed in Chapter 
VI, growth potential within our application could provide a full lockdown of the device. 
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This could be done via registered IP addresses where wireless connection with personal 
devices is unauthorized. The second scenario is a device that does not have our 
application installed, in which case the intrusion detection software would have to detect 
the attempted connection. 
(15) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-008 
Rule: “The organization must define the appropriate action(s) to be taken if an 
unauthorized wireless connection is discovered…Wireless technologies include, but are 
not limited to, microwave, satellite, packet radio (UHF/VHF), Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth.”109 
STIG Fix Recommendation: “Define and document the appropriate action(s) to be 
taken when unauthorized wireless connections are discovered.”110 
Discussion: This is the policy piece of STIG SRG-MPOL-007 where defining and 
documenting appropriate actions to be taken in the event of unauthorized wireless 
connections are discovered. With respect to the implementation of our application, we 
would recommend that the application place the phone in complete lockdown if an 
attempt to access an unauthorized network was made while the device was unlocked. In 
the event that the device was locked, there is no capability for accessing a network. 
(16) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-009 
Rule: “The organization must confine Wi-Fi and Bluetooth communications to 
organization-controlled boundaries…Ensure the organization has defined and established 
organization-controlled boundaries for the implementation of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth 
communications.”111 
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Fix: “Define and establish organization controlled boundaries for the 
implementation of the Wi-Fi and Bluetooth communications.”112 
Discussion: These boundaries will be defined by the commander and the site 
authorization to operate (ATO). With that in mind, our application can maintain device 
access to and from these boundaries. When outside an approved boundary, the 
application could be modified in future implementations to lock down access to specific 
Bluetooth or wireless networks. 
(17) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-010 
Rule: “The organization must establish usage restrictions for wireless 
access…Implementing wireless computing and networking capabilities in accordance 
with the organization defined wireless policy, and allowing only authorized and qualified 
personnel to configure wireless services, greatly reduces vulnerabilities.”113 
Fix: “Establish a usage restrictions policy for wireless access within the 
organization’s boundaries/enclave/area of responsibility.”114 
Discussion: Our security application targets this STIG directly, by controlling 
wireless access to networks. In current form, it eliminates all access, placing the device in 
a safer mode when in the vicinity of an unauthorized network or space. In future 
iterations, it could be modified to prevent access to specific networks, while allowing 
access to others, such as an Internet gateway network in a common space such as the 
mess decks or wardroom. 
(18) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-012 
Rule: “The organization concept of operations (CONOPS) or site security plan 
must include guidance that signal amplification, antenna configuration, or other 
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techniques must not be modified in Bluetooth radios that could affect signal detection or 
interception.”115 
Fix: “Update CONOPS or site security plan to include Bluetooth radios must not 
be modified through signal amplification, antenna configuration, or other techniques that 
could affect signal detection or interception.”116 
Discussion: This STIG is not directly related to our research. 
(19) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-016 
Rule: “The organization must establish implementation guidance for wireless 
access…Implementing wireless computing and networking capabilities in accordance 
with the organization defined wireless policy, and allowing only authorized and qualified 
personnel to configure wireless services, greatly reduces vulnerabilities.”117 
Fix: “Establish clear guidance for the implementation of wireless access within 
the organization’s boundaries/enclave/area of responsibility.”118 
Discussion: Similar to STIG’s SRG-MPOL-007 through SRG-MPOL-010 our 
application would ideally be managed and configured by command security manager and 
or information security officer. The current version does not enable variable settings, but 
in future implementations and as discussed in Chapter VI, these features could be added 
to allow the manager to configure device specific setting with respect to wireless access. 
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(20) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-024 
Rule: “The organization must only procure and deploy WPA2-Enterprise certified 
WLAN equipment and software for wireless systems that connect directly to DOD 
networks.”119 
Fix: “Update all WLAN equipment and software to WPA2-Enterprise certified for 
wireless systems that connect directly to DOD networks.”120 
Discussion: As non-agency procured devices are not currently authorized to 
operate on DOD networks this STIG does not directly apply to our research. Future 
implementations of our application could however mandate that WPA-2 be the sole 
connection setting for personal mobile devices operating on DOD networks. 
(21) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-028 
Rule: “The organization must authorize wireless access to the information system 
prior to connection.”121 
Fix: “Establish a wireless access control and security policy to define the 
administrative procedures and technical requirements to be met prior to being authorized 
to connect to an organization’s information system(s).”122 
Discussion: This STIG provides a perfect policy for requiring all individuals and 
their devices to be registered and have our application installed prior to permitting access 
to command networks. Doing so would further enable STIG SRG-MPOL-005 
requirements for WIDS detection of unapproved connections to command networks. 
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(22) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-032 
Rule: “The organization must notify the Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority 
(CTTA) before a Secure WLAN (SWLAN) becomes operational and connected to the 
SIPRNet.”123 
Fix: “Confirm and document the local CTTA has been notified of the site’s intent 
to install and operate a SWLAN.”124 
Discussion: This STIG is not directly related to our research or BYOD, but our 
application can assist in ensuring the TEMPEST certification remains intact by locking 
out network, mic and camera features when an individual swipes an NFC tag outside a 
secure space.  
(23) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-035 
Rule: “The organization must ensure the network access control solution supports 
wireless clients and solutions if wireless networking is implemented.”125 
Fix: “Update the network access control solution to support all wireless clients 
and devices.”126 
Discussion: Currently, CANES allows wireless networking aboard ships and with 
future implementations this feature will only become more prevalent throughout the 
Navy. That said, our application could assist in such implementation by restricting access 
when needed, and allowing it when authorized. Furthermore, by allowing individuals to 
utilize their personal devices the DOD and Navy could realize a significant cost 
reduction. 
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(24) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-038 
Rule: “The organization must not permit operation of unclassified wireless 
devices in areas where classified information is electronically stored, processed, or 
transmitted unless operation is in accordance with DAA-approved CTTA restrictions at 
the site.”127 
Fix: “Do not permit operation of wireless devices in areas where classified 
information is electronically stored, processed, or transmitted unless operation is in 
accordance with DAA-approved CTTA restrictions at the site.”128 
Discussion: Our application and associated research aims directly at satisfying 
this requirement. By locking out networking features on a mobile device, we knock out 
the intentional or unintentional access to the threat vector of a mobile device in a 
classified setting.  
(25) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-043 
Rule:  
The organization must not permit non-enterprise activated CMDs to 
process or store DOD sensitive information, including DOD email. There 
is a high risk of introducing malware and exfiltration of information if 
these types of devices store or process anything other than non-sensitive 
information.129 
Fix: “Develop and publish the policy or procedure preventing the processing or 
storing of DOD sensitive information, including DOD email, by non-enterprise activated 
CMDs.”130 
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Discussion: When in a lockdown state, our application prevents access to any 
wireless network. With respect to processing and storing DOD sensitive information, 
preventing the device from touching a network with said information on it could be 
accomplished in future work on our application. Furthermore, locking out access to data 
storage via a future implementation of our application could meet the second of these 
requirements.  
(26) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-044 
Rule:  
The organization must require that mobile devices used in facilities 
containing information systems processing, storing, or transmitting 
classified information, and the information stored on those devices, are 
subject to random reviews/inspections by organization defined security 
officials…A process of randomly inspecting or reviewing the various 
mobile devices, to include connected or imbedded capabilities, can be 
effective in ensuring compliance with the organization’s mobile device 
policies and procedures.131 
Fix:  
Develop and publish a requirement for mobile devices to be randomly 
reviewed/inspected for compliance with the organization’s access control 
policy regarding the use of mobile devices within its facilities containing 
information systems processing, storing, or transmitting classified 
information, and the information stored on those devices.132 
Discussion: The current version of our application provides a large font display of 
the current access state of WiFi, Bluetooth, Microphone, Mobile Data and Camera as 
either locked or unlocked. This feature was designed to meet the requirements of this 
STIG by enabling immediate feedback to any individual inspecting the device. The 
notion was that at any time a sailor could be required to unlock their device display and 
our application will be running with this display. The reader of the display has immediate 
feedback on the state of the features listed above. An example of one such inspection 
                                                
131 Defense Information Systems Agency, Mobile Policy Security Requirements Guide (SRG-MPOL-
044), July 3, 2013, www.stigviewer.com/stig/mobile_policy_security_requirements_guide/2013-07-
03/finding/V-35962, ID: V-35962.  
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scenario discussed in later chapters would be watch turnover, whereby sailors are 
required to display their screen and log the status as either locked down or unlocked. 
(27) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-047 
Rule:  
The organization must store and maintain a configuration baseline of each 
CMD, including application software…An integrity baseline scan must be 
maintained, so the baseline can be compared to any subsequent scan to 
identify any anomalies or determine if there are any security vulnerability 
trends or compromises to the system.133 
Fix: “Maintain an integrity system baseline of the mobile device.”134 
Discussion: This is a perfect example of growth work for our application. 
Creating a baseline image of the device and delivering it to the command database could 
be part of application activation upon install and subsequently at each access to the 
quarterdeck or upon entering a specific space. Significant database architecture would 
have to exist based on the sheer number of devices on a ship or at a command. Consider a 
command with 300 personnel, and assume that each individual only has one device 
(which is an intentional gross underestimate). If they were to each provide a partial 
system image of 4GB over the command wireless network once per day, the database 
would have to be capable of handling and analyzing several hundred terabytes of data. 
The use of smaller partial scans and state of the art processing power might assist future 
baseline analysis. 
(28) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-053 
Rule:  
The organization must establish a standard operating procedure (SOP) for 
data spills on CMDs…When a data spill occurs on a CMD, classified or 
sensitive data must be protected to prevent disclosure. After a data spill, 
the CMD must either be wiped using approved procedures, or destroyed if 
                                                
133 Defense Information Systems Agency, Mobile Policy Security Requirements Guide (SRG-MPOL-
047), July 3, 2013, www.stigviewer.com/stig/mobile_policy_security_requirements_guide/2013-07-
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no procedures are available, so classified or sensitive data is not exposed. 
If a data spill procedure is not published, the site may not use approved 
procedures to remediate after a data spill occurs and classified data could 
be exposed. This requirement also applies to sensitive DOD information 
stored on mobile OS devices that are not authorized to connect to DOD 
networks or store/process sensitive DOD information. Sensitive DOD data 
or information is defined as any data/information that has not been 
approved for public release by the site/Command Public Affairs Officer 
(PAO). In accordance with DOD policy, all components must establish 
Incident Handling and Response procedures. A classified message 
incident (CMI) or “data spill” occurs when a classified email or document 
is inadvertently sent on an unclassified network and received on a wireless 
email device. Classified information may also be transmitted through 
some other form of file transfer, to include web browser downloads and 
files transferred through tethered connections. CMDs are not authorized 
for processing classified data. The site’s Incident Handling and Response 
procedures should reference National Security Agency/Central Security 
Service (NSA/CSS) Storage Device Declassification Manual 9–12, 
Section 5, for CMD destruction procedures.135 
Fix: “Create and publish an SOP for CMI on CMDs.”136 
Discussion: Our application currently utilizes device policy administration to 
restrict access to the camera. Another feature available to the device policy administrator 
(and in fact the user) is to remote wipe the device. We did not implement this feature out 
of fear of inadvertently wiping Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) 
research equipment, but the feature could be implemented in future iterations of our 
application. This tool could be utilized to remotely wipe a device in the event that a data 
spill is suspected, or evidence support the fact that it did occur, or if the device is lost/
misplaced. Also note that CMDs are now authorized for processing Secret data, with Top 
Secret currently under review.137 
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(29) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-055 
Rule:  
The organization must have a CMD Personal Use Policy that specifies 
what types of personal files are permitted on the device…Malware can be 
introduced to a DOD enclave via personally-owned applications and 
personal website accounts. In addition, sensitive DOD data could be 
exposed, altered, or exfiltrated by the same malware…The policy must 
include: (1) Installation of user-owned and free commercial applications, 
download of user-owned data (music files, picture files, etc.), (2) 
Connections to user social media accounts, (3) Use of geo-location aware 
applications that save or transmit the location of the device. The use of 
geo-location aware applications should be based on an Operational 
Security (OPSEC) risk assessment, (4) Connecting DOD managed mobile 
devices to personally-owned computers. (For example, a personally owned 
computer used to download personally-owned files to the mobile 
device).138 
Fix: “Develop a Personal Use Policy which details the requirements for 
downloading user owned data (music files, picture files, etc.) on the mobile device.”139 
Discussion: Our application could be expanded to deny device access to other 
mobile applications such as Internet browsers, social media sites or apps or geolocation 
apps. Furthermore, our application could be configured to lock out and report to the 
command IS monitor any attempted or actual accesses to DOD computers or 
unauthorized networks or websites. 
(30) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-056 
Rule: “The organization must have a CMD Personal Use Policy that specifies 
restrictions on the use of personal email…The DOD component must publish a Personal 
Use Policy for DOD component managed or owned CMDs.”140 
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Fix: “Develop a Mobile Device Personal Use Policy which details the 
requirements for the operating system device to view or download personal email.”141 
Discussion: As previously stated our application could be configured to prevent 
access to specific websites and or applications, thereby preventing access to restricted 
email accounts. 
(31) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-061 
Rule: “The organization must establish standard operating procedures for 
provisioning mobile devices.”142 
Fix: “Establish standard operating procedures for provisioning mobile devices to 
include integrity mechanisms protecting the confidentiality of over the air (OTA) 
provisioning.”143 
Discussion: By controlling the security posture of a personal mobile device, there 
is no need for command provisioning of a mobile device. 
(32) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-063 
Rule:  
Develop policy that states CMD software updates must only originate 
from DOD approved sources…Users must not accept over-the-air (OTA) 
wireless software updates from the wireless carrier or other non-DOD 
sources unless the updates have been tested and DOD approved. 
Unauthorized/unapproved software updates could include malware or 
cause a degradation of the security posture of the CMD and DOD network 
infrastructure.144 
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Fix: “Develop policy requiring CMD software updates originate from DOD 
approved sources.”145 
Discussion: This STIG is directed at enterprise procured devices and does not 
directly relate to our research. Individuals would most likely prefer to have their software 
updates come from outside the DOD. Requiring that non-enterprise CMD’s receive their 
updates from DOD sources such as DISA could be part of the authorization to utilize the 
device on DOD Internet gateway network connections.  
(33) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-064 
Rule: “The organizations DAA must approve the use of software PKI certificates 
on enterprise-activated CMDs prior to provisioning CMDs with DOD PKI digital 
certificates.”146 
Fix: “Obtain DAA approval for the use of software certificates or purchase 
approved CAC readers for enterprise-activated CMDs.”147 
Discussion: CAC readers for mobile devices are available for Android OS based 
mobile devices and iOS devices.148 This presents a specific challenges for individuals 
with iOS devices, namely that they will have to have software-installed PKI certificates, 
which are only authorized with enterprise provided CMDs. Utilization of sites that 
require PKI authentication will therefore be limited to enterprise activated CMD’s based 
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(34) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-065 
Rule:  
The organization must develop policy to restrict CMD Instant Messaging 
(IM) client applications to connect to only security-compliant, DOD-
controlled IM servers…Non-DOD IM servers can be located anywhere in 
the world and may be under an adversary’s control. If a DOD CMD IM 
client connects to a non-DOD IM server, malware could be installed on 
the CMD from the server, or sensitive DOD data on the CMD could be 
transferred to the server.149 
Fix: “Develop policy to require Instant Messaging (IM) client applications 
connect only to a security-compliant, DOD-controlled IM server.”150 
Discussion: This is not applicable to personally owned devices, as the use of 
mobile IM applications is extensive. From Facebook, to snapchat, to google+, it would be 
unreasonable to require individuals to only connect to DOD IM servers. It is beyond the 
scope of our research to provide an IM solution for personal mobile devices. 
(35) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-066 
Rule:  
The organization must obtain approval from the DAA or Command IT 
Configuration Control Board prior to installing a software application on a 
mobile device…Core applications are applications included in the CMD 
operating system. Applications added by the wireless carrier are not 
considered core applications. A security risk analysis must be performed 
by the DAA or DAA approval must be obtained prior to a mobile OS 
application being used. Non-approved applications can contain 
malware.151 
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Fix: “Obtain DAA or Command IT CCB approval prior to installing non-core 
applications on CMDs.”152 
Discussion: The application we developed as part of our research will be 
ultimately be submitted to DISA’s DOD Mobility Unclassified Capability (DMUC) 
Mobile Application Store (MAS) for evaluation and testing. DISA will serve as 
Designated Approving Authority (DAA) for our application.  
(36) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-067 
Rule:  
The organization must perform a security risk analysis on a mobile 
operating system (OS) application by the DAA or DAA-authorized 
approval authority prior to the application being approved for use…Non-
approved applications can contain malware. Approved applications should 
be reviewed and tested by the approving authority to ensure they do not 
contain malware, spyware, or have unexpected features (e.g., send private 
information to a website, track user actions, connect to a non-DOD 
management server). Core applications are applications included in the 
CMD operating system. Applications added by the wireless carrier are not 
considered core applications.153 
Fix: “Perform a security risk analysis on a mobile operating system (OS) 
application prior to the application being approved for use.”154 
Discussion: We have designed and built our application from the ground up in the 
Android Studio programming environment. No malware, spyware, or unexpected features 
have been coded into the application, and will be demonstrated in Chapters IV and V. 
The Navy will be required to perform a security risk analysis on the mobile device 
application we developed. With DISA approval through DMUC and MAS, and as the 
application was developed at Naval Postgraduate School the likelihood of the application 
containing malware, spyware or unexpected features is unlikely.  
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(37) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-070 
Rule:  
An authorization process must be developed and published that states the 
process to obtain approval before CMDs can connect to the organizations 
information system(s)…In order to protect their information systems, 
organizations must have a process in place ensuring mobile devices adhere 
to implementation guidance, meet published usage restrictions, and are 
processed through an authorization process prior to connecting to the 
information system(s). Lacking such a process, organizations will 
experience an array of unauthorized mobile devices, with a myriad of 
configuration settings and no usage restrictions, connecting to their 
information systems.155 
Fix: “Develop and publish an authorization process to be performed on each 
mobile device before the device can connect to the organization’s information 
system(s).”156 
Discussion: This requirement could be met through the command check in and 
indoctrination process. The configuration settings required by different spaces within the 
command could be preset by the command security manager in a future implementation 
of our application. Note that we recommend specific settings be applied by the sensitivity 
of the space the individual will have access to, and will require routine updates to NFC 
tags to ensure maximum compliance and configuration control. 
(38) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-072 
Rule:  
The organization must define locations the organization deems to be of 
significant risk to DOD information systems, in accordance with 
organizational policies and procedures…Failure of an organization to 
identify these locations could result in dangerous situations for its 
personnel, such as; damaged, stolen or compromised equipment; or 
                                                 
155 Defense Information Systems Agency, Mobile Policy Security Requirements Guide (SRG-MPOL-
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unauthorized access to, modification of, or destruction of sensitive or 
classified data.157 
Fix: “Develop and document a list of high risk locations, and publish this list to 
security staff and other organizational personnel.”158 
Discussion: This requirement should be met as part of annual information security 
training and with routine updates in the Plan of the Day (POD) so that all DOD members 
are aware of dangerous locations and organizations. A simple pop-up banner could be 
programmatically inserted into our application that informs users at a regular but non-
intrusive interval about dangerous locations and organizations. 
(39) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-074 
Rule: “The organization must apply organization defined inspection and 
preventative measures to mobile devices returning from locations the organization deems 
to be of significant risk to DOD information systems.”159 
Fix: “Document the inspection and preventive measures applied to each mobile 
device returning from a high risk location, ensuring organization defined inspection and 
preventative measures are being applied.”160 
Discussion: While we explored many programmatic solutions to this problem to 
automate reporting of cell phone location, such as GPS location log storage and delivery 
to command security management, this regulation is best handled via disclosure 
statements normally associated with high risk travel requests (Leave). Upon returning 
from travel, a mandatory stop on check-in could be the Information Assurance Manager 
for scan of the owners mobile device.  
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(40) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-075 
Rule:  
The organization must produce a written policy and training material that 
states CMDs that are classified as non-enterprise activated must not be 
used to send, receive, store, or process sensitive/FOUO or classified data 
and information or connect to DOD networks…Some CMDs are not 
authorized to store or process sensitive DOD data and information because 
they do not have required security controls to protect the data/information. 
There is a high risk that sensitive data will be exposed to unauthorized 
personnel with access to the device. Sensitive DOD data or information is 
defined as any data/information that has not been approved for public 
release by the site/Command Public Affairs Officer (PAO).161 
Fix: “Develop a written policy and training material that states CMDs classified 
as non-enterprise activated must not be used to send, receive, store, or process sensitive/
FOUO or classified data and information or connect to DOD networks.”162 
Discussion: Similar to OPSEC training requirements examined later in this 
chapter, a pop-up or push notification banner requiring user input (pin) to pass could be 
developed such that on application initiation via NFC swipe the user certifies that they 
understand that their device will not access sensitive/FOUO information.  
(41) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-076 
Rule:  
The organization must produce a written policy and training material that 
states CMDs classified as non-enterprise activated must not access DOD 
email systems…There is a high risk of introducing malware on a DOD 
email system or of compromising sensitive DOD data if these types of 
devices are connected to a DOD email system. There is a high risk 
sensitive data will be exposed to unauthorized personnel with access to the 
device if DOD email was viewed, processed, or stored on the device.163 
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Fix: “Develop a written policy and training material that states CMDs classified 
as non-enterprise activated must not access DOD email systems.”164 
Discussion: As stated above our application could be modified to prohibit access 
to DOD email either through webpage blocks or application blocks. 
(42) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-079 
Rule:  
The organization must ensure all non-enterprise activated CMD users 
complete Operational Security (OPSEC) training that provides use 
guidelines and vulnerability mitigation techniques…Improper use of CMD 
devices can compromise both the CMD and the network, as well as, 
expose DOD data to unauthorized individuals. Without adequate OPSEC 
training, users are more likely to engage in behaviors that make DOD 
networks and information more vulnerable to security exploits. The 
security personnel and the site CMD device administrators must ensure 
non-enterprise activated CMD users receive OPSEC training.165 
Fix: “Develop and publish policy mandating all non-enterprise activated CMD 
users complete Operational Security (OPSEC) training that provides use guidelines and 
vulnerability mitigation techniques.”166 
Discussion: The required training could be conducted prior to application 
installation at command check-in, or during indoctrination briefs. This requirement could 
also be part of a push notification system built into future iterations of the application 
where by the device is placed in a fully locked down state until a security manager or 
information security officer certifies the training is complete and enters a unique pin into 
the device to certify that training is complete. 
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(43) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-084 
Rule: “The organization must secure all wireless network devices, such as 
wireless Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and wireless routers, access points, gateways, 
and controllers to prevent tampering or theft, or must be located in a secure room with 
limited access.”167 
Fix: “Place all network devices (i.e., Intrusion Detection System (IDS), routers, 
Remote Access System (RAS), firewalls, etc.) in a secure room with limited access or 
otherwise secure to prevent tampering or theft.”168 
Discussion: This STIG is not directly applicable to our research or application. 
(44) STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-085 
Rule: “The organization must ensure physical security controls are implemented 
for Secure WLAN (SWLAN) access points.”169 
Fix: “Implement required physical security controls for the SWLAN.”170 
Discussion: This STIG is not directly applicable to our research or application. 
2. Commercial Mobile Device Policy Security Technical Implementation 
Guide: Release: 3 Benchmark Date: 12 Mar 2013 
Rules one through six are CAT I severity related rules. The remainder are CAT II 
or III rules. 
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(1) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-003-01 
Rule: “A data spill (Classified Message Incident (CMI)) procedure or policy must 
be published for site CMDs.”171 
Fix: “Publish a Classified Message Incident (CMI) procedure or policy for the 
site.”172 
Discussion: As discussed in STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-053, our application seeks to 
mitigate the occurrence of data spills by restricting access to data and data transfer when 
in lockdown. 
(2) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-003-02 
Rule:  
If a data spill (Classified Message Incident (CMI)) occurs on a wireless 
email device or system at a site, the site must follow required data spill 
procedures…This requirement also applies to sensitive DOD information 
stored on mobile OS devices that are not authorized to connect to DOD 
networks or store/process sensitive DOD information. Sensitive DOD data 
or information is defined as any data/information that has not been 
approved for public release by the site/Command Public Affairs Officer 
(PAO).173 
Fix: “Follow required procedures after a data spill occurs.”174 
Discussion: As discussed in STIG’s SRG-MPOL-053 and WIR-SPP-003-01 we 
recommend adding personal mobile device wiping authorization in exchange for DOD 
network access. This will allow wiping and thereby securing of personal mobile device’s 
suspected or found to have been party to a data spill. 
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(3) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-005 
Rule: “Mobile operating system (OS) based CMDs and systems must not be used 
to send, receive, store, or process classified messages unless specifically approved by 
NSA for such purposes and NSA approved transmission and storage methods are 
used.”175 
Fix: “Publish written policy or training material stating CMDs must not process, 
send, or receive classified information unless approved for use.”176 
Discussion: As stated in STIG ID: SRG-MPOL-075 a push notification with user 
feedback could notify and confirm user acceptance of policy with respect to classified 
data. 
(4) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-009 
Rule: “CMD Instant Messaging (IM) client application must connect only to a 
DOD controlled IM server compliant with the Instant Messaging STIG.”177 
Fix: “Ensure the IM client application connects only to a DOD controlled IM 
server compliant with the Instant Messaging STIG.”178 
Discussion: This STIG is nearly identical to STIG SRG-MPOL-065, and as stated 
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(5) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-020 
Rule:  
All non-core applications on the CMD must be approved by the DAA or 
the Command IT Configuration Control Board…Non-approved 
applications can contain malware. Approved applications should be 
reviewed and tested by the approving authority to ensure they do not 
contain malware, spyware, or have unexpected features (e.g., send private 
information to a website, track user actions, connect to a non-DOD 
management server).179 
Fix: “Have DAA or Command IT CCB review and approve all non-core 
applications on mobile OS devices.”180 
Discussion: As this STIG is identical to STIG SRG-MPOL-066 our input remains 
the same. The application we developed as part of our research will be ultimately be 
submitted to DISA’s DOD Mobility Unclassified Capability (DMUC) Mobile 
Application Store (MAS) for evaluation and testing. DISA will serve as designated 
approving authority (DAA) for our application. 
(6) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-021 
Rule:  
A security risk analysis must be performed on a mobile application by the 
DAA or DAA authorized authority prior to the application being approved 
for use…Core applications are applications included in the mobile device 
operating system. Applications added by the wireless carrier are not 
considered core applications. A security risk analysis must be performed 
by the DAA or DAA approved approval authority prior to a mobile OS 
application being approved for use.181 
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Fix: “Have DAA or Command IT CCB use the required procedures to review 
mobile applications prior to approving them.”182 
Discussion: Identical to STIG SRG-MPOL-067.  
(7) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-001 
Rule: “Site physical security policy must include a statement outlining whether 
CMDs with digital cameras (still and video) are permitted or prohibited on or in this 
DOD facility.”183 Mobile devices with cameras are easily used to photograph sensitive 
information and areas if not addressed. 
Fix: “Update the security documentation to include a statement outlining whether 
CMDs with digital cameras (still and video) are allowed in the facility.”184  
Discussion: By design our application locks and unlocks camera (and therefore 
video) feature access. Since this is done by utilizing a device policy controller, the access 
is controlled at the root level. This design feature enables the local commander to set 
camera access permissions based on the site physical security policy discussed in the 
STIG. This design feature adds a second layer of defense against personnel using their 
camera’s in prohibited facilities or spaces with the facility. 
(8) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-004 
Rule:  
Required procedures must be followed for the disposal of CMDs…If 
appropriate procedures are not followed prior to disposal of a CMD, an 
adversary may be able to obtain sensitive DOD information or learn 
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aspects of the configuration of the device that might facilitate a subsequent 
attack.185 
Fix: “Follow required procedures prior to disposing of a CMD or transitioning it 
to another user.”186 
Discussion: Based on the nature of our application and the notion that we have 
programmed it to be devoid of malware, maintaining version control over the source code 
is essential to avoid a third party adding unwanted features or malware. For this reason 
we recommend adding personal mobile devices to the disposal procedures related to 
CMD’s. Personnel could take their device to the security manager or IAM and have the 
application removed or the device wiped depending on command preference.  
(9) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-005 
Rule: Mobile operating system (OS) based CMDs and systems must not be used 
to send, receive, store, or process classified messages unless specifically approved by 
NSA for such purposes and NSA approved transmission and storage methods are used. 
Fix: Publish written policy or training material stating CMDs must not process, 
send, or receive classified information unless approved for use.  
Discussion: As stated in STIG’s WIR-SPP-005 and SRG-MPOL-075 push 
notifications could be sent to the user requiring feedback acknowledgement of policy 
with respect to transfer of classified data.  
(10) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-010 
Rule: “The site wireless policy or wireless remote access policy must include 
information on required CMD Wi-Fi security controls. The site wireless security policy 
or wireless remote access policy shall include information on locations where CMD Wi-
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Fi access is approved or disapproved. The following locations will be specifically listed 
in the policy:  
• Site-managed Wi-Fi access point connected to the NIPRNet (Enclave-
NIPRNet Connected).  
• Site-managed Wi-Fi access point connected to the Internet only (Internet 
Gateway Only Connection).  
• Public Wi-Fi Hotspot.  
• Hotel Wi-Fi Hotspot.  
• Home Wi-Fi network (user managed). 
Note: DOD CMD will not be used to connect to public or hotel Hotspots.”187 
Fix: “Publish CMD Wi-Fi security policy that includes information on required 
CMD Wi-Fi security controls.”188 
Discussion: This STIG provides excellent clarification on the types of Wi-Fi 
access points that are present within a typical DOD and Navy command, and how DOD 
procured CMD’s may be used. Specifically, they note that DOD CMD’s are not 
permitted on Public or Hotel Hotspots. Interestingly onboard ships with CANES systems, 
Wi-Fi hotspots are available in common spaces such as mess decks and wardroom. With 
minor modifications, our application could be used to lock out access to networks other 
than public or hotel hotspots, and completely lock out access to others (discussed further 
in Chapter VI).  
(11) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-011 
Rule:  
Mobile devices must be provisioned with DOD PKI digital certificates, so 
users can digitally sign and encrypt email notifications or other email 
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messages required by DOD policy. DAA approval will be obtained prior 
to the use of software PKI certificates on mobile devices.189 
Fix: “Obtain DAA approval for the use of software certificates or purchase 
approved CAC readers.”190 
Discussion: as discussed in STIG SRG-MPOL-064, provisioning of software PKI 
certificates is not authorized for personal mobile devices. Authorization is reserved for 
DOD enterprise provided CMD’s.  
(12) STIG ID: WIR-WRA-001 
Rule:  
Users must receive training on required topics before they are authorized 
to access a DOD network via a wireless remote access device…Improper 
use of wireless remote access to a DOD network can compromise both the 
wireless client and the network, as well as, expose DOD data to 
unauthorized people.191 
Fix: “Complete required training.”192 
Discussion: This is another example of an area where our application could 
amplify and add security layers to a STIG policy requirement. As stated many times 
throughout our analysis of the mobile application STIG’s, push notification with user 
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(13) STIG ID: WIR-WRA-002 
Rule: “The site must have a Wireless Remote Access Policy signed by the site 
DAA, commander, director, or other appropriate authority.”193 
Fix: “Publish Wireless Remote Access Policy signed by the site DAA, 
commander, director, or other appropriate authority.”194 
Discussion: This STIG is not within the scope of our research. 
(14) STIG ID: WIR-WRA-003 
Rule: “The site physical security policy must include a statement if CMDs with 
digital cameras (still and video) are permitted or prohibited on or in the DOD facility.”195 
Fix: “Publish a site physical security policy that includes a statement if CMDs 
with cameras (still and video) are permitted or prohibited on or in the DOD facility.”196 
Discussion: as discussed in STIG WIR-SPP-001, our application specifically 
locks out access to device camera functions. By doing so, our application adds a layer of 
security to this policy requirement, whereby access to a device camera can be accessed/
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(15) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-006-01 
Rule: “Mobile device users must complete training on required content before 
being provided mobile devices or allowed access to DOD networks with a mobile 
device.”197 
Fix:  
This requirement applies to mobile operating system (OS) CMDs. All 
mobile device users must receive required training on the following topics 
before they are provided a mobile device or allowed access to DOD 
networks with a mobile device. Training is divided into two groups: Group 
A (general topics) and Group B (device specific topics).198 
Discussion: The list of required training forms one of the most all-encompassing 
regulation pieces found in the STIG review. Coverage and integration of the guidance 
herein is highly encouraged for commanders, security officers and IA personnel as it 
provides an excellent framework for utilization of mobile devices. While the majority of 
the list covers enterprise issued CMDs, a number of the policy and procedure 
requirements could be tailored to include personally owned mobile devices. While 
outside the scope of our research, we identify the policy and procedure development and 
integration of personal mobile devices into these policy requirements. We present the 
topic lists in full to ensure full coverage of policy requirements for mobile devices:  
Group A—General Topics  
a. Requirement that personally-owned PEDs are not used to transmit, 
receive, store, or process DOD information unless approved by the DAA 
and the owner signs forfeiture agreement in case of a security incident.  
b. Procedures for wireless device usage in and around classified processing 
areas.  
c. Requirement that PEDs with digital cameras (still and video) are not 
allowed in any SCIF or other areas where classified documents or 
information is stored, transmitted, or processed.  
d. Procedures for a data spill.  
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e. Requirement that wireless email devices and systems are not used to send, 
receive, store, or process classified messages (does not apply to the SME 
PED).  
f. Requirement that CMDs and systems will not be connected to classified 
DOD networks or information systems.  
g. Requirement that a user immediately notify appropriate site contacts (i.e., 
IAO, CMD management server administrator, supervisor, etc.) when his/
her CMD has been lost or stolen.  
h. Secure Bluetooth Smart Card Reader (SCR) usage:  
• Secure pairing procedures.  
• Perform secure pairing immediately after the SCR is reset.  
• Accept only Bluetooth connection requests from devices they 
control.  
• Monitor Bluetooth connection requests and activity in order to 
detect possible attacks and unauthorized activity.  
i. Procedures on how to sign and encrypt email.  
j. If Short Message Service (SMS) and/or Multi-media Messaging Service 
(MMS) are used, IA awareness training material should include SMS/
MMS security issues.  
k. Requirement that Over-The-Air (OTA) wireless software updates should 
only come from DOD approved sources.  
l. When CMD Wi-Fi Service is used, the following training will be 
completed:  
• Procedures for setting up a secure Wi-Fi connection and verifying 
the active connection is to a known access point.  
• Approved connection options (i.e., enterprise, home, etc.).  
• Requirements for home Wi-Fi connections.  
• The Wi-Fi radio will be disabled by the user whenever a Wi-Fi 
connection is not being used.  
• The Wi-Fi radio must never be enabled while the CMD is 
connected to a PC.  
m. Do not discuss sensitive or classified information on non-secure (devices 
not FIPS 140–2 certified or NSA Type-1 certified for voice) cellular 
phones, cordless phones, and two-way radios used for voice 
communications.  
n. Do not connect PDAs, smartphones, and tablets to any workstation that 
stores, processes, or transmits classified data. (Exception: SME PED).  
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o. The installation of user owned applications, including geo-location aware 
applications, on the mobile device will be based on the Command’s 
Mobile Device Personal Use Policy.  
p. The use of the mobile OS device to view and/or download personal email 
will be based the Command’s Mobile Device Personal Use Policy.  
q. The download of user owned data (music files, picture files, etc.) on the 
mobile device will be based the Command’s Mobile Device Personal Use 
Policy.  
r. The use of the mobile device to connect to user social media web accounts 
will be based the Command’s Mobile Device Personal Use Policy.  
s. When the Bluetooth radio is authorized for use with an approved 
smartcard reader or handsfree headset, the user will disable the Bluetooth 
radio whenever a Bluetooth connection is not being used.  
t. All radios on the mobile device (Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, near-field 
communications (NFC)) must be turned off when not needed.  
u. Procedure on how to disable Location Services on the device. Location 
Services must be disabled for all applications or enabled only for 
applications approved by the DAA for location based services.  
Group B—Device Specific Topics  
Additional BlackBerry requirements:  
a. If the use of the BlackBerry Keeper is approved by the DAA, users are 
trained on password configuration and change requirements. Passwords 
must be changed at least every 90 days  
b. When SCR is used with a PC, users with PC administrative rights will not 
disable the RIM Bluetooth Lockdown tool on the PC.  
c. When using an approved Bluetooth headset or handsfree device the 
following procedures will be followed:  
• The user will pair only an approved device to the BlackBerry 
handheld.  
• If the user receives a request for Bluetooth pairing on their 
BlackBerry handheld from a Bluetooth device other than their 
smart card reader (CAC reader) or headset, the request will not be 
accepted by the user.  
• Pairing of a Bluetooth headset with the BlackBerry handheld will 
be completed in a non-public area whenever possible.  
Additional iOS device (iPhone and iPad) requirements:  
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a. Procedure on how to disable the device Bluetooth radio when not being 
used.  
b. Procedure on how to disable the device Wi-Fi radio when not being used.  
c. Procedure to disable “Ask to Join Networks” Wi-Fi feature. This feature 
must be disabled at all times.  
d. Message should be considered an unsecure messaging application, similar 
to cellular SMS. Sensitive information should not be sent via iMessage.  
e. Procedure for not allowing applications access to PIM date (calendar, 
address book, etc.) when prompted during application install. The only 
allowed exception is for the secure email application (for example, the 
Good application).  
f. Procedure for not allowing applications access to iOS device Personal 
Information Manager (PIM) data (calendar, contacts, notes, etc.) when 
prompted during application installation. The only allowed exception is 
for the DOD email application (for example, the Good Technology app).  
Additional Android requirements:  
a. Procedure on how to disable the device Bluetooth radio when not being 
used.  
b. Procedure on how to disable the device Wi-Fi radio when not being used.  
Additional training requirements for mobile device not authorized to connect to a 
DOD network or store/process sensitive DOD information (Non-Enterprise activated): 
a. Mobile Device (Non-Enterprise Activated) must not be connected to a 
DOD wired or wireless network. Allowed exception: the device can be 
connected to a DOD managed Internet-Gateway-only connected Wi-Fi 
access point (AP).  
b. Mobile Device (Non-Enterprise Activated) must not have sensitive or 
classified data stored or processed on the device.  
c. Mobile Device (Non-Enterprise Activated) must not be used to connect to 
a DOD email system.  
d. The user will read and be familiar with the local site and/or Command 
must publish a Personal Use Policy for site/Command managed or owned 
CMDs.  
Additional BlackBerry Playbook Tablet requirements:  
When using BlackBerry Bridge, the user will not attach files saved on the 
Playbook to email messages sent on the BlackBerry smartphone.  
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Note: Listing training requirements in the User Agreement is an acceptable 
procedure for informing/training users on many of the required training topics. 
(16) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-006-02 
Rule: “Mobile users must complete required training annually.”199 
Fix: “Complete required training annually for all CMD users.”200 
Discussion: STIG WIR-SPP-006-02 provides the full and most comprehensive list 
for annual training. As previously mentioned our application could be modified to 
provide banner notification of training requirements such as due date, date last 
completed, number of days to report completion etc. Furthermore, these banners could be 
designed to require user feedback to clear them whereby consent to the requirements, 
dates, etc., are acknowledged.  
(17) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-007-01 
Rule: “The site Incident Response Plan or other procedure must include 
procedures to follow when a mobile operating system (OS) based mobile device is 
reported lost or stolen.”201 
Fix:  
Publish procedures to follow if a mobile operating system (OS) based 
CMD is lost or stolen. Mobile device user notifies IAO, SM, and other site 
personnel, as required by the site’s incident response plan, within the 
timeframe required by the site’s incident response plan. The IAO notifies 
the mobile device management server system administrator and other site 
personnel, as required by the site’s Incident Response Plan, within the 
timeframe required by the site’s Incident Response Plan. The site mobile 
device management server administrator sends a wipe command to the 
CMD and then disables the user account on the management server or 
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removes the CMD from the user account. The site will contact the carrier 
to have the device deactivated on the carrier’s network.202 
Discussion: The importance of reporting lost or stolen devices cannot be 
understated. In my experience in the fleet, numerous personal mobile devices were lost or 
stolen in foreign ports or while at sea resulting theft of personal financial data and 
personally identifiable information resulting in thousands of dollars of loss and hundreds 
of hours of man hours to repair or recover. The overall loss of skilled operators and their 
resultant degradation of mission effectiveness was significant. For these reasons we 
recommend personal mobile devices be included in some tracking system and when lost, 
require reporting of the lost device. For example, what if unclassified personnel and 
ships’ movements were stored on the lost device? If those devices were tracked, and were 
able to be remotely wiped, the data may not have the potential to fall into an adversary’s 
hands. 
(18) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-007-02 
Rule: “Required actions must be followed at the site when a CMD has been lost 
or stolen.”203 
Fix: “Follow required actions when a CMD is reported lost or stolen.”204 
Discussion: As mentioned above, based on the general sensitivity of personal data 
stored on everyone’s mobile devices, we recommend personal mobile devices be 
registered with the command security manager, IAO etc., so that a remote wipe can be 
initiated by our application in cases of loss or theft. While anticipated resistance to such a 
control mechanism is high, the resultant protection of personal data would be invaluable 
when measured against the amount of added sailor response time and resultant mission 
degradation when personal devices are lost or stolen.  
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(19) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-008-01 
Rule:  
The mobile device SA must perform a wipe command on all new or 
reissued CMDs and a STIG-compliant IT policy will be pushed to the 
device before issuing it to DOD personnel. The CMD system 
administrator must perform a wipe command on all new or reissued 
CMDs, reload system software, and load a STIG-compliant security policy 
on the CMD before issuing it to DOD personnel and placing the device on 
a DOD network. The intent is to return the device to the factory state 
before the DOD software baseline is installed.205 
Fix: “Perform a wipe command on all new or reissued mobile devices.”206 
Discussion: Not directly related to our research or application. 
(20) STIG ID: WIR-SPP-008-02 
Rule:  
Mobile device software updates must only originate from approved DOD 
sources. CMD system administrators should push OTA software updates 
from the CMD management server, when this feature is available. 
Otherwise the site administrator should verify the non-DOD source of the 
update has been approved by IT management.207 
Fix: “Ensure CMD software updates originate from DOD sources or approved 
non-DOD sources only. Users do not accept Over-The-Air (OTA) wireless software 
updates from non-approved sources.”208 
Discussion: Already addressed in SRG-MPOL-063 this STIG is directed at 
enterprise procured devices and does not directly relate to our research. Individuals 
would most likely prefer to have their software updates come from outside the DOD. 
                                                 
205 Defense Information Systems Agency, Smartphone Policy Security Technical Implementation 
Guide (WIR-SPP-008-01), November 28, 2011, https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/smartphone_policy/2011-
11-28/MAC-3_Sensitive/xml, ID: V-24963. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Defense Information Systems Agency, Smartphone Policy Security Technical Implementation 
Guide (WIR-SPP-008-02), November 28, 2011, https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/smartphone_policy/2011-
11-28/MAC-3_Sensitive/xml, ID: V-24964. 
208 Ibid. 
 88 
Requiring that non-enterprise CMD’s receive their updates from DOD sources such as 
DISA could be part of the authorization to utilize the device on DOD Internet gateway 




III. TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The technological aspects of recommending a lockdown or security program for 
any operating system must consider the methods of implementing control mechanisms. 
Some forms of input could give greater control to an account administrator while at the 
same time opening the operating system up to greater forms of attack or granting 
privileges with unintended accesses. It is important that any implementation follows the 
recommendations of the OS developer, specifically Google in our case, and not try to use 
unintended methods that will be removed in future updates. In this chapter, we examine 
two input methods for starting an application or exchanging data and then examined 
some of the technologies that comes bundled on typical smart devices. Looking at each 
will give the reader of this thesis a small piece of the information that should be 
considered when discussing these technologies and how they work. 
The first input method we consider is Quick Response (QR) codes. Through our 
research we determine that they are not the best fit for our application but they may have 
a place in future versions of the program. The second form of input we examine is near 
field communication (NFC), which allows for programmable, quickly customizable tags 
to perform actions on a smart device. QR codes offer direct access to data through a 
smart device’s camera while NFC allows for RF transmission of programmed data. An 
introduction to how each works and the input method’s characteristics are discussed 
along with potential vulnerabilities. Additional mitigations are be recommended where 
appropriate and implementations will be built around scenarios so that the benefits can be 
imagined. 
Looking at the device as a whole makes it difficult to decide where to start 
locking down features. However, as shown in the documentation review, there are several 
specific pieces of hardware that would need to be disabled in an environment where 
official DOD work is being conducted. Looking at each piece individually, an application 
that can lock down a device can start to take shape. Each of these components is  
discussed along with some of the ways in which data is moved on and off the device. 
While our application deals mostly with the hardware lockdown implications, we would 
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like a method to control the ability to send and receive cellular data in the current 
Android API. Future versions should consider methods to disable the sending of text 
messages over standard cellular networks and the potential for authorized Wi-Fi access to 
a ship’s intranet. For now, however, we demonstrate what should be and can be disabled 
prior to adding increased flexibility. 
A. INPUT METHODS 
When designing our application in the early stages we were unsure about a 
method to initialize the lockout features on the phone. Trusting a sailor to start an 
application and push a button did not provide a suitable solution and the intent of the 
application was to put the lockout control in the hands of the security manager. We 
ultimately look at Quick Response codes and near field communication as input methods 
to initialize our application. A discussion on the characteristics of each will include 
strengths and weaknesses.  
1. QR Code Characteristics and Uses 
Scanning of 1D barcodes for quick access to data started to be used in the 1960s 
with railroad companies.209 They proved useful, but were not durable enough for long-
term use and were eventually abandoned with the exception of a few manufacturing 
environments. It was not until the supermarket industry adopted them for point-of-sale 
purchases that a greater audience started taking note of their potential for carrying data 
and automating processes on a grander scale. Having proven their utility to the public, it 
was in this era that the use of scanning tech expanded and eventually a need for higher 
capacity was needed in the coding scheme. 
2D and Quick Response (QR) codes have been used in the industry sector for 
several years. A QR code for any implementation is a product of a library, which is 
referenced when it is scanned, the amount of data written, and the amount of error 
correction embedded in the code. The reference library can be written or purchased 
online but is necessary to encode and decode the actual QR data. Sites exist to give 
                                                
209 Tony Seidman, “Barcode History: Barcodes Sweep the World,” Barcoding Incorporated, accessed 
January 20, 2016, http://www.barcoding.com/information/barcode_history.shtml.  
 91 
example QR code libraries if desired, but the development of a library falls outside the 
scope of this thesis and would require a greater amount of upfront effort to create and 
secure.  
The amount of data found in a code is a very important component to understand 
as it can range from a few alpha-numeric characters to 4300 characters (Figure 9).210 This 
is a significant amount of data and can point to sites on a network or can trigger small 
code implementations already present on a device. An example of this would be in the 
restaurant industry where companies can use a QR code to jump to a company’s menu 
hosted online or their application in any operating system’s app store. At that location, 
executable code can exist that will allow a customer to order and pay for food while 
waiting or before arrival. This can be translated to virtually any requisition system where 
a worker would need to access a database and submit an order for replacement parts or 
consumables. 
By design, QR codes are resistant to the impacts of damage and debris. Their 
utility in dirty, manufacturing-type environments has been proven and provided workers 
a method to quickly implement various controls. These include ordering parts, 
documenting movement along patrol routes, or the ability to access needed documents 
and maintenance/procurement requirements. QR codes have been used in office 
environments to automate processes like network management, inventory controls, and 
restocking mechanisms. Marketing companies now use them to point to websites of 
interest to consumers. Movie posters, safety notices, and areas where additional info can 
be presented on a mobile device can and do utilize QR codes to provide access to 
collateral information through websites and online forums. QR codes are easily 
implemented in many environments, relatively customizable, provide quick and easy 
access to data, and their functionality is ultimately limited by the type of library 
referenced and the writable data limits within the code itself. 
 
                                                




Figure 9.  A comparison of QR and 2D barcode data storage limits 
 
Source: DENSO ADC, QR Code Essential (White Paper R1f), 2011,://www.nacs.org/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D1FpVAvvJuo=&tabid=1426&mid=4802, 3.  
QR codes were developed with ease of functionality in mind and have given users 
the ability to control the amount of error correction for lost/damaged data within the 
code, in addition to scanability in virtually any orientation. The error correction in a code 
can be increased up to 30 percent at the expense of writable data, however this is a very 
useful feature in environments where dirt and debris could cover a code or damage could 
affect the code’s surface. In addition to allowing for various levels of code obfuscation, 
the error correction allows for code distortion. Placing a code does not necessarily require 
a flat surface as the data can be maintained with the formatting and timing patterns 
printed into the code. Finally, QR code orientation is also flexible since the codes 
themselves have built in position detection patterns. These allow a scanner to quickly 
determine where the data in a code will start and stop and eliminates the need of scanning 
from various sides and angles until the data makes sense and is useful (as was the case 
with traditional 2D codes). All of these features combined keep the need to reprint and 
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replace codes to a minimum and still provides utility in normal operations. Controlling 
the data against the level of desired correction gives users a significant control over the 
actual code’s size when printed and orientation patterns allow for more flexibility in 
surface placement (see Figure 10).211 
Figure 10.  A depiction of data storage format on a QR format 
 
Source: DENSO ADC, QR Code Essential, 4.  
2. QR Code Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities 
Despite their versatility QR codes still suffer from many weaknesses. Even with 
error correction, data can be lost if the code is smudged, ripped, or covered beyond the 
correction threshold. This will make a code useless and require that it is physically 
replaced. Additionally, if the data being referenced changes then the code must be 
changed to direct data appropriately as there is no way to push updated data to an old QR 
code. If the codes of a facility point to specific intranet sites, and that network is 
reconfigured, it is possible that every QR code will have to be reprinted and replaced if 
the library cannot be made to compensate for the change.  
With regard to replicability, it is entirely possible that a malicious actor could 
replace codes with bad information that redirects to sites with bad data or set up to exploit 
vulnerabilities. User interaction could be required after the redirect, but it is not out of the 
realm of imagination to suppose a user would accept whatever prompts come from a 
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supposedly trusted code. This opens the door to exploit OS vulnerabilities and goes 
beyond the inconvenience of just having to replace all distributed codes. 
With the advent of smart devices and their onboard cameras, QR codes have been 
brought to the general public. Their successful adoption is a topic of much debate among 
marketing companies but their flexibility cannot be denied.212 Manufacturers, employers, 
and marketers can easily encode data for specific applications. Individuals scanning the 
codes have an innate trust that the data being scanned is as safe as the data on their 
device. It is this feeling that can give the QR code its greatest vulnerability for abuse. 
As is the case with many technologies related to smart devices or secure 
environments, it is the end user who presents the greatest opportunity to exploit a 
vulnerability. The example mentioned before only touched on replacement of codes in a 
trusted environment. However, consider a user that installs an application with other 
malicious designs. This application could collect data about a user, where codes are 
scanned, network options at the time of scan, and many specifics about what is read. 
Once in an open network again, that data could be forwarded and provide usable 
information.  
The ability to embed executable code in QR codes present another form of 
weakness. If that code allows a mobile device to send data back to a host, then it is a 
matter of what data is collected and sent by the code. An example of this was 
documented in a 2013 article, “What Is behind That QR Code?” The authors referenced 
various examples of when commands executed through a user reading a QR code allowed 
access to personal data, device data, or device commands such as a device reset.213 
A QR code in a controlled environment with proper policy and implementation 
could allow for quick access to vast amounts of information. On a restricted network, 
they could enable a soldier or sailor access to repair publications, placing part orders, or 
                                                
212 Brian Morris, “Are QR Codes Thriving or Dying?” Business 2 Community, May 21, 2015, 
http://www.business2community.com/marketing/qr-codes-thriving-dying-
01228016#DoWpfBHtY3rYivO3.97.  
213 InfoSec Institute, “What Is behind That QR Code?” March 21, 2013, 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/what-is-behind-that-qr-code/.  
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completing necessary training with a simple scan of a code and an on-device camera. 
Monitored implementation and policies that control their use can help mitigate the listed 
vulnerabilities but one must keep in mind there is no built-in security features with a QR 
code. The potential for good can outweigh the risks on an unclassified network where the 
stored data will not cause harm if it is recovered, but appropriate user training should be 
provided along with policy to reduce the risk of exposing personal smart devices to 
malware.  
3. NFC Characteristics and Uses 
Near field communication (NFC) is a technology based off radio frequency 
identification (RFID). RFID has also been in place for several years and has been used in 
contactless card readers for identification and area admission purposes throughout the 
DOD. Badges at secure facilities have relied on this technology to securely identify 
cardholders by having encrypted data on a card that is coupled with a pin chosen by the 
card holder. These two items together (something a user has and something a user knows) 
provides a form of two-factor authentication before someone can enter a facility. 
The concept of powering a passive device, that is one without its own source of 
power, has been shown to be useful. As with other RFID technology, NFC will work 
between a user’s mobile device (typically a phone or tablet) and a passive tag that stores 
some limited amount of data. When the mobile device is placed in close proximity to the 
tag, a magnetic flux field is generated, the passive tag has power, and the data written can 
be read by the mobile device. Once read, the mobile device can use the data for setup of 
applications, event triggering, data storage, payments, or various other features. The 
flexibility provided by smart mobile technologies and NFC can allow for very specific 
access control mechanisms and controller events on a mobile device. It is with this in 
mind that focus shifted away from strictly using the QR code as an input source. 
NFC devices are typically more robust than QR codes for a variety of reasons. 
The largest advantages are that there does not have to be a direct line of site between a 
tag and a reader and security options are in place. A tag or NFC device placed in a secure 
container can still exchange data if the minimum distance requirements are met. An NFC 
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tag does not become smudged or torn in an industrial environment and require a reprint 
and replacement. Since it can be internally attached and still exchange data, it can operate 
in even harsher industrial environments than a QR code. This is not to say that NFC will 
always be preferred, rather it is to say that the environment and purpose of each 
technology should be considered before a design is implemented. If data is only available 
from a distance of several feet, a larger, printed QR code would be preferable to an NFC 
device that is not readable by a user.  
Since NFC is a device with a chip and memory, there are some security and data 
encryption options that can be used with them. This level of security is not provided in a 
QR code. The security provided by having a writable chip does come at a cost that is 
invested up front to get the appropriate hardware for NFC and then the continued cost of 
buying NFC tags. While tags have come down in price over time, it will always have a 
higher cost associated than a QR code. QR code replacement only requires that a security 
manager set up the code and print it. Reprinting codes is quick and cheap, while NFC’s 
security and reliability come at a higher cost. 
The average NFC tag offers less user storage than can be coded into a QR code 
but there are options so that with proper planning the right tags can be implemented (see 
Figure 11). A peer-to-peer communication option also exists so that NFC devices, which 
are powered and have larger storage can communicate. This is done between mobile 
devices, payment systems, etc. Setting up an NFC to initiate an application on a mobile 
device requires little physical memory and in the case of this thesis the smallest memory 
options were used to provide examples. As security is implemented and larger settings 
are desired it will be necessary to allow for more programming space and more expensive 
tags to solve more complex problems.  
Keeping these considerations in mind as we discuss usage scenarios in an official 
context will assist in imagining the full potential of BYOD environments for these two 
particular input methods. With appropriate construction and the proper security policies 
in place both can be useful in a command environment. The documentation and critiques 
of both technologies and their lack of utility is often discussed from a consumer 
perspective. However, practical implementations exist in the DOD and when coupled 
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with a BYOD strategy of locking down a mobile device, these technologies can allow for 
future flexibility and utility. 
Figure 11.  Comparison of NFC tag storage values and uses 
 
This graphic adapted from NFC chip supplier RapidNFC. Source: “Which NFC Chip?” 
accessed January 10, 2016. http://rapidnfc.com/which_nfc_chip.  
4. NFC Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities 
NFC lives in the domain of radio frequency identification (RFID) standards and 
allows for short-range communications and pairing between devices. This exchange of 
information is almost instant once a device is in range of a reader tag. While the 
expectation is that a user would not scan a tag that was unknown, it is possible for misuse 
to expose a device to input vulnerabilities mentioned in the QR code section. A tag could 
prompt a device to open a webpage with malicious data, prompt the download of a third 
party application, or simply not perform the desired action and leave the user unaware 
that a setting had been changed. 
Additionally, there is no detection method to see if the data exchange is being 
monitored. If an NFC tag were to communicate securely with a mobile device, it is not 
certain that radio exchange was not recorded for future use. A mobile device that is 
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already compromised could be used to scan any tag nearby and record the actions or data 
exchanged. This could give an attacker insight into how an NFC tag is coded, information 
about provided encryption, and details about how to work within an established system. 
This particular issue is inherent in any RF system and could be especially present when 
users carry their personal devices outside of the controlled environment on a ship. It is the 
activity outside of DOD networks and what that means for mobile devices that creates the 
largest area of vulnerability and would have to be addressed in other device policies. 
B. SOFTWARE APPLICATION LOCKDOWN 
Using an application to lockdown features and control settings on a cellular 
device requires addressing each input method with coding specific to it. Disabling the 
camera is not done in the same manner as disabling Wi-Fi or cutting off the microphone. 
Several applications were looked at to determine which approaches were the most 
effective and would function properly on the most devices. Additionally, ensuring that 
our particular choices for implementation were usable on the most devices required 
careful consideration. Device control based on time, location detection, and root-level 
control features have worked its way into applications using Android’s administrative 
control methods coupled with standard accesses. These give a programmer greater 
flexibility over what the application can do and access, and forces the user to grant 
permission for the application to function properly. While our application is a basic proof 
of concept, there is a lot of room for flexibility and increased protection/detection 
methods for Android devices. 
Even with the more robust device administration control system that was 
introduced in Android 22, there are still capabilities and hardware components that are 
not easily disabled or mitigated through standard practices.214 There may come a time 
when direct control of all input/output methods is streamlined in device administration 
settings. However, Android currently has not provided a default control for writing data 
to various forms of memory or directly disabling text input, and these are just two 
                                                
214 Developers, “Device Administration,” accessed February 14, 2016, 
http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin.html.  
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examples. Explanations will be given below, but some of these will have to be creatively 
mitigated through more robust coding in the future or they may require designs that were 
not intended by Google (which could be patched out of a future build of Android). Our 
application looks to work within the intended uses of Android and the recommended 
methods for coding applications to reduce the chance that our implementation could 
simply be patched away in a future update. 
The final consideration when developing this application is that our prototype 
does not have a file in which device state is saved. This is possible to do, but requires 
more robust programming than the scope of this thesis. State is saved locally on the 
Android device, but additional features will require a file within the app that saves and is 
accessed for crash/restart re-enabling of the lockdown. Additionally, the application does 
not automatically restart when it crashes or is disabled. It is recommended that if a form 
of this is implemented in the future, the application is designed to restart after it is cut off 
while locking down features. For this to work, it should reference a state file maintained 
inside the application and use that to ensure that the device is placed in a state similar to 
when the application stopped running. This would be especially important for features 
not controlled by device administrator policy settings (for example, the microphone, Wi-
Fi, or Bluetooth states) that could be potentially turned back on by a user once the 
application is turned off. 
This thesis touches on the concern associated with third party application access 
and what that could mean for using a device in a secure environment. However, the 
insider threat (intentional or accidental) continues to be the initial concern with non-
enterprise issued mobile devices. A device that can be managed with regard to the 
various input/output methods in a lightweight application is a reasonable goal. Building 
on this and adding plug ins or other approved applications to increase functionality, 
encrypted data separation, and utility to the user and DOD would pave the path for a 
useful BYOD implementation. When coupled with appropriate policy, user training, and 
eventual network controls, a device lockdown application could provide an onboard 
software solution to device hardware concerns. 
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1. Camera Considerations 
With regard to onboard hardware, cameras offer a simple method to store large, 
detailed amounts of data in memory in a quick, discrete manner. While carrying a mobile 
device inside an unclassified facility, data can be visually documented regarding layout, 
personnel, guards, and other useful information. Before allowing a mobile device into a 
facility that could have official use areas, or specifically the spaces on a ship, all cameras 
should be collected or turned off and verified. 
The question then turns to how a phone with a camera on board can be made to 
disable the camera’s functionality completely. On studying this, we found that early 
implementations of camera disabling applications simply took control of the camera and 
never released it. This actually exploits the design of the Android OS and did not in fact 
disable the camera. Just because the application had control, and was not recording (as far 
as the user knew) anything, did not mean the camera was actually disabled. Android fixed 
this in a newer version by making the camera automatically release when the application 
that had control was no longer the application with which the user was interacting. This 
small change in how the OS functioned made obsolete all applications that handled 
camera “disabling” in this manner.  
It was not until Android version 22 that Google began using administrative 
controls to control particular functions on the phone. In addition to allowing enterprise-
level control of issued phones for network access, encryption, and some handling of data 
(contacts, security applications, and email accounts, for example), it also provided for a 
method of getting root-level control and disabling of the camera hardware in a software 
implementation. Once the camera is disabled at this level, then any photo capture is no 
longer possible, including screen captures.  
Implementation is demonstrated in Chapter IV, but it is a straightforward 
approach that can be manipulated in a variety of methods, all of which function as an on/
off switch for all photo access. For our prototype, we use an NFC tag as an input to start 
an app, which will disable the camera (along with other parts of the device). There are a 
couple of conditions for this to work. For any application to function with device 
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administrator access, the user must give permission when it is first opened so that all 
accesses are granted. If the user does not give access, then the application will not 
function despite its presence on the smart device. Additionally, granting access does not 
actually cause any functionality to occur. With our application, the user must interact 
with an NFC tag. Once that has been done, the user cannot re-enable the camera 
functionality without scanning another, differently programmed NFC tag. That is to say, 
double scanning the tag that disables the camera will not actually turn the camera back on 
and the user does not have a button to subvert the design of the camera. Third, the camera 
is still disabled if the application is terminated by the user or if it were to crash. This is 
not the case for all items that are disabled, but is especially important to note when it is 
possible to keep the user from reinstating an access and subverting our application. 
2. Microphone Considerations 
A concern with microphones is the ability to record conversations that may be 
anything from official information up to top secret, compartmentalized information. 
Training several years ago focused on miniaturized digital recorders that could be hidden 
in a pocket or taped to a body. We were warned to be on the lookout for such devices and 
it was easy to raise a flag on spotting one. Today with a cellular phone in the hands of at 
least 90 percent of Americans and desensitization to them, we think less about what 
capabilities are on board.215 
The microphone presents a unique opportunity since a user can start recording and 
drop the phone in a pocket where it can record unnoticed. It can also provide a direct line 
out to another location if a phone call is connected, allowing someone else to listen to the 
discussion occurring at a location, record remotely, or even accidentally expose classified 
details to an unknowing call recipient. This is mentioned because it is possible to have a 
phone in auto answer mode for driving or motorcycle riding with Bluetooth devices or 
just bump the answer button but never actually realize that someone has called. If 
accidentally answered or if auto answer is enabled, anyone that calls will hear what is 
going on and be difficult to detect until the physical device is looked at. 
                                                
215 Pew Research Center, “Mobile Technology Fact Sheet.”  
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A final reason to turn off the ability to use a microphone is because Android has 
shown vulnerabilities in the past which allowed hackers to access a microphone.216 This 
allows for listening and recording of conversations in a situation where the phone’s 
owner would have no idea what was happening. The likelihood of this is very low on a 
typical device, there is a trend among more savvy android users to “root” a cell phone. 
“Rooting” will be discussed later, but essentially it allows for more flexibility and 
disables some Android OS safeguards so that the user has more control. With this done, it 
also allows hackers easier access to phone features, specifically a microphone or camera, 
and would open the user to a higher potential for exploitation.217 
Disabling the microphone requires access permission, but at a lower level of 
access than that of the camera. That is to say it does not require device administrator 
support. Chapter IV discusses how we approach disabling the mic. We utilize a toggle of 
the microphones mute feature. This method does not function at a level that would 
prevent it from being toggled back on if our application were to conflict with another 
application’s attempt to unmute the mic. Note that another application would have to 
specifically access the unmute method to override our mute. The application is set up to 
show the current status of the microphone when it is started. When it performs that initial 
check, which is a Boolean check, it will know if the microphone is muted or not and will 
display the appropriate message in the bottom left side of the screen with the status of 
other components.  
There are other ways to help mitigate this issue that should be considered in an 
application that is ready for release to sailors, however for this proof of concept we 
simply wanted to show that it could be done. In a polished application it would be smart 
to go ahead and address input volume as well as muting the mic. A programmer could set 
this to zero so that if the mic is not muted, then it is not registering a pick up of sound 
                                                
216 Ms. Smith, “Black Hat: It’s Not ‘’Tricky’ for Hackers to Turn Your Phone into a SpyPhone,” 
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by the author. 
217 Veo Zhang, “Hacking Team RCSAndroid Spying Tool Listens to Calls; Roots Devices to Get In,” 
TrendLabs Security Intelligence Blog, July 21, 2015, http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-
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until the user or some other application bumps it back up. Taking a multi-step approach 
to the microphone must be considered since actually disabling it like the camera is 
currently not available. 
3. Wi-Fi Considerations 
Wi-Fi technologies have existed for years and over time their communication 
reliability, range, and data transfer speed has improved. These technologies have opened 
up a whole range of new uses on smart phones. It is no longer just a simple tool to enable 
higher data rates to browse the Internet. Now, smart devices can be linked through local 
Wi-Fi connections. Remote controlling can be implemented with onboard applications 
for everything from communications with other smart devices to light bulbs and data can 
travel with high reliability between multiple devices on the same network.  
For smartphones with a reliable Wi-Fi connection it is not unreasonable to see 
transfer speeds comparable to (or even in excess of) that of a computer. There was a time 
when accessing the Internet, even via Wi-Fi, on a mobile device was considerably slower 
than on a full computer but that difference has diminished significantly. Onboard 
smartphone Wi-Fi is no longer limited to the older, more miniaturized technologies, and 
can operate at the newest standards available for 802.11 in many cases. 
We performed two separate speed tests on the same wireless network on both a 
personally owned 2011 MacBook Pro and an iPhone 6+ (Figures 12 through 15). The 
tests were done using Ookla’s speedtest site (www.speedtest.net) and Speedofme’s site 
(www.speedof.me). These are considered to be two of the more reliable online bandwidth 
tests with the differences in each not being a critical factor for the scope of this thesis. 
Rather, this demonstration shows with the two tests that in both cases a modern 
smartphone had faster data transfer speeds than a reasonably modern laptop. The 
MacBook is running a current version of El Capitan, the most modern operating system, 
has 16GB of onboard RAM, and a 2.3 GHz Intel I5 processor (Dual Core). The iPhone 
6+ is running the most current version of iOS 9, has 1GB of onboard RAM and a 1.4 
GHz Typhoon processor (Dual Core). 
  
 104 
Figure 12.  Screen shot of www.speedof.me in-browser speed test for 
MacBook Pro  
 
Using www.speedof.me to perform a speed test, the MacBook Pro achieved a maximum 
download speed of 69.71 Mbps across multiple size file samples. Upload speeds peaked 
at 6.57 Mbps. 
Figure 13.  Screen shot of www.speedof.me in browser speed test, mobile 
version, for iPhone 6+ 
 
Accessing www.speedof.me on the iPhone 6+, maximum download speeds were 88.73 
Mbps and uploads peaked at 5.92 Mbps. 
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Figure 14.  Screen shot of Ookla’s www.speedtest.net in-browser speed test 
for MacBook Pro 
 
Using www.speedtest.net to perform a speed test the MacBook Pro achieved a maximum 
download speed of 87.79 Mbps. Upload speeds peaked at 6.24 Mbps. 
Figure 15.  Screen shot of Ookla’s speed test using the iPhone application 
 
Using Ookla’s iPhone application to perform a speed test on the iPhone 6+ the maximum 
download speed was 89.61 Mbps with uploads peaking at 6.21 Mbps 
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Disabling Wi-Fi in our application is handled in a fashion similar to the 
microphone. What is interesting, however, is that the state is not saved so if the 
application is disabled, crashes, or is forced to restart, then the NFC tag must be 
rescanned to disable Wi-Fi again. While the application is running, Wi-Fi will remain off 
and cannot be re-enabled in the user’s settings. As mentioned in the general application 
discussion, a developer would have to implement more robust implementations to restart 
and save device settings in the event of a restart. 
4. Bluetooth Considerations 
Bluetooth, much like NFC, creates a way for two devices to exchange data using 
RF transmissions. It is traditionally associated with earpieces to communicate during 
phone calls, speaker systems to listen to music, cameras to view a video feed, or a 
method to pair and control many other devices like smart home components or remote 
controlled drones. It also allows for pairing for input/output devices like keyboards and 
mice, eases transferring files, and can automatically configure Wi-Fi settings for a new 
network. It is a very flexible, powerful communication technology that is now included 
on virtually every smart phone and many forms of tablets. 
Bluetooth’s frequency range and power allows for much greater range than NFC, 
and its ability to pair devices makes it especially appealing to users of the technology. It 
is the range of Bluetooth that also presents particular concern (Figure 16). Bluetooth can 
carry any data over a connection between paired devices and is only limited by what the 
application using it is requesting. A phone can send back a host of information that is 
useful to a user and the typical thought that it is strictly a short-range communication is 
misleading. Depending on the class of Bluetooth on a device data can be sent and 





Figure 16.  Graphic showing expected Bluetooth RF ranges 
Source: Joshua Wright, “Dispelling Common Bluetooth Misconceptions,” Sans 
Technology Institute, Security Laboratory, accessed February 1, 2016, 
https://www.sans.edu/research/security-laboratory/article/bluetooth.  
The many exploits and vulnerabilities associated with Bluetooth technology could 
provide enough information for a paper that would rival the length of this thesis and is 
readily available on the Internet and in tech journals. For this reason and the potential 
range, disabling Bluetooth communication on a device should be a main feature of any 
lockdown application. In our implementation shutting down Bluetooth functions in much 
the same way we shut down Wi-Fi. It will be off as long as the application is running but 
it can be subverted by disabling the application or if the application crashes. Much like 
Wi-Fi, it would be advisable to save the current state in a file within the application so 
that Bluetooth capability status can be controlled if a restart occurs. 
5. Messaging Considerations
Text messaging on Android is handled via a couple of possible text exchange 
manners. The default application is called Google Hangouts and it allows for sending of 
traditional short message service (SMS) and multi-media service (MMS) messages to 
other phone numbers, google hangout contacts, or email addresses. Google Hangouts will 
send the data through the cellular network when no Wi-Fi is present, or will chose to send 
messages over Wi-Fi if available and the message recipient is an email address, a user 
logged into a browser with the Hangouts plug in, or a phone number that also uses 
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Hangouts.218 Looking only at Hangouts or considering basic messaging does not capture 
the actual picture of how users now communicate with each other. 
Hangouts is a robust messaging application, but it is not the only way that users 
on Android send text messages. Messaging service apps have become very popular and 
the features offered now include much more than just text transfer. Many, such as Kik or 
Facebook Messenger, offer the ability to send photos and videos. Some, such as Skype, 
even offer direct connections to video chat with multiple people in real time.  
Messaging and data exchange over cellular networks has also opened smart 
devices to greater exposure to traditional attacks. Clicking a link in a text message can 
lead to a site that executes malicious code or asks permission to install a malicious third 
party application. Smart devices that automatically download the contents of a 
multimedia message can also download malware without any user interaction and leave it 
open to being hacked or having its data exploited.219 Users should absolutely be aware of 
what they are clicking and who it is coming from, but it is also important that the device 
be updated with all vulnerability patches. Automatic downloads of data should be 
blocked, and users should be trained on why this creates greater vulnerabilities in their 
personal devices. This is not an easy consideration for Android, but is necessary for it to 
function within a DOD environment. 
The final consideration for text messaging is that this feature, whether on the 
native app or in some third party app, still provides a means to record data and transport 
it. Even if a message is opened and never sent, it can be used as a note pad to record 
observations or copy text from classified documents. The information in that text will 
stay in the app, and can be added to as long as the application is open. For this reason, 
future versions of our application would have to address this problem. 
                                                
218 Google Support, “Get Started with Hangouts,” Google Support, accessed February 10, 2016, 
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219 Dan Goodin, “950 Million Android Phones Can Be Hijacked by Malicious Text Messages,” 
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There are a couple of ways this could be done, but neither would avoid possibly 
being patched out of future versions of Android. Currently, one could implement a 
custom keyboard that does not have any letters on it. While our app is running, a user 
could still receive a text message but would be unable to type a response. The native 
keyboard would be suspended in exchange for our app’s keyboard. In this way, a user 
could still receive urgent messages while in cellular coverage, but would not run the risk 
of transferring or recording classified or official use information. The other to mitigate 
the risk would to be to have our application kill any applications that are not authorized. 
This would require a more robust coding package, and would require a white list of 
authorized applications. If an application was not specifically authorized by the security 
lockdown app, it would be killed as soon as it was started. Both functions would work, 
but would require more programming than was covered in our example and was not 
implemented in this application. 
6. Cellular Data Considerations 
A final area that should be looked at is the transfer of cellular data to and from a 
mobile device. We attempt to shut this down and were successful with older versions of 
Android, but as discussed later we are unable to do so with the current implementations 
of Android. We mention it here because a compromised device could still send 
information off without a user’s knowledge and this is a significant consideration. 
It is desirable that when the application is activated all cellular data exchange is 
disabled. Having this ability stops applications on the phone from transferring data to 
other parties. This will essentially turn a smart device, with all other security 
implementations in place, into a cellular handset much like the Nokia phones that were 
popular in the late 1990s. The cell phone could then send and receive traditional SMS/
MMS messages and make phone calls. However, users cannot browse the web or post 
status updates to social media. The phone, without the ability to take photos, no ability to 
record with a microphone, with no access to Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, and with no cellular data 
capability will have been locked down to a level where considerations are more 
manageable and building out additional BYOD features becomes a possibility. 
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C. ANDROID OS CONSIDERATIONS 
Android’s OS controls greater than 80 percent of the smartphones currently in use 
around the world. Additionally, it is widely used in tablets. Its flexibility and 
customizability for manufacturers has allowed a wide market distribution. It is used on 
both low-end, bargain-priced tablets as well as high-end devices from manufacturers like 
Samsung and Nexus. The ability for manufacturers to use it as they see fit and load it 
exactly as they would like also creates significant difficulty in rolling out patches for 
vulnerabilities. Google places the onus on manufacturers to roll out updates as they are 
made available. This compared with iOS, which controls and encourages updates, means 
that there is a much greater amount of fragmentation in the Android OS market.220 
Manufacturers must put forth the effort to provide device OS updates and upgrades to 
their users. Those of low-end smart device offerings have little incentive to push updates 
in a timely manner to older versions of Android and often devices are often left with 
unpatched vulnerabilities.221  
Looking beyond the difficulties associated with upgrading/updating the Android 
OS sitting on most smart-devices, there are many features, which are employed that are 
very useful and successful and keeping devices safe. The biggest obstacle to the security 
mechanisms on the device is the end user. While taking an operating systems class we 
both worked with Jerel Yam (another student) to specifically explore how typical 
malware can exploit Android vulnerabilities. What we found was that it was Android’s 
flexibility coupled with the user’s lack of attention that created a dangerous environment 
for the operating system. Android has implemented methods such as sandboxing, using 
unique user/namespace instances, and limiting resource access and communication 
between applications. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) lists are enforced and 
permissions associated with each process are not communicated to other processes. These 
                                                
220 “Why Hasn’t My Android Phone Updated Yet?” MakeUseOf, accessed February 10, 2016, 
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221 Ibid.  
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are indicative of significant efforts to provide the safest, most stable OS to the users while 
maintaining a high degree of customizability for manufacturers and users alike.222  
If BYOD is to eventually be an option in any DOD environment, then policy must 
exist to cover the gaps that do exist in Android’s OS (as well as that in iOS). Users have 
the ability to root a device, which is a way of saying opening up all root access and is 
similar to jailbreaking in iOS. This degrades the security features on the phone and gives 
malware and applications a method to manipulate the device at a level normally not 
permitted. In addition to rooting a device to change security settings, Android also allows 
users to explore applications outside of its Play Store. Third party application providers 
do not always have the same requirements for security screening before posting an 
application for download. When users step outside of the main, reputable providers they 
open themselves up for greater malware infection. Policy must account for this and 
implementation must have a way to verify that all OS-specific security features are 
operating and have the most current updates. While this can create difficulty given 
Androids difficulty to update/upgrade, it will ensure that as the device operates it is not 
performing unexpected or unauthorized execution of code. 
1. Android Development 
The second broad effort of our document research related to the development of 
an Android application discussed further in Chapter IV. The review has technological 
implications, which helps it fit more appropriately in Chapter III. We begin our research 
by attempting to develop a basic application in Android. This effort started in winter 
2014. This date is important because at the time, Eclipse was the principle IDE for 
developing Android applications. Meanwhile, Google was in the process of enriching and 
debugging their own standalone IDE Android Studio. In the winter of 2014–15, Android 
Studio was heavily criticized as unstable and broadly unusable for application 
development. We focused our efforts on utilization of Murach’s Android Programming 
methods for the remainder of 2015. With numerous smaller applications built in Eclipse, 
                                                
222 Travis Miller, Jerel Yam, and Liam Dorney, “An Examination of Malware Interactions in the 
Android OS” (class paper, CS3070, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2015).  
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we started to realize that updates to the IDE and builds were harder and harder to install 
and run successfully. This drove our migration to Android Studio in September of 2015. 
The transition was much easier than expected and accomplished using The Big Nerd 
Ranch Guide to Android Programming. Overlooking the obvious naming convention 
issue, we found this book was highly recommended and received excellent reviews from 
online android programming communities and stores.  
2. Murach’s Android Programming 
We began our research into Android development with Murach’s Android 
Programming during the winter of 2014–2015. As stated above, Eclipse was the IDE 
most widely used in Android application development in 2014 and prior. Eclipse was the 
backbone of Murach’s book. The amount of time trying to get Eclipse up and running and 
then using it to programmatically access and control the features we sought to control, 
such as camera, microphone, Wi-Fi, were excessive. Numerous hours were spent solving 
Eclipse for Android issues rather than the device features themselves, such as numerous 
emulator and device build fails due to unsupported device features. Furthermore, the 
versions of Android we were able to access tended to be two to three builds behind 
current versions of Android OS. This made online support for the programs and 
techniques in Murach less appealing from the commencement of a project. We offer this 
information not as critique of the book itself, but rather as an important lesson learned 
through our research: the absolute necessity of staying current with IDEs and associated 
reference texts for the operating system in question. This rule of thumb is even more 
important in the world of mobile application development due to rapid changes in mobile 
technology. Significant time was spent in Murach’s book utilizing techniques and build 
styles that were less relevant to the current Android OS, but no longer supported by 
software development kits (SDK), or better implemented in Android Studio. After 
numerous attempts to get our training applications up and running, and looking at the 
most current methods of programming in Android we made the decision to transition to 
Android Studio.223 
                                                
223 Joel Murach, Murach’s Android Programming (Fresno, CA: Mike Murach & Associates, 2013).  
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3. Android Programming: The Big Nerd Ranch Guide  
The Big Nerd Ranch Guide (BNRG) proved to be an invaluable asset across the 
board in the early stages of our Android Studio (AS) experience. The book itself and the 
accompanying update website provided thorough instruction on installation and basic 
operations in AS. The first noticeable difference in IDEs presented in BNRG is the AS 
project builder. BNRG discusses what became a pivotal point in our research—the AS 
Android Target Device selection.224 We discuss this topic and its impact on our research 
further in Chapters IV and V. 
BNRG provided another key research point in its coverage of the activity life 
cycle. Critical to Android programming BNRG provide the following explanation: 
“During this life cycle, an activity transitions between three states: running, paused, and 
stopped.”225 The book goes further and provides the graphic in Figure 17. This helped 
identify the points of potential intercept for our applications listeners when trying to 
control instance of camera, microphone, Wi-Fi, data etc. On numerous occasions, we 
visited this graphic to plan our attack on various activities further discussed in Chapter IV 






                                                
224 Bill Phillips, and Brian Hardy, Android Programming: The Big Nerd Ranch Guide, Vol. 2 
(Atlanta, GA: Big Nerd Ranch, 2015).  
225 Ibid.  
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Figure 17.  The activity life cycle 
 
Source: Bill Phillips, and Brian Hardy, Android Programming: The Big Nerd Ranch 
Guide, Vol. 2 (Atlanta, GA: Big Nerd Ranch, 2015).  
BNRG took us one step deeper and walked through the logging of the activity life 
cycle to eavesdrop on every method call within each class. Again, this technique was 
essential for identifying locations for listeners on OS attempts to access various features 
we sought to lock. An example of the BNRG code used to log activity calls is presented 
in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18.  Logging activity calls at every stage of the activity life cycle 
 
Source: Phillips, and Hardy, Android Programming.  
Another key learning point seen in Figure 18 was the application of a Java code strategy 
invoking super on the class of each activity. This invoked the parent class that gave 
access to any instance of that class call or construction.  
To avoid excessive duplication, we cite BNRG often in later chapters as we use 
the tools and lessons discovered therein. The essence of this discussion is to point out 
how vital current resources are when trying to develop mobile applications where change 
occurs and new technology supports learning. BNRG was vital in our understanding of 
intents, listeners, and activities as they relate to the features we tried to control from our 
application. 
4. Google Android Development  
This source provided the backbone of our application development. We save the 
more technical aspects of our research for Chapters IV and V, but for the purposes of 
identifying pivotal Android development access points we identify some key learning 
onramp locations. First among these onramps was the foundation of GAD that is based 
on programing in the Android Studio (AS) IDE. We initially struggled as discussed above 
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when trying to code in Eclipse as every Google document or webpage we tried to access 
referenced features or tools only available in AS. This was the driving factor utilizing AS 
as our principal IDE for application development. Once we embraced AS, GAD opened a 
plethora of development assets that proved essential for our research. The remaining 
onramps for our research are based on the GAD structure loosely defined in two 
categories, design and develop, and are discussed below. We discuss the design specifics 
of our application in Chapters IV and V, but provide the basic elements of GAD design 
principles here to ensure this and future research considers Googles principles when 
developing applications.226 
a. Developers Design 
Google sets standards for the design of applications running on the Android OS. 
Google enumerates several design features for optimization of presentation and user 
experiences. Any user of an Android device knows the wide disparity in the design layout 
of the hundreds of thousands of applications available via the Google Play store. In what 
could be compared to interior design guidelines, Google has created a standard for the 
user experience while interacting with Android applications. The Developers Material 
Design (DMD) page is the virtual guidebook for these standards and breaks these 
guidelines down into the following groups: 
(1) Animation 
Animation covers motion, responsive interaction, transitions, and details. Motion 
covers the elements of object movement throughout the application layout. Spatial 
relationships between elements within the design are covered here. Google has gone so 
far as to study the amount of attention user pay to objects as they enter and exit the space. 
An example given is the entrance and exit of objects, menus and pictures, where by the 
recommended setting calls for increase in speed when object exit and the opposite when 
                                                
226 Developers, “Get Started with Android Studio,” Developers, accessed February 1, 2016, 
http://developer.android.com/develop/index.html. 
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entering the frame.227 The responsive interaction section discusses surface reaction and 
tactile responses. Recommendations include material popups should expand out of the 
point of input, as opposed to random spots on the interface.228 Radial action provides 
further clarity to the user, doing so here by adding clarity for the user through a visual 
reaction to their input.229 Finally, worth noting in the interaction subcategory is the note 
that an input should provide action such as a transition that is visually connected to the 
point of input, specifically calling out that the input should provide a direct transition to 
related information.  
(2) Components 
Components is the compendium of parts design specifications that make up the 
application. From the three types of button (floating action, raised, and flat) to menu 
specification for optimized experiences the Design Components pages has a design 
recommended specification, examples of those specifications, and samples for download. 
Google design built into coded layouts and expected behaviors was especially helpful in 
our research. Simple UI features often overlooked by developers can be preprogrammed 
into an application by utilizing GAD’s design samples for use. An example is the built-in 
behavior of menus so that the menu is positioned over the emitting elements.230 
(3) Layout 
The most useful section in the design elements in our research is the layout 
principles section. The Metrics and Keylines sections give representative examples of 
virtually every application layout available with spacing and orientation design elements 
for optimized viewing (Figure 19).  
                                                
227 Google, “Authentic Motion—Animation—Google Design Guidelines,” Google, accessed February 
1, 2016, https://www.google.com/design/spec/animation/authentic-motion.html#.  
228 Ibid.  
229 Ibid.  
230 Google, “Menus—Components—Google Design Guidelines,” Google, accessed February 1, 2016, 
https://www.google.com/design/spec/components/menus.html#menus-behavior. 
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Figure 19.  Example metric and keyline layout of phone application 
 
Google, “Metrics & Keylines—Layout—Google Design Guidelines,” Google, accessed 
February 2, 2016, https://www.google.com/design/spec/layout/metrics-
keylines.html#metrics-keylines-keylines-spacing. 
As a point of reference, the layout of our application was based on information and 
specifications gleaned from the Design layout section. 
(4) Patterns 
Patterns contains the general styling parameters of typical situations that arise in 
the most common applications. An example is the date and time parameters shown in 
Figure 20. This is one of several tables on the date and time patterns page. We offer this 
example to demonstrate the thoroughness and depth of the Google design team 
specification guidance that many developers violate. To extent the point there are 
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seventeen specific patterns that Google has identified as common and offers standardized 
solutions for them. 
Figure 20.  Date and time parameters and implementation 
 
Google, “Data Formats—Patterns—Google Design Guidelines,” Google accessed 
February 4, 2016, https://www.google.com/design/spec/patterns/data-formats.html#data-
formats-date-time. 
With respect to patterns, our research implemented the patterns recommended in 
the Notifications Patterns page. The exact notification patterns used is discussed further 
in Chapters IV and V. 
(5) Style 
Style makes up the largest of the design elements google has provided 
specifications for. In the Style Color section, Google provides thousands of color palettes 
available to the developer with pairing recommendations in the Color Scheme section. 
Further amplification on style is given for text, with follow on text and background color 
guidance. Style Icons is the next section where specification for design and 
implementation of the application icon is thoroughly laid out. From the five parts of a 
icons anatomy (finish, material background, material foreground, color, shadow) through 
to the design principles associated with each level, Google has completely specified icon 
development and use for optimal user experience. The Imagery Style section provides 
guidance on the use of Images in an application. This is especially useful for our 
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application as the guidance is was used to format and position the imagery used, which is 
discussed further in Chapter V. 
(6) Usability 
According to Google, usability should be one of the foremost design principles an 
application developer adheres to. With the goal of maximum usability consideration must 
be given to the ideas of quick, effective, and efficient navigation for every user.231 
Google again provides examples and samples for download and implementation in 
design, and further encourages its specifications in those samples. Usability was one of 
the key sections we used in the design of our application. We attempt to adhere to the 
principle of complete access discussed in this section and will elaborate in Chapter V.  
b. Developers Develop 
The meat of our research is conducted within the Develop pages. Getting used to 
AS was difficult and we often could not rely solely on BNRG for executing tasks with in 
the IDE. The homepage offers extensive guidance on installation a setup of AS on any 
OS. This is indispensable in the onset of application development as early installation 
was successful but failed after use due to incorrect installation of AS’s SDK manager. 
The six portals available on the Develop page branch the user off quickly and effectively 
based owned and experience and are discussed further below. 
(1) Training 
This is home too much of our early research as we struggle through the initial 
stages of Android development. Thankfully, the training portal offers a “building Your 
First App” session that walks the user through set up of a simple text display and 
triggering the display with a button. Based on the interactive nature of the majority of the 
Android applications available in the Play Store, Google emphasizes the importance of 
buttons and their use through this tutorial.232 With the thorough coverage of intents in the 
                                                
231 Google, “Accessibility—Usability—Google Design Guidelines,” Google, accessed February 4, 
2016, https://www.google.com/design/spec/usability/accessibility.html#accessibility-types. 
232 Developers, “Starting Another Activity,” Developers, accessed February 4, 2016, 
http://developer.android.com/training/basics/firstapp/starting-activity.html. 
 121 
training app we are able to execute some of the more vital functions in our security 
application, and we highly recommend anyone attempting to start Android programming 
begin with these guides. 
(2) API Guides 
The API guides provide a more advanced framework for development in Android. 
Here is where we learned the four tenants of Androids security sandbox operating 
environment. First each application is considered an individual user in the multi-user 
operating system, whereby multiple apps run as multiple individual users (Linux multi 
user system).233 Second, the OS assigns unique user identification to each application, 
and that identification number is known only to the operating system.234 Associated with 
that number is a set of system permissions designated by the developer, but governed by 
the operating system.235 For example, an application cannot grant critical system 
permissions without the user authorizing such permission, after which the ID number is 
assigned those approved permissions. Third, each application’s code is run on an 
independent virtual machine (VM) separate from the other VMs for other running 
applications.236 Fourth, all applications run in their own Linux process, starting when 
onCreate is called, and shutting down with onDestroy or when the Android OS must 
recover memory for system functions and or other applications processes.237  
This section is also pivotal in our understanding of the four essential components 
of an application. We list and discuss them here as a reference for future research. (1) 
Activities are exactly what the word describes. These are the things that get the work 
done within the application, and each application could have several or only one of them 
depending on the complexity of the application. The application given by Google 
demonstrates an activity best as used in an email application. One activity might retrieve 
                                                
233 Developers, “Application Fundamentals,” Developers, accessed February 4, 2016, 
http://developer.android.com/guide/components/fundamentals.html. 
234 Ibid.  
235 Ibid.  
236 Ibid.  
237 Ibid.  
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new mail, another might allow the user to compose new mail, and yet another might take 
care of deleting mail.238 (2) Services perform the long-term tasks that do not involve user 
interface such as playing music on a playlist.239 These services are initiated by an activity 
and stopped by an activity. (3) Content Provider provides data management between 
applications in any location that the application has access to store data.240 (4) Broadcast 
Receivers respond to broadcasts that are made system wide such as an announcement that 
the battery is low, the screen is turned off, or an application has accessed the camera.241 
These responses can initiate activities, cause something to happen with in the OS, or 
limits other work functions in the system. Understanding these four components proved 
crucial to our research in learning how to target the application components we were 
looking to control. Explained here by Google and with numerous links to related 
information, formatting, use, and training modules made this section a go-to-part of our 
research.  
(3) References 
The technical library of the Android Developer experience, section was accessed 
several times. In fact, the reference library contains the entire bank of packages, classes, 
subclasses, methods within each class, every broadcast receiver available to the 
programmer. An example of a MediaController is provided in Figure 21. Notice that this 
image is only an introduction to the class. Several pages of data on the class is available 
and hyperlinked to further explanations and usages. For example, all the public methods 
are available, with the associated input parameters and data types. It goes without saying 
searching the developer references for class and method uses occurred regularly and was 
a great source when issues with code arose.  
                                                
238 Ibid.  
239 Ibid.  
240 Ibid.  
241 Ibid.  
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Figure 21.  MediaController class in Google Developer 
 
Developer, “MediaController,” accessed February 1, 2016, http://developer.android.com/
reference/android/media/session/MediaController.html. 
(4) Tools 
Tools provides the AS interfaces for basic through advanced development. 
Starting with complete system tours of the Android Studio IDE and including plugins for 
Gradle and Manifest Merging. 
(5) Samples 
Samples contains hundreds of bare bones application and API samples. These are 
useful within applications and have been provided by Google for use in development. 
The samples themselves serve to help standardize Android applications by providing a 
base to build from. Often times the samples require build out of components. We utilized 
several samples applicable to our application, specifically the device police controller 
API, which we discuss further in Chapters IV and V. 
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5. StackOverflow 
StackOverflow242 was invaluable in our build process. We set out trying to take 
control of very specific features of mobile devices, namely camera, microphone, Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, and Data. Without the numerous blog entries and code samples posted by the 
stackOverflow community we would not have been able to complete our work. The visits 
to stackOverflow were made most often for help with the most complex development 
questions and when trying to access root functions within the Android OS.  
6. Android Weekly 
Android Weekly243 provided essential guidance and in depth examples that 
enabled working through some of the more advanced parts of our Android coding. Article 
number 183 stands out as a good example, as it included coverage of the use of 
permissions, which was a significant part of our coding experimentation. At one point the 
Android Weekly article on permissions saved us from what we though would be a 
complete rewrite of a class, when basic permissions modifications to the manifest file 
were all that were needed.  
D. EXAMPLE SCENARIOS 
We see our application fitting in as an initial offering to meet a larger goal with 
DISA and DOD. Enterprise offerings and solutions exist, but do nothing to address the 
users reporting to ships and installations with smart devices in their possession. By 
showing that the dangerous-to-security features can be disabled we hope that we can 
improve the probability that these powerful devices will be used to enhance the 
environment in which we operate. The example scenario below goes beyond what our 
application demonstrates, but also shows why it could help the DOD, ship’s COs, and 
end users to have greater access to data on personal devices. 
                                                
242 Stack Exchange Inc., “Bounty ‘Android’ Questions,” Stack Exchange Inc., accessed November 14, 
2015, http://stackoverflow.com/questions/tagged/android?sort=featured.  
243 Gyuri Grell, Martin Gauer, and Sebastian Deutsch, “Android Weekly,” Android Weekly, 2016, 
http://androidweekly.net/.  
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1. Preparation on the Ship 
Ships’ captains are tasked with protecting their ship from all forms of harm and 
ensuring that security is maintained at all levels. When a sailor reports to a ship with a 
cellular phone, tablet, laptop, and other electronic devices the policy should be written so 
that the sailor has some ability to use these devices while maintaining official and 
classified data’s integrity. It is up to the security manager on each ship to work with the 
captain and, within DOD policy, set up standards that best reflect the captain’s level of 
comfort and conform to best security practice standards. 
In this scenario, that conversation has taken place. The security manager 
understands that the captain wants all smart phones carried on sailors to be as locked 
down as possible. The captain has also made it clear that despite this security feature, 
phones and mobile smart devices are still not to be carried into secure spaces and he does 
not want to see them in combat or radio. The security manager can now sit down at his 
desk and start programming the NFC tags that have been provided by the Navy. The first 
two tags are those that will turn the application on and lockdown all of the above features 
and the second tag will turn them back on and disable the application. After writing data 
to the tags, the security manager will verify that they are active by placing a smart device 
in close proximity and observing the device. If all is well, the application will open and a 
message listing which components have been disabled will be displayed on the screen. 
From here, the security manager moves to verify that these functions are in fact disabled 
by trying to access them. For example, attempting to take a screen shot and accessing the 
camera should throw an exception that those features are not available. Checking the 
phone’s photo album would show that no new photos had been added. At this time, the 
security manager will place the two tags at the quarterdeck in preparation of sailors 
arriving on the ship and locking down their phone. 
All of this preparation can be done on a ship’s computer with an NFC encoding 
program in place. Rules will have been set up so that the security manager will simply 
click those features that need to be locked, and when the NFC tag is written it will be 
locked so that the data on the tag cannot be changed. To update the tag would no longer 
be possible and would require a rewrite to the change in policy. This would only take a 
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few moments. Additionally, multiple tags could be written in one session to account for 
different security practices. For example, if a captain was ok with photographs while 
sailors were outside the skin of the ship, a tag could be set up to lockdown all of the 
above features with the exception of the camera. 
2. The Sailor Interactions 
Once a stepping across the brow of a ship and after showing identification to 
board, sailors should go to a designated spot near the quarterdeck to scan their phone. 
They will place their Android device in close proximity to the lockdown tag. An audible 
beep will be produced by the device, and the application will start. Once the application 
starts it uses the data provided by the NFC tag to quickly disable features as required by 
ship’s policy. The sailors, when looking at the application, will see which features are 
disabled in the bottom left corner of the app. When requested at random to show their 
device, leadership can quickly verify that the phone is in fact locked down in accordance 
with the ship’s captain’s policy. 
At the end of the day, when getting ready to leave the ship, the sailor will 
approach the quarterdeck and scan the deactivation NFC tag. This tag will tell the app to 
re-enable those features that were locked down. The sailors can now receive data, make 
phone calls, take photos, and do all other activities that were possible before the device 
was locked down. The sailors will show identification and depart the ship with their 
phone fully functional and not having ran the risk of photographing or recording 
classified information. 
E. CONSIDERATIONS CONCLUSION 
Securing a mobile device requires careful interpretation of DOD policy by a 
ship’s captain, implementation of a policy at the unit level, and a method to manage that 
policy. The collect or prohibit mobile devices is not always practical and can still lead to 
security violations. Even with an application that locks down the devices, it is possible 
that a user might not scan an NFC tag. It is for this reason that ship’s force must take it 
upon themselves to enforce the standard of using the application and spot checking 
sailors. With this application installed, the possibility for security violations does not go 
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away. However, when a commanding officer has to self report that a sailor sat in combat 
all day with a mobile device he can at least note that the device was fully locked down 
and in a state that limited or prohibited the recording of classified data. This is a big step 
forward in how we manage personal mobile devices, and in future work it will be shown 
how this should set the stage for implementing methods to take advantage of these 
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IV. APPLICATION DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 
A. DESIGN CONCEPTUALIZATION  
Initial design of our application comes from the notion that there has to be a way 
to programmatically lock down a mobile device via a mobile application. Specifically, 
the device should not be able to access features deemed a threat to security while the 
application holds the state of the device in lockdown. Those features that we find 
threatening to security based on our experience as security managers include camera, Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth, mobile data, microphone and keyboard. We are primarily concerned with 
mobile device users and any images, recordings, connections, and documentations that 
they may have initiated or accessed while in a secure space, during a critical exercise, or 
when otherwise deemed inappropriate by the command.  
From this programmatically naïve position, and with literally no computer science 
background beyond that gained in the courses studied at NPS, our initial solutions 
originate from our exposure to technology that we use in our daily lives such as our 
mobile phones and the applications on them. That said, we initially envisioned an 
application that would be activated and deactivated by scanning a QR code with the 
device camera. We used this notion to identify requirements and the desired application 
flow for a project in our Human Computer Interaction that will be discussed further 
below. Following initial requirements and design consideration study, we commence 
detailed study in Java and Android programming, leading to several pivot points in our 
research. Principal among these driving factors is the shift of focus from activation and 
deactivation via QR code to via NFC. Other discoveries and design changes include the 
design and layout of Android applications via Google Design guidance, and the policy, 
class, and methods functionality within Android Studio. 
1. Initial Requirements and Design 
As part of a course requirement’s for Human Computer Interaction (HCI) course, 
we looked at our security application from a requirements standpoint, developed notions 
for human computer interactions at each one the identified requirements, refined these 
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notions, and created a sample application implementation without any lockout 
functionality.244 We developed the system model seen in Figure 22, whereby the security 
application controls the state of lockdown on the device, which thereby restricts access to 
specific features. The model provides for system management via a security manager and 
overall program management via SPAWAR. 
Figure 22.  Initial system model for security application  
 
Source: Liam J. Dorney et al., “CS3004 Project 1: Mobile Security at Sea (class project, 
Naval Postgraduate, School, 2015).  
a. Requirements for a Mobile Security Application 
Perhaps one of the most useful set of requirements that evolved out of our 
research is the expansion of those features that could be deemed a threat to security. We 
                                                
244 Liam J. Dorney et al., “CS3004 Project 1: Mobile Security at Sea” (class paper, CS3004, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2015).   
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added the experience of another security manager, LT Sellers, and three foreign nationals 
(LT Jerel Yam, LT Elmas, and 1st LT Yilmaz) with experience in security. After 
significant brainstorming and trying to identify every possible threat to security from a 
mobile device, we identified the following features that would in some way have to be 
addressed by our security application, either through lockout or banner 
acknowledgements and agreements:245  
• Camera—image capture 
• Video—video capture 
• Microphone—voice recording 
• SMS—sharing information 
• Document editing—note taking 
• Social media—that is accessible by the mobile devices 
• GPS—location sharing 
• Wi-Fi—Internet access and electromagnetic transmission/radiation 
• Bluetooth/infrared—file transmission 
• All other forms of wireless data access 
This list serves as our primary target list in later development, and interestingly captures 
the entirety of the requirements of NIST and STIG with respect to connectivity as 
discussed in Chapter II.  
Following requirements identification for features desired to be locked down, we 
took one step back and attempted to identify system function requirements. Again, 
relying on our experience with security and mobile devices in the secure environments 
we had operated in, we attempted to identify as many system functions of our mobile 
application to enable rapid application deployment and low cost system implementation. 
From this analysis we identify seven main functions discussed below.  
(1) Low Cost Implementation  
Beyond development and testing, the security manager’s software system will not 
result in an increase in cost to the Navy because it uses existing hardware already present 
                                                
245 Ibid.  
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on naval vessels.246 We try to implement a solution that would allow for minimal costs to 
the Navy. While initially considering QR code implementation, we envision a security 
manager easily and readily printing out new QR codes and posting them as necessary 
throughout the ship as security required. While this intent initially holds merit, there are 
costs associated with development and testing of a secure QR code library, or costs of 
purchasing and testing of a secure QR code library. The recurring cost would be 
maintenance of the library and its integration with the application’s functions. 
The costs of purchasing NFC writers and tags to get a program started are be 
higher, because a reader/writer would have to be sent to each unit. These devices range in 
price from around $50 up to $100. Additionally, bulk tags start at approximately 30 cents 
per tag. Resupplying tags will be a recurring an expense, but the security provided 
through an NFC implementation overrides the lower cost of simply printing a QR code. 
This cost, while being higher, seems to be a smart investment and is still not substantial 
given the cost per tag. It is possible to get a unit set up with NFC hardware and 100 tags 
for under $100. Additionally, some situations allow for NFC tags to be reused, reducing 
the number of thrown away tags. The cost per unit by providing a QR code library could 
presumably be lower, but there are no available encryption or security features for such a 
library. 
(2) Two Factor Device Login for Security  
The CO and security manager’s interface are protected with two-factor 
authentication for added security.247 This design element is generally agreed to by the 
team and remains a future design feature for our application.  
(3) Support for Android and IOS Based Personal Devices 
The security system has a mobile device portion that will support Android and 
IOS based personal devices.248 This was one of the key components in early system 
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function requirements identification. As seen in Figure 23, by creating an application that 
covers Android and iOS, the effective coverage for mobile devices in U.S. market would 
be 96.2 percent.249 As a cross section of society, we believe that these two OS’s equally 
represent the vast amount of sailor’s devices currently and in future use in the Navy. 
Figure 23.  Smartphone OS market share November 2015 
 
Source: Statista, “Smartphone OS Market Share in the U.S. 2012–2015,” Statistic, 
accessed February 2, 2016, http://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-
by-smartphone-platforms-in-the-united-states/. 
(4) Offline and Online Functionality  
To cater for the ship’s network conditions, the security system must take the 
availability of the wireless network into consideration.250 This is another key feature 
identified early that is part of our approach to securing a mobile device. The most 
important aspect of this feature is the notion that lock and unlock should be possible 
without prompting via network activity, namely via NFC. On the other side of that 
                                                
249 Statista, “Smartphone OS Market Share in the US 2012–2015 Statistic,” Statista, accessed 
February 2, 2016, http://www.statista.com/statistics/266572/market-share-held-by-smartphone-platforms-
in-the-united-states/. 
250 Dorney et al., “CS3004 Project 1: Mobile Security at Sea.” 
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feature, is the functionality that comes with connectivity such as the ability to push out 
updates wirelessly, generate security posture changes remotely, and pulse devices to 
determine network participation and identification all considerations for future 
development and research.  
(5) Rapid Registration Process for Personal Devices  
Registration of personal devices for the ship’s crew can be time consuming if 
there is a considerable number of devices to register, and if the flow of registration is not 
fluid. The first concept of the system makes use of QR codes for device registration 
which greatly speeds up the registration process.251 The initial implementation seeks to 
have QR codes push registration information to a central database assigning names to 
device data such as international mobile equipment identifier (IMEI) and the international 
mobile subscriber identifier (IMSI). While the principle driver of this data push changes 
in our move from QR code to NFC, the desire to develop a database that stores, secures 
and is managed by qualified personnel could be an ideal way to track who is registered to 
use what devices at the command, in what capacity, and whether they are up to date and 
operating according to the NIST, DISA and STIG security requirements identified and 
chapter 2. Future work discusses these features more fully. 
(6) Central management and Dissemination for Security Postures 
The baseline security posture of all the vessels in the fleet can be centrally 
managed by SPAWAR and central management allows SPAWAR to maintain standards 
and uniformity for security implementations when necessary.252 This remains a design 
goal for our application, as uniformity and central management are key to successful 
implementation fleet wide. 
(7) Allowances for Tweaking of Security Postures on a Ship-by-ship Basis  
The COs have the option to tweak the security postures for their ships. This could 
be useful necessary as every vessel has their own security considerations based on 
                                                
251 Ibid.  
252 Ibid.  
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mission and crew profile.253 As discussed in Chapter I, the ability of a commanding 
officer to control the security settings at his or her command is vital to the notion of 
command in the Navy.  
b. Variable Security Postures 
Another key finding in the HCI research we conducted was the principle of 
variable security stances and evaluating how those stances might affect the accessibility 
of features on a mobile device. As stated above we rely on the security related experience 
of the members of the team to try to capture the widest range of postures we could 
envision. We initially identify eight potential postures listed and discussed below: 
(1) Low  
The application will allow full access to all features on the mobile device, while 
still allowing it to be tracked on the network.254 This is the stance (later referred to as a 
state) of a device when registered, but fully unlocked. This state is also where command 
specific tailoring could take place, one example being a case where abuse of social media 
has taken place and a commanding officer may wish to lock out access to social media 
applications. Said commander could direct the security manager to lock out access to 
those specific social media applications during working hours, all managed through our 
application. This is another area for future development with our application. 
(2) Home Port Access 
While in homeport, the application will allow access to all mobile features outside 
the skin of the ship. Once internal (and after scanning a QR/NFC code), the application 
will lock out voice recording, document editing, video and image capture.255 This state is 
also one in which further tailoring could take place allowing network access on the mess 
decks, wardroom, berths or staterooms.  
                                                
253 Ibid.  
254 Ibid.  
255 Ibid.  
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(3) High 
The application will fully lockdown all features on all mobile devices. This will 
be utilized in times of heightened security such as during wartime or highly sensitive 
operations.256 Furthermore this state represents the most restrictive stance of the 
application applying controls over the device. 
(4) Visitor 
While in homeport and overseas, tours of U.S. naval warships occur frequently. 
This setting is for all visitors who are visiting the ship at port. It lockouts all features of 
the device, and provide near real time access attempt notifications to the security team. It 
also requires registration and application download prior to commencement of any 
tour.257 A significant amount of discussion went into topic, as the potential for release of 
our application as open source presents certain security threats, such as manipulation and 
introduction of malware of spyware. One consensus calls for the design of a visitor 
application that stood alone from the other DOD based application. This of course 
presents its own challenges as legalities with manipulating the settings of an individual’s 
phone could raise alarms with the individual or their organization. Any common sense 
individual can also easily see how this could be an issue for a high-ranking dignitary 
visiting a ship on short notice in a foreign port. 
(5) Secret and Higher 
Full lockdown of device prior to accessing the space.258 This and the High setting 
discussed above were chosen in the design phase as the starting point for development 
with the rationale that if we could fully lock down the device we should be able to tailor 
those lockdown executions based on the settings listed herein. In this thesis we apply 
what we agree to as the most threating features to security as the starting point, namely 
camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, microphone, and mobile data. 
                                                
256 Ibid.  
257 Ibid.  
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(6) Video and Image Sensitive 
For evolutions deemed appropriate by the commanding officer and his team such 
as missile launches, classified ships maneuvers, video and image capture features should 
be locked down.259 Every member of the team identified a time at their command that the 
leadership had expressed concern over the open availability of mobile device image and 
video capture. One such event was the launch of a tomahawk missile in 7th Fleet. While 
thoroughly documented and discussed on the Internet, the full video capture of all phases 
of launch was captured by crew members spectating and resulted in significant delays in 
releasing the phone back to crewmembers due to security evaluations of the video data. 
This is one very public example, but any individual with military experience can envision 
times when video and image recording could threaten the security of the exercise, sailors, 
of the command.  
(7) Underway 
Lockdown camera, GPS, and wireless access as deemed necessary by the 
commanding officer and his security team.260 This is a specific posture identified by the 
American members of the team as essential given our experience with sailors accessing 
their mobile devices during high risk underway operations such as sea and anchor details, 
underway replenishments, or flight operations. In all the situations listed, individuals 
have been found utilizing their devices when in proximity of cell or data signals, not only 
distracting from their duties, but in also in the case of GPS providing potential signaling 
data to adversaries. 
(8) Silence 
All the devices are set to be silent, by disabling their speakers and headset 
outputs.261 This is a setting identified by the entirety of the team and speaks to the need 
for device silence in sensitive meetings where high-ranking individuals are speaking or 
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being briefed. Everyone spoke to separate instances where a silence option would have 
provided critical backup to a lower ranking individual whose phone alarmed or rang 
while someone several pay grades above them was speaking or being honored.  
c. Application Employment 
As part of larger adoption of our application, we attempt to identify as many 
critical stages as possible, where the program and associated application require 
leadership training, interaction and use. As with all things military, we identify early that 
the need for training on any new system or process could not be avoided. We therefore 
try to keep our application and its associated process as basic as possible, and have 
operation and flow occur as closely as possible to applications and systems with which 
most would have experience. As a result, we identify five specific stages and identified 
the critical steps in each stage to ensure the intended goal for the user is met, as discussed 
below. 
(1) System Initialization 
With all of the members of our team having experienced the implementation of 
new software or programs at previous commands, we all felt comfortable with targeting 
initialization as a critical stage in the utilization of the security application. We therefore 
brake initialization up into two parts, System preparation and Training, making the 
former dependent on the latter so that opportunities for training on the system cannot be 
bypassed by leadership, security personnel, or users as seen in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24.  System initialization 
 
Source: Dorney et al., “CS3004 Project 1: Mobile Security at Sea.”  
One of the key events identified in this stage is the need to have a source of baseline data 
from which to draw the initial system software. This data storage and management is a 
significant piece to any major technology implementation in the Navy. We propose it for 
future work as an opportunity for SPAWAR or 10th Fleet to manage and direct software 
implementations and updates to our application. 
The other key piece to initialization is the notion of two types of registration, the 
first for commanders and security managers, and the other for the users or ships force. 
We envision the registration in the case of leadership and security personnel involving 
facial recognition and user password combinations as seen in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25.  Commanding officer and security manager facial recognition and 
username password screen 
  
Source: Dorney et al., “CS3004 Project 3: Mobile Security at Sea.”  
This provided for two-layer security access to setting for said individuals, but again 
requires database storage and management for name, facial data, password, and username 
information.  
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(2) All Hands Device Registration 
In this critical stage, we identify the need to identify and register each device into 
the command database. The user inputs their username, a password, and then the system 
generates a QR code that is scanned by command security management for input into the 
security system. Our goal in this stage is to ensure that the database accurately captures 
all of the user’s information and correlates it to device specific information. We place a 
simple repeating step to the process so that all the devices a user owns are registered and 
reported to the management suite of software as seen in Figure 26. In this process, each 
device registered generates a new QR code that is individually uploaded to the command 
managed database for storage and tracking as required. Registration via QR code 
generation presents database management and security related challenges. For that 
reason, we now envision the application reporting features of the device including user 
name and division on initial connection to the network following application installation 
on a device. By these means, the application sends a report to the system containing 
IMEI, IMSI, User ID etc., and is stored within the system suite for access in report 
generation and device monitoring.  
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Figure 26.  Device registration process 
 
Source: Dorney et al., “CS3004 Project 3: Mobile Security at Sea.”   
(3) Space Specific Lockdown 
This feature spans initial QR code and eventual NFC tag implementations of our 
application design. The ability of a security manager and their respective command to 
determine specific postures and have those postures translate into device security settings, 
then rapidly deploy that setting mechanism to the space in question is deemed essential to 
the success of our application by all parties involved in our research. Initially we envision 
a QR code posted outside a space that could be readily updated by the security manger as 
seen in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27.  QR code implementation of security settings at various spaces in a 
command 
 
Source: Dorney et al., “CS3004 Project 3: Mobile Security at Sea.”  
This seems ideal, but based on the size and management requirements of useable QR 
generation software, combined with the storage and security of QR code libraries, we 
migrate to utilization of NFC writer and tags. In place of generating a QR code, posting 
outside a space, and having users scan it, we write to an NFC tag that initiates the 
security features built into our application and tailored by the security manager. These 
tags are inexpensive, disposable, and are able to be written so that they are read only, 
preventing any future access to data on the tag. Writing is also a non-issue, as multiple 
downloadable mobile application exits for tag writing, as does hardware devices that can 
be connected to a management suite. Furthermore, tag writing can be limited to specific 
users, allowing the security manager to re-write a tag as needed without fear of 
compromise from other individuals with malicious intent.  
 144 
(4) Real-Time Security Posture Change 
Having been in multiple scenarios whereby the commanding officer or his 
designated official have to make a command wide announcement to secure mobile 
devices, the need for a real time push to change the security setting on every registered 
uses device is deemed vital. To this end, we identify a Wi-Fi enabled and non-Wi-Fi 
enabled scenario for rapid changes to security setting on devices as seen in Figure 28. 
Figure 28.  Real-time security posture change 
 
Source: Dorney et al., “CS3004 Project 3: Mobile Security at Sea.”  
Again, this early design incorporates the use of QR codes. In a Wi-Fi disabled 
environment, this involves printing out new QR codes and posting them throughout the 
command, or carrying pre-printed QR codes. For the pivot into NFC, we envision a 
predetermined setting written to a tag that is placed in a position of easy access such as a 
manager’s clipboard or on the bridge log. These settings could be any of the above 
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postures or a tailored version of any of them and written to a tag. Having several tags 
labelled and adhered to the back of a clipboard or log is one fast and effective method to 
rapidly change postures in a situation where Wi-Fi is not enabled. In a case where Wi-Fi 
is enabled, a system wide push notification updates all connected devices settings as 
desired by the commanding officer or security manager. This is not currently built into 
our application but is a significant consideration for future work as discussed in Chapter 
V.  
(5) Report Generation 
Having all spent time answering to senior officers, most military personnel 
understand how often the manager requires a system report or wants to know the status of 
a system or process. For that eventuality we incorporate report generation into the critical 
stages of our application. This feature is not part of the current application 
implementation, but identified as a significant area for future development in our 
application. We envision the ability to press a button interface within the application and 
have the system report back all desired information, such as number of users, users by 
setting and posture, and users and associated devices. This again points to the need for 
database management and is another area for future work. 
B. EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
At onset we had no background in Java, the underlying programming language 
used in Android programming, or the Android environment itself. This proved to be a key 
setback as our early attempts to manipulate the settings and features we identified in 
conceptualization were not successful. As discussed in Chapter III, we commence our 
development in a major technology shift period for Android development. At the time of 
initial conceptualization, Eclipse was still in widespread use and for the most part no 
local resources or instructions were available for the industry shift to Android Studio. 
Several hours were spent in the research phase of identifying each feature we sought to 
lockdown, accessing the classes and methods that allowed us to manipulate those 
features, only to find that through the Eclipse IDE, numerous features were no longer 
applicable or worked across any reasonable range of devices, either emulated or actual. In 
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fact, after two months of attempting to program Android in Eclipse, we were forced to 
transition to Android Studio in order to access the full power of Androids OS.  
Once inside Android Studio our principle approach to tackling each feature 
involves creating an instance of each feature. For example, we create an instance of the 
camera, display it on the screen, then shut it off. This is done for camera and microphone 
but proves impossible in the case of Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or cell data. In these three cases, 
we have to implement a toggle switch that enables on and off functionality, as we cannot 
initially programmatically toggle each feature. Again this leads us to a shift in our focus, 
as we are convinced there has to be a method to restrict access to these features beyond 
building in toggle switches. As a note the encapsulation method we built in our initial 
attempts at application design are not conducive to initiation via QR code or NFC. 
Specifically, as we progress through Wi-Fi and Bluetooth toggling, we are encapsulating 
the event toggle inside other toggle events, activated by buttons, leading to convolution 
of event logic. This logic flaw progresses into a situation where button presses are not 
connected to all the events for the desired outcome of the event, for example “lockdown” 
results in turning Wi-Fi on and Bluetooth off. This again drives us to shift our focus to 
build the interaction event, i.e., the swiping of an NFC device, and then encapsulate the 
features we wanted to access inside that event. This provides a critical point for 
development moving forward. We now realize that we have two very distinct events to 
manage and code for: (1) activity driven system response such as NFC swipe, and (2) 
lockdown and unlock. Furthermore, we need to focus on seamless integration of the 
activities that drove system responses, avoiding logic flaws and outdated class features. 
C. ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT 
Realizing that we cannot possibly capture all the features and critical stages in our 
application without establishing the basic functionality of lockdown and unlock 
controlled by NFC device, we have to scale down the scope and focus on the lock/unlock 
activity first. In doing so we develop a use case scenario to better understand the steps we 
want to accomplish in the act of lockout out the mobile device. We then create sequence 
diagrams for those steps, which further assist us breaking down how we go after each part 
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of the application. Once we define a scaled down version of our goal, visualize how this 
goal might be achieved, and what steps are required, we move into advanced 
development. Through early analysis of requirements, critical stages, and visual 
interpretation of steps, we are able to step into development at a streamlined point of 
origin, where our application is not trying to solve the entire problem set by meeting all 
the requirements in one place, rather addressing a very specific set of lockdown features 
requiring simple UI. In Figure 29, we break down the four basic steps we wanted to 
accomplish with our application as a user entered and then exited a secure facility. Note 
that at any point with the application running in the foreground, the status of the features 







Figure 29.  4 step use case diagram for use of security application 
 
In this use case diagram, a user has the security application on their device and progresses 
through a secure area. Locking and unlocking the device is accomplished in four steps: 
(1) swipe NFC tag, (2) Application locks features on device, User enters the secure space 
with device locked down, (3) user exits the space then swipes an NFC tag, (4) application 
unlocks access to device features. Note the five features we are trying to manipulate in 
this implementation are Camera, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Microphone, and Cell Data. 
The desired interactions in each step are captured in sequence diagrams shown in 
Figures 30 (lock) and Figure 31 (unlock). As stated above, breaking down the 
interactions as we understand them and identifying the interaction we are able to solve 
critical issues related to how we are attempting to manipulate the mobile device state. For 
instance, the NFC itself triggers the application through the OS, not triggering individual 






Figure 30.  Lockdown interaction diagram 
 
A simplified interaction diagram that captures the four step interaction between the 
mobile device, the NFC tag, and the security application.  
Figure 31.  Unlock interaction diagram 
 
The reversal of the lockdown noted in Figure 29, this interaction diagram shows the 
unlock interactions between the mobile device, NFC tag, and the security application. 
As we step into the locking and unlocking of features we realize that the Android 
programming environment contains literally thousands of super classes, classes, and 
methods that are used throughout the activity life cycle to achieve the ends of each 
activity. In our early more basic research we assumed that we would be able to utilize a 
feature, such as opening an instance of the camera, and then enveloping that instance in a 
lockdown activity. Interestingly enough we have discovered that we need to access very 
specific classes that further access the lockdown function associated with a feature. Even 
more challenging is the fact that certain features are not directly lockable, that is to say 
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the OS cannot directly deny access to these features, based on Android principle of least 
privilege. A reminder from Chapter III, according to this architecture, no one application 
can utilize any one resource at a higher priority than another.262 Furthermore, this OS 
rule also restricts access to classes and methods according to permissions. These two 
aspects are discussed more thoroughly below. 
1. Lock and Unlock Access 
After numerous attempts to simply lock out access to features, and investigating 
Androids principle of least principle we identify one crucial piece of development 
information: various system permissions are required to execute these lockdowns. The 
next critical step is ensuring that the locking methods we use fully captured each feature. 
In many instances, we catch one feature during startup, but do not address it if the feature 
is already running, or while the device is changing state. These are flushed out through 
our continuous efforts to capture every event related to each feature, and they are 
discussed below under intents. With respect to actually locking out a feature however, 
permissions themselves define the scope of method usage and ultimate device feature 
access.  
a. Permissions 
Permissions are coded into the AndoridManifest.xml, which is the root file for the 
application.263 This file contains among other things the activities, broadcast receivers, 
services, and links those such items to an associated permission. In a more specific sense, 
and a direct finding in our research, the most thoroughly written android activities and 
broadcast receivers will do exactly nothing if they do not have the proper permissions, 
and low level debugging is required to catch situations where either of those aspects of a 
program (activities or broadcast receivers) do not have the proper permissions. The 
second and perhaps more important factor with respect to permissions is various groups 
of permissions. As stated by Google, the two most common groups are normal 
                                                
262 Developer, “Application Fundamentals.”  
263 Developer, “App Manifest,” accessed January 18, 2016, 
http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/manifest-intro.html. 
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permissions and dangerous permissions.264 Normal permissions include any permission 
that allows access to any data that is native to the sandbox of the application, such as 
setting an alarm, or launching a web browser.265 Dangerous permissions on the other 
hand are those permissions that an application seeks such that user data is affected, 
privacy is threatened, or system wide effects are expected as a result of the permission 
given. This presents a very critical turning point in our research as our application 
initially seeks to use a dangerous permission: we want to lock out access to features 
system wide and prevent the user from manipulating that setting. As a result, we re-work 
our attempts at accessing those permissions by using others as seen in Figure 32 and as 
discussed below.  
Figure 32.  Security application list of permissions 
 
Android Studio permissions listed in the AndroidManifest.xml file showing the 
permissions utilized in our security application. 
(1) Dangerous Permissions 
Note that writing permissions that Google and the Android IDE identify as 
dangerous requires not only permission written in the AndroidManifest.xml but also an 
intent that sends an approval request to the  user anytime that permission is accessed.266 
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http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/security/permissions.html. 
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This is a feature that comes as part of the Android update in API 23. Prior to this update, 
authorizations were granted at installation of an application. Google and numerous 
forums identify the installation acknowledgements for dangerous permission granting as 
a security flaw that takes control of the device away from the user.267 This is an 
important finding as it changes the nature of our application. If every time an attempt to 
change system wide setting results in user prompting for each individual feature to grant 
authorization for setting change, our application becomes burdensome, inefficient, and 
something people generally try to avoid using. Note that normal permissions (non-
dangerous) are still handled at installation and do not usually require user authorization, 
making them a more appropriate target for use. Given this challenge, we pivot late in 
development and take a different approach on just about every feature we are attempting 
to control via dangerous permissions, resulting in the need for device policy 
administration and broadcast receivers, discussed in the section under that name. 
(2) Normal Permissions 
Our application, in the current iteration, uses only normal permissions to avoid the 
added interactions that are required when using dangerous permissions as seen in Figure 
32. There are a couple of lesser used permissions we employ that are worth identifying 
here, as until we discovered their need and associated potential, our application was 
functioning in a diminished capacity. First among them is 
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED. This permission enables our application to receive 
system wide notification that the device has completed booting, essential for tracking of a 
restart of the device and our attempts at maintaining a listening state within device for 
attempts to reboot out of the lockdown/unlock state the application was in prior to 
shutdown.  
Another permission worth noting is MODIFY_PHONE_STATES. This 
permission is required for a few of our features, but is considered a diminished 
permission with reduced capacity. As discussed above, within the principle of least 
privilege this permission is only able to touch the non-dangerous states of the phone, i.e., 
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those that reside in the sandbox of the application. That said this method grants access to 
monitoring and not actually modifying phone states.  
The NFC permission (android.permission.NFC) is worth discussing as well in so 
far as it is an older (API 9) permission, but a highly effective one. It contains the 
permissions for full functionality and interaction with NFC tags. Given the scope of 
available tag types (four unique types), modes (peer-to-peer, read/write, card 
emulation)268 and interaction methods, this normal permission is very self-contained in 
that it grants full access to all NFC capabilities. As an example, compare NFC to Wi-Fi. 
Our manipulation of Wi-Fi required extensive research to identify effective permissions, 
as opposed to the all-inclusive design and rapidly employed NFC permission. Also notice 
in Figure 32 that both NETWORK_STATE and WIFI_STATE are required for Wi-Fi 
features we access, and further that both require ACCESS and CHANGE components to 
accomplish the same functions NFC accomplishes in one permission. 
2. Methods of Control
Having run into roadblocks with permissions we pivot and seek out other ways to 
control the five features in our initial implementation. This change of how we think about 
controlling features is key to our success as it breaks our application into three distinct 
approaches to achieve lockdown. First, we have discovered the device policy manager 
that Google developed for an enterprise solution for mobile devices. Using this approach, 
we realize that specific features can be controlled at the system level within a managed 
profile that is created and approved at application installation. Second, for the features 
not built into the Device Policy Manager we have decided to build broadcast receivers to 
receive notification of intents (such as Wi-Fi state change), and then allow the application 
to enforce a simple on or off setting related to those intents. And third, we have 
discovered that one specific feature is controllable programmatically without the need for 
a managed profile or broadcast receiver, namely the microphone.  
268 Gerald Madlmayr, “NFC Development & Consulting,” NFC Development Consulting, March 8, 
2011. http://www.nfc.cc/technology/nfc/.   
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a. Device Policy Manager 
The Device Policy Manager class provides the deepest level of control for the 
accessible features, as the permissions and services controlled therein operate at the root 
level in the OS. This class is supported through the Device Administration API, whereby 
the device installs the application as an administration application and the user grants 
system level access to it.269 In the case of our application this access is granted in return 
for being able to utilize a mobile device at work, adhering to the reward for access 
guidance from Google. In any case, upon discovering this API, we immediately explored 
the features that we can enforce with its system policies and privileges. Unfortunately, 
the only feature of use to our application included in the current version of the API is the 
camera. Several other useful features are available to be programmed into the profile, 
such as wipe features for number of password attempts and lost device situations, but 
they are not within the scope of our current research. 
Within the Device Policy Manger, locking and unlocking of the camera is very 
straight forward and dependable, as expected given the system level privileges inherent to 
its implementation. As seen in Figure 33 by casting the SystemService context of the 
Device_Policy_Service into DevicePolicyManager, built in class features take care of 
system prompts to the user for acknowledgement of privileges, and present the 
administrator authorization screen, buttons, and handlers for a UI. Given the degree of 
built in features for this policy administration, this is the preferred means of controlling 
all the features on the device we seek to control. For this reason, and for others noted 
throughout the broadcast receiver section, we recommend DOD and Navy approach 
Google to have other feature policy restrictions built into Device Policy Manager as the 
most effective way to ensure that devices are fully locked down. 
                                                
269 Developer, “Device Administration.”  
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Figure 33.  Device policy administrator construction 
 
 
Construction of the devicePolicyManager in the OnCreate class.  
b. Intents and Broadcast Receivers 
Given the lack of access to all features we seek to control beside camera (Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth, Mobile Data and Microphone) with in the Device Policy Manager class, we 
had to find another way to have our application be aware of device access attempts, 
without requiring system level “dangerous” permissions. This drove us to look deeper at 
the actual components of the Android application architecture, and specifically utilize the 
Broadcast Receiver component. The amount of time taken to delve into the 
implementation of a broadcast receiver in our application cannot be overstated, as the 
complexity and system knowledge required to identify, register, and wire up responses 
for the activity driven intents that the broadcast receiver must listen for is extensive and 
multi-facetted. We include specific examples below as we implement and test, implement 
and test, along the Agile programming method. In layman’s terms, by utilizing the 
broadcast receiver method of notification we essentially tell the system our application 
wants to be notified of any attempt to access a feature, like the proverbial hand in the 
cookie jar causing an audible alarm. We then programmatically take some action based 
on that notification to either initiate lockdown/unlock, or ensure the desired state is still in 
place and enforced via simple on and off commands. 
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(1) Intents 
As stated above the most complicated factor in getting our application to function 
properly outside the initial plan whereby we accessed dangerous permissions is by 
utilizing broadcast receivers and associated intents. In trying to build broadcast receivers 
for the application countless hours were spent trying to determine the appropriate, 
effective, and authorized intents filters for the system broadcasts of feature access 
attempts (i.e., turn on Wi-Fi). Once the desired intent filter is found and assigned, it must 
be registered with the appropriate broadcast receiver. Our applications intents are 
registered in the ConnectionMonitor (extends broadcast monitor) class that contains all 
the methods that the program will execute when the OS sends it a filtered intent. Notice 
in Figure 34 that the various features we access require different intents. The most 
challenging system broadcast to address is Wi-Fi, which has multiple intents available in 
the WiFiManager class. Our initial attempts to trigger receiver responses to Wi-
Fi.STATE_CHANGE were unsuccessful at catching more fine-grained system state 
changes related to Wi-Fi state. For that reason, we add the designated fine-grained 
supplicant states that address specific access to the security protocols of Wi-Fi initiation 
(WPA) via Wi-Fi.supplicant.STATE_CHANGE and .CONNECTION_CHANGE. 
Figure 34.  Security application intents 
 
MainActivity.java file intents that we declare and then register with the broadcast 
receiver for OS notification suring system wide broadcasts. 
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(2) Broadcast Receivers 
The aim here is to capture every possible system broadcast and drive some 
reaction to that broadcast. We take the approach that a system broadcast should trigger 
our application to verify the state of the feature that triggered the notification, then check 
the state of our application (either locked down or unlocked), and then finally trigger the 
placement of the feature accessed into the state it should be in according to the state of 
our application (if they differ). We essentially listen for an attempt to change Wi-Fi or 
Bluetooth system state, determine if the state change is in accordance with our 
application current state (locked or unlocked), and then have our application step in to 
place the feature in the desired state as necessary. By doing so, we catch any other 
applications attempts to access the intents associated with turning Wi-Fi or Bluetooth on 
or off, and have our application intervene and take control of those features according to 
what state the device was in. In a running example, if a social media application attempts 
to turn Wi-Fi on, the OS broadcasts that applications intent system wide to all registered 
intents. That broadcast is picked up by our applications registered intent filters for Wi-Fi. 
In turn our application activates and resumes (in the background) programmatically 
setting the state back to the state recorded in the security application’s static memory, 
essentially revoking the Wi-Fi state change attempt out of the social media application’s 










Figure 35.  Connection monitor broadcast receiver 
 
Source: Yazan, “Prevent Android Phone from Connecting to WiFi Network,” Stackoverflow, November 
12, 2014, http://stackoverflow.com/questions/26687211/prevent-android-phone-from-connecting-to-wifi-
network-unless-my-app-approves-it. Security Application Connection Monitor Class with onReceive 
method and applicable operations for checking the intent, the state of the Wi-Fi adapter, and putting it in 
the correct state. Modified from stackoverflow. 
 
Another key to our research is building the broadcast receiver for the NFC 
interface. In fact, as stated above early development focused on QR code interface with 
our application. Through working with how a broadcast receiver would respond to a 
defined QR code our research drove us to look for a more meaningful system trigger. We 
find that QR codes need to be very specifically formatted, requiring extensive generation 
software and user experience, especially given that we seek to have our application 
respond to various different and rapidly changing QR codes. We question the immediate 
feasibility of the research required for the various aspects of QR code library security, 
management from a database standpoint, and a user in the fleets ability to easily navigate 
these issues. These issues combined with the extensive broadcast receiver issues we have 
with triggering actions from any QR code interaction, never mind specific QR codes, 
ultimately drive us to use NFC triggered events. 
NFC has instantly noticeable advantages from a programming standpoint. First 
and foremost, the ease with which permissions, intents, and broadcast receivers 
seamlessly integrated into the OS. An example is the initiation of system responses 
instantly upon creating and registering intents, and building the most basic of receivers. 
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This pushes our research in a security related direction as we seek to protect the 
application from activation via rouge NFC tags. The solution we propose is to write a 
simple binary string to the NFC tag “Hello, World!.” Our receiver looks for any string, 
and makes the required state check and change actions upon reading it. We note this as an 
important feature, as the application could be modified in future implementations such 
that the NFC receiver only reacts to specific strings. This allows for the use of secure 
hashes to be used in place of a simple string, enabling improved security over the 
authenticity of the tag. 
c. Direct Control via API Calls
The third and final method we use to control features on the device is perhaps the 
most basic and thereby potentially the least effective, namely direct API calls to the 
feature itself. We utilize this method for the microphone as we find that the permissions 
needed to mute the microphone through the AudioManager class are not deemed 
dangerous (see Figure 36). This provides instant state change to mute in a lockdown 
scenario and until our application releases the microphone state from mute, the mic is 
largely unavailable to the system. The potential flaw to this design is a situation where 
another application specifically calls on the OS to release all instances of the microphone 
in a muted state. Depending on how the OS adjudicates the precedence of that conflict 
between our application and another the OS determines which application would 
maintain control over the microphone and its muted state. This noted flaw is not observed 
in over one dozen attempts to use the microphone through other applications, whereby 
our application always remains in control of microphone and its muted setting. 
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Figure 36.  Audio manager class 
 
Security application lock for the microphone.  
d. State Related Features 
One of the persistent issues we identify in the early stages of development is the 
management of the state of the device. We want as few states as possible to prevent 
situations where complexity overruns the system logic required to manage the state of the 
device. We have come to the conclusion that we need to use binary logic toggling, and 
create the variable lockdown=!lockdown to implement this logic. This toggle is located 
inside the processFinish method that is triggered by the NFC interface. Once the NFC tag 
is read, the toggle occurs, resulting in the various lockdowns associated with each of the 
five features.  
Recognizing the need for the device to maintain a stored value that it could 
reference to check itself and reference as a context, we add the code in Figure 37 to the 
onCreate method to ensure it is built into our application from initiation on the device. 
Furthermore, we store the value of lockdown in persistent storage and through 
MODE_PRIVATE make it accessible only to our application, thereby using the system 
permissions that had previously worked against us to our advantage, by prohibiting other 
applications from accessing the applications data.  
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Security Application storage of the device lockdown state. Adapted from: Darkie, and 
Syed Junaid, “Android Shared Preferences,” Sharedpreferences. October 20, 2015, 
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/23024831/android-shared-preferences-example. 
Note that editor.comit writes to storage immediately vice editor.apply, which executes the 
write command in the background, meaning as the OS decides write time. We want the 
state written immediately and not as determined by the OS to prevent any race conditions 
related to state of the device. 
D. DESIGN LAYOUT 
As stated throughout Chapter III, and earlier in this chapter, by embracing the 
Android Studio IDE we are fully immersed in Google’s Android Design. The standards 
and specifications therein provide developers with optimal functionality and esthetically 
pleasing experiences for their intended users. With that said, for our application we stay 
as close as possible to Google’s design style and layout guidance. For the background, we 
utilize the Navy ethos “Honor Courage Commitment” image available at www.Navy.mil 
(see Figure 38). We put that image within a relative layout in order to keep the “layout 
hierarchy flat, which improves performance.”270 We then add a text view to display the 
                                                
270 Google, “Relative Layout,” accessed January 21, 2016, 
http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/ui/layout/relative.html. 
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system status and aligned it with the bottom of the screen and made the text color red. 
This provides focused, visually eye catching, immediate feedback to anyone wanting to 
ascertain the status of the device features, say for example a security manager in a secure 
space. The status text view is updated and sent to the screen programmatically inside the 
state change functions in the MainActivity.java file, again, according to Google’s 
principles for optimum performance.  




The application we developed is pictured as seen on the screens of a Nexus 9 in 
Figures 39 and 40. One notable takeaway from these images is the simplified structure of 
the display, whereby a previously approved organizational image, namely the Navy 
ethos, is used as a background, rather than recreating the wheel so to speak and 
developing the layout form the ground up. Another notable feature is the toast message in 
Figure 39 that displays the NFC initiated state change. This provides the user with instant 
feedback that the NFC has in fact been swiped and as such the state has in fact changed. 
Also notice the system status in red, and immediately visible to anyone who wishes to 
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monitor the status of the system. The statuses are updated with the java code for the 
application and indicate the feedback from the receivers or system status. 








Figure 40.  Application on screen in unlocked mode  
 
F. TESTING 
Based on our software engineering track and associated exposure, we decided 
early on that we would utilize the Agile testing approach. Between the two of us, we 
developed over a dozen different applications, with several sub variants of the last 
application. We progressed from testing code on the built in emulator on Android Studio 
to actual devices following completion of the NFC portion of the application. Testing 
took place utilizing SPAWAR provided mobile devices, and principally on a Nexus 9 and 
Samsung Galaxy S6.  
1. Testing Approach 
We begin each test cycle by uninstalling previous versions of the application, then 
initiating the application from Android Studio. This means the latest build variant is 
loaded on the device for testing. The approach we utilize is to test each feature for 
lockdown and unlock functionality via NFC tag activation. We continue manipulating the 
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code related to each feature until we achieve lockdown, then subsequent unlock. Once 
state change is achieved, we test access to the feature by other applications on the device, 
starting with system applications such as Settings, and then to others such as camera and 
then finally to third party application attempts to access locked features. Findings are 
discussed below. 
2. Camera 
The Device Policy Manger works so seamlessly that controlling this feature is the 
single easiest portion of developing this application. We literally generate code to create 
the administrator API, put it inside our NFC broadcast receiver and it completely handles 
every attempt by the system to access the camera. By default, the camera access is also 
denied for video capture when in the lockdown state. We identify this here in testing as 
further evidence that the DOD and DON should approach Google with respect to adding 
the other features identified earlier in this chapter for lockout via the Device Policy 
Manager class.  
3. Camera Race Condition 
A race condition initially existed between calling the function to disable the 
camera and the installation of the device administration policies. This results in a device 
administration popup prompt for authorization of the application as an administrator 
every time the application tries to alter the state of the camera to lockdown. The solution 
is to leave camera access enabled on application installation, relying on the NFC tag to 
initiate lockdown on initial swipe by moving the disable function inside the NFC 
receiver. We apply this NFC receiver solution across all five features that we control, 
placing all of their disable functions inside the NFC receiver.  
4. Wi-Fi 
On application start, we toggle Wi-Fi interface to on/off off/on using Wi-
FiManager. The act of toggling the Wi-Fi interface results in the OS sending an intent via 
broadcast, which got picked up by our broadcast receiver. The broadcast receiver is set to 
detect if supplicant state was to set to INTERFACE_DISABLED, if not, then we set Wi-
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FiEnabled to false, triggering WiFi to close anytime an attempt is made to set Wi-Fi to 
enabled. This results in a permanent state where Wi-Fi interface is inhibited from being 
enabled, regardless of the state of the device (locked/unlocked). The fix is to create a 
context based intent filter that is received by our broadcast receiver. This allows us to 
associate our applications context with the broadcast receiver. Hence when the broadcast 
receiver onReceive function is called, we have the application context (locked/unlocked), 
and therefore access all the states associated with the application, allowing us to know 
what the current state is, allowing us to toggle Wi-Fi, vice simply force it into locked out 
at all times. 
5. Shut Down and Restart 
With the app running and in a state of lockdown set we power down the device, 
then restart. Our observations are very interesting as upon restart, camera access remains 
disabled due to its device admin policy membership, while Wi-Fi and Bluetooth both 
regain full functionality and restart. After both services are confirmed up, we re-open our 
application which immediately disables connection to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. This means 
that the state of the application is held within the application itself, so that upon 
application restart it places the device in the anticipated state (in this case lockdown). We 
now realize that we need a way to have the application startup with system start-up to 
prevent a user from utilizing a power down to circumvent the policies enforced by the 
application. The fix for this problem is to make the application start on boot, using proper 
boot permissions. The solution as recommended by Google Developer is to implement a 
new class called BootReceiver, and is henceforth seamlessly integrated into our 
application. Now even on reboot, the application starts and restores the state of the device 
on shutdown.  
6. Mobile Data and Permissions 
Perhaps the most significant finding in our research comes from testing our 
application across multiple platforms. As stated throughout our research we intend to 
have our application be as broadly relevant to as many mobile devices used by the widest 
cross section of sailors as possible. With that said, one very important feature comes 
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about in the most recent Android API update. The loss of programmatic access to the 
MODIFY_PHONE_STATE permission and method, both of which are required for 
accessing functionality associated with mobile data. We did not initially observe the 
change, but rather came across a loss of functionality with respect to locking out device 
access to mobile data on a relatively new device. We receive the following Android 
monitor IDE log report when attempting to use 
andoird.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE: “java.lang.SecurityException: Neither 
user 10216 nor current process has android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE.” 
Through further analysis we find that the permission to access has been removed 
effective Android API 23 as per Figure 41. The documentation points at 
MODIFY_PHONE_STATE as “Not for use by third-party applications.” This would 
include our application and any other application not developed directly by Google for 
Android, or not a registered system application provided by a mobile device producer or 
provider (such as Sony, or AT&T). 
Figure 41.  Android studio API guidance documentation 
 
Screenshot from Android Studio IDE 
We have made multiple further attempts to access the permissions required to lockout 
access to mobile data though the AndroidManifest.xml file, but continue to receive the 
error message noted in the yellow box in Figure 42. 
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Figure 42.  Android IDE automatic editing guidance  
 
IDE provided guidance on the use of the 
android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE. 
As a result of the updated Android API 23 access to our applications ability to 
manipulate mobile data access has been removed. This makes the case more strongly for 
DOD and DON interaction with Google for access to this feature with in the Device 
Policy Administration class and Administrator API. We provide two potential solutions: 
(1) have this application deemed a system application by Google or (2) approach Google 
for further expansion of their Device Policy Manager class and administrator API for 
inclusion of all 8 features identified in the first part of this chapter. The former likely 
needs to involve liaison with Google in the form of a Navy representative, which is 
currently in the works via the secretary of the Navy’s Tour with Industry in which 
Google is an approved partner.271 The latter option provides more immediate 
programmatic control of the features we sought to lockout, but would require 
programmatic development by google to incorporate those features into the associated 
class. A best case scenario likely involves some hybrid of the two solutions coordinated 
through NPS under future research.  
                                                
271 Department of the Navy, “Secretary of the Navy Tours with Industry,” accessed February 15, 
2016, http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/career/talentmanagement/Pages/SNTWI.aspx. 
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V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
The rest of this section attempts to answer where these devices can be better 
enabled to operate in a DOD environment, meet current mobile device requirements, and 
provide a structure to plan implementation. It is not all-inclusive, but can guide towards 
reasonable implementation for enabling maintenance records access, unclassified forms, 
eLearning, or even safety information for jobs and chemicals. We have stepped through 
what we believe is required from documentation described in Chapter II and is available 
from Android’s device solutions. 
A. THE LARGER PICTURE OF BYOD 
The application demonstrated in this thesis attempts to tackle the security 
vulnerabilities presented by the hardware capabilities on the smart device with a 
lightweight, software solution. We clearly attempt to address the issue of the insider 
threat by disabling those capabilities of a device that present an opportunity to violate 
security. However, this is just one small part of a much larger DOD initiative that seems 
to have a lot of backing but no apparent way forward. That is not to say that DISA and 
NIST are ignoring the potential in these devices, but so far BYOD has been a big project 
for the future.  
Enterprise solutions enabling reasonably current smart devices are in place, but 
these devices are still behind the technology curve in most cases. Examining DISA’s 
approved product list supports this claim.272 While it is possible to now use an Android 
enabled Samsung Galaxy S6, it is still only allowed on a prior operating system version. 
The iOS devices are still limited to iPhone 5 variants and are only allowed up through 
iOS 8. Since iOS 9 is now the standard, procuring devices with the older operating 
system creates a challenge to these devices. When purchasing new devices from Apple, it 
                                                
272 Defense Systems Information Agency keeps a list of currently approved products on their website. 
This is supported with dropdowns to search by device type. When visiting the site 
(https://aplits.disa.mil/processAPList.action) a user should select multifunction mobile devices for all 
vendors to get a full list of currently approved devices and view the valid operating system and 
notifications associated with each. 
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is the company’s policy that the most current version of the operating system be on the 
device. 
B. RECOMMENDED FEATURES 
Our application touches on one small piece of securing a device to be carried 
about a Navy ship. The potential for future work and making this an implementable 
solution cannot be overstated. The following areas are either required by previous 
policies referenced are are recommended to grow the application to play a bigger role in 
BYOD.  
1. Authorization Banners 
Access to a DOD system or unclassified devices used in a DOD facility is 
generally initiated by accepting a warning banner. This banner informs the user of proper 
use of the system, what is not acceptable, and stands as notification that accessing the 
network guarantees no privacy if data is transferred over the network. Additionally, it has 
a user interaction that is required to proceed. This is generally a simple click of an “OK” 
button or clicking a tick box and then proceeding. In any scenario where this banner 
exists, it does require active user acknowledgement to proceed. 
A pop up of this nature could be built into the application and should exist prior to 
being implemented in any fashion. The pop up should happen after scanning the NFC tag 
and should immediately required the user to hit ok before proceeding. A time limit to 
accept does not need to be established for the banner, but the application should keep 
track of whether or not this banner was accepted (this would be a simple Boolean state 
change) before actually releasing any other activity on the phone. To be noted, the policy 
put in place by the NFC tag scan should be immediately implemented, regardless of 
whether the banner has been acknowledged. The phone should still have all required 
hardware and transfer methods disabled, even if the user forgot to click ok on a policy 
banner. An example of a DOD email banner text is given in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43.  An example consent to use banner from a military email exchange 
server 
 
An example of a government system access warning dialogue box. This requires acknowledgement by the 
user before any access is granted. A similar box should be adapted before our application is used. The text 
should mention specifically what the application blocks and that subverting any of the applications normal 
operation is a violation of secure BYOD policy. Adapted from unclassified military mail access site: 
https://web-mont05.mail.mil/my.policy. 
2. Separate Memory Space 
The Android operating system allows applications to save files within an 
application such that the files cannot be accessed by the user outside of the application 
and no other application can reach in and pull the information out.273 Management of 
                                                
273 Storage of files within an application and device internal storage management is described in the 
Android Developer Guide at http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/data/data-storage.html.  
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storage on a device can give some powerful flexibility when it comes to an 
implementable BYOD policy. Enterprise solutions already create a partition in memory 
for access to classified and unclassified information and official access to email and 
contacts. Files are accessed and maintained within the application’s allocated storage, 
reducing the possibility of spillage. Setting up the internal storage is not a difficult task 
for an application programmer, but it would absolutely be a requirement for any BYOD 
application that designed to access official files on a local network or pull emails from a 
DOD exchange server. 
With reference to future applications, we would like to see storage space set aside 
for saving emails, ship’s policy instructions and publications, and access to learning 
requirements. This information, saved locally, would allow greater flexibility for those 
users that routinely need information, possibly outside of access to a network. An 
example of where this would be useful is in Force Protection. Generally, before pulling in 
to a foreign country’s pier, the ship’s leadership will receive force protection updates and 
the pier laydown (how the pier is physically configured along with security structures). 
As a Force Protection Officer (FPO), it would be a benefit to be able to walk the pier 
once a ship has pulled in, compare current conditions with ship’s instructions and Navy 
force protection policy, and adjust maps so that the host/husbanding agent can ensure the 
greatest level of protection. Accessing this information before leaving the ship’s network 
and being able to carry it on a manageable device instead of multiple binders would give 
the FPO greater flexibility and keep references at his fingertips. Creating an application 
with allocated storage space would allow for this feature. 
Since Android already separates files saved within an application, access to the 
data from outside of that application’s sandbox is controlled and is not possible. There 
would have to be limits to what is kept on the phone, but that falls under policy and could 
be set up within the application. Additionally, establishing file size limits will help 
manage storage space and keep users aware of the items that are saved on their phone. 
Removing older, no longer needed data should be a requirement so that only those files 
and records needed to do a current job are kept inside the application. 
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3. Network White Listing 
Building a ship’s network to access additional features will be discussed later in 
this chapter, but the utility of accessing a list of approved networks should not be 
overlooked. Security is the goal of our application and we have demonstrated those 
features that can be controlled in an Android environment. It is worth noting that 
programmers are also provided methods by which they can limit access to networks or 
provide a list of approved networks. Putting this information directly into the application 
would require oversight and should not be changed at the user level without a security 
manager’s approval, but it can be built in. Further discussion of why this is useful will be 
discussed in the section about a ship’s wireless network. 
4. Mobile Data Solution 
Since Android has removed the ability to control mobile data, and it is unknown if 
a creative solution to shut this feature down exists, then some exploration on this topic is 
warranted. Android removed the access to this feature under the auspices of preventing 
applications from turning on or increasing mobile data usage. A lot of control is however 
currently offered to users to monitor data usage, which applications are using the most 
data, and mobile data can be restricted app by app instead of only turning it off or on. 
This is very handy for users. If access to the way this works can be gained via code, then 
the application could possibly just set all data moving through apps to zero. If a solution 
is not provided by Google, then this is a communication consideration that may not be 
able to be secured at the application level. 
5. Report Space Casualty 
This particular recommendation is a long-distance hope that makes sense based 
on our combined time on surface ships and submarines. Once an application and intranet 
has progressed to where policy appropriately manages mobile devices on the unit, 
logging exists for which devices are permitted on the network, and users have been 
trained on appropriate use, it is not unreasonable to place a button on the app that can 
report smoke, flooding, a personnel accident, etc. This should never be used when 
traditional reporting mechanisms are available, but in a connected ship it could be 
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beneficial. Consider a situation in which a sailor has been trapped or injured and is unable 
to reasonably move to where he can report his condition or situation. If this sailor had a 
mobile device on him with access to a connection, he could hit a button that reported to a 
server that would notify someone sitting watch in engineering and on the quarterdeck, as 
appropriate. The logging of such notifications and on a server would minimize the chance 
for abuse to levels similar to internal communication reporting mechanisms. This simple 
addition could provide a mechanism for injured or trapped sailors to report their 
condition prior to being discovered by someone making rounds. 
6. Plug Ins 
When we discussed this idea for an application that locks down a device with 
SPAWAR, a Marine listening to the conversation was quickly interested. He related a 
story where on deployment in Afghanistan he and his men were having issues with the 
maps they were taking when leaving base. Because of how dynamic the environment was 
and how often they were diverted, carrying the necessary paper maps for such a large 
area was almost impossible. He worked through his chain of command, eventually 
getting an admiral’s permission, to use iPads to load area maps. This is not normally 
acceptable and the devices are not permitted. However, his environment necessitated an 
innovative approach to the problem. 
When we mentioned how we could shut down components of the device to 
eliminate some security concerns he asked about the feasibility of adding access to other 
information, based on his experience with the maps. This led us to consider adding a plug 
in feature for the application. We imagine an application that, once a device is secure, 
provides a drop down or menu to available features. If a sailor wishes to load ship 
instructions, the PDF can open up in the application with a PDF viewer component. If a 
sailor wishes to complete training, then a lite, in-app browser opens the page on a local 
server to finish and report the training. If a sailor is conducting maintenance, then the 
appropriate MRC can open. Adding plug ins for additional features would not be as 
straight forward, and would require additional oversight to ensure they were not 
bypassing security features, but could be a manageable, flexible addition. 
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C. SEPARATE TECHNOLOGY 
In addition to the recommended changes above, solutions off the device are also 
proposed. When added to a function application that locks down features and has the 
capability to be used by the sailor, the following pieces of technology will help in 
providing a more secure and useful environment. 
1. Ship’s Wireless Network 
As the application stands, we attempt to disable as many ways to transfer data as 
possible. This demonstrates that data transfer methods can be controlled. It is not 
absolutely necessary to disable the Wi-Fi on the device, and in the future it would be 
beneficial to have Wi-Fi turned on. This would enable access to a local network that 
contained ship’s databases, document repositories, and online training. Having a Wi-Fi 
network white list could enable the application to choose to connect to the ship’s intranet 
while ignoring other incoming connection requests. This would also allow moving the 
Internet control from being a smart device consideration to a network setup 
consideration, reducing greater app requirements. 
When a ship’s intranet is set up, the network administrator can easily set up 
folders that could be accessed from an application. We are considering the ability to pull 
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) for hazardous materials, Maintenance Requirement 
Cards (MRC) for gear, and even access to ship’s publications, email, or the lightweight 
version of Navy Learning. The ship’s security manager could operate a database that is 
checked any time a phone gets on the network, verifying a device is registered and its 
user has been trained on appropriate usage. A network no only increases the amount that 
can be done with the device, but gives a greater option for device management to ship’s 
leadership. 
Being able to complete training requirements from a tablet or phone while sitting 
on the mess deck would reduce the time sailors spend waiting for a computer to open up 
and would increase how quickly commands can report that a training requirement is 
completed. Additionally, a network administrator could configure the network to refuse 
and block all inbound/outbound connections not specifically associated with NKO. In this 
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way, if a high-speed connection were available, access to training could be increased 
beyond what is available on the ship’s server version of NKO. 
The flexibility to use a device appropriately will increase when a network 
communication option is offered. However, policy must be established to outline smart 
use and network setup. Restrictions against internal ship networks will have to be 
adjusted to accommodate routine use of a wireless connection. Placement of access 
points must be considered and power must be adjusted so that they cannot be accessed 
outside of desired spaces, or more importantly, inside off-limits spaces. Additionally, the 
previously mentioned banner must be incorporated into the app and it must mention that a 
DOD or Navy network is being accessed. Implementing a ship’s Wi-Fi network for smart 
devices would not be difficult in practice, but would require substantial planning and 
documentation so that it follows Navy policy and best practices. 
2. Publication Server 
Sitting on the wireless network can be access to various pieces of information. 
One of the frustrations of working on a ship is the need to get regular access to ship’s 
documents and publications. Unclassified, FOUO documents are referenced regularly 
while in various spaces throughout the ship. Having the ability to access a repository of 
manuals, ship’s instructions, the Plan of the Day, and other documents as leadership sees 
fit would enable a sailor to more easily seek documented guidance. Given the limited 
number of computers on a ship this could provide a large amount of flexibility and would 
be references at the fingertips of leadership and junior sailors alike. 
3. Ship’s Database and Management 
Chapter IV discussed in depth an HTML implementation of a security manager 
interface. This lightweight example allows for logging of devices that are permitted on 
the ship, can provide when settings are changed on the phone, and could push updates to 
the main screen of the sailors’ devices once configured. These updates could be 
notifications of required training or that their device is no longer permitted until a 
security update has been performed to the application. The security manager would also 
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use this interface to configure and write new NFC tags for use in accordance with the 
CO’s standing orders and general guidance. 
4. Space Alarms for Mobile Devices 
One of the biggest reasons we want to write a software solution to disable 
hardware capabilities is because of how often we hear stories of a sailor accidentally 
going into Combat, Radio, or some other restricted space with a mobile device. These 
will be in the pocket of the sailor, and their presence in these spaces represent a 
significant security issue. By the letter of current security requirements, the command 
should send a self-report each time this occurs, and the device is supposed to be taken 
and examined to ensure no classified data is on the device. While our application would 
not remove the self-reporting requirement, it can definitely provide amplifying 
information on the status of the device at the time the violation occurred. 
For example, consider the following: a mobile device in Combat for the duration 
of a scenario in which classified actions and preplanned responses to enemy actions are 
occurring. Sending a message that details the scenario and that the device was present 
creates a difficult situation for the CO and the sailor but is a requirement. If the CO had 
the ability to note in his message that the device had been locked down in accordance 
with policy, the sailor had received the training prior to entering the space (but clearly 
requires remediation), and no data had been recorded to the device or left the device 
should relieve some concern. However, what if none of that were necessary? What if as 
soon as a sailor entered a space, a sniffer picked up his mobile device, which is searching 
for a Wi-Fi signal, and alerted leadership that a device had entered the space? 
There are multiple commercial solutions that would easily allow such a situation 
to exist. Devices that detect cell phones are not new, and sensitivity to the various 
communication methods are device dependent. However, installing and tuning a 
detection system to an appropriate power setting such that it can sense a mobile device in 
a space such as Combat without providing false alarms from devices walking in 
proximity to the space is not a terribly difficult task. It is our recommendation that as 
policy adjusts for BYOD, as an application is built, and as a ship’s network is managed 
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and grows appropriately that these devices be installed in off-limits spaces for quick 
notification and reaction of a device entering. 
D. FUTURE WORK WRAP-UP 
The development of this application allows us to look inside a wide range of 
publications and standard practices for mobile devices. The thought of minimizing the 
insider threat drove initial research but expanded into the realm of BYOD. Looking at 
how much this is discussed by high-level leadership within the DOD and DISA while 
having very little published on implementation, we feel it is important to provide a small 
piece for future work. For example, if the goal is to develop an eLearning capability 
afloat such that sailors can use their personal devices, then future work could focus on 
going that direction. Security mechanisms should be built using the OS developer APIs 
and policy should be developed to guide training and implementation. 
Without picking a single goal for testing how this will work, getting that goal 
supported by the DOD and DISA, and providing oversight from security policies BYOD 
will continue to simply be a goal. If sailors can check into a ship, have their devices set 
up to operate in the ship’s environment, and easily transition to and from that 
environment then the Navy will have provided something significant for the sailors and 
taken a smart, active approach at reducing risks and practices dangerous to security. An 
example of a screen with some of the discussed features is in Figure 44. It is our belief 
that this application is a starting point for discussion on moving BYOD and ship’s 
security from a future discussion to a reality.  
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Figure 44.  An example of a more developed application screen 
 
This model of an application home screen takes into consideration how the device would 
look to a sailor if the future work recommendations were implemented. All of the 
features discussed for future work are implementable and, with policy, create a useful 
application for sailor’s operating on Android smart devices.  
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